Zbigniew ZIELONKA[*]

MULTINATIONAL DIVISION CENTRAL - SOUTH TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (SELECTED ISSUES)

The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was an internal G-3 cell of the Multinational Division Central-South Headquarters. The TOC consisted of three different structures: the TOC Branch (from Operations), the extended TOC and some officers "On call" from other HQ's divisions and specialised branches. As a center serving 24 hours 7 days a week, it ensured continuous monitoring and assessment of current operations, control of the actions taken by subordinate formations and kept the commander and staff apprised of the current situation in the area of responsibility.

The author of the article presents tasks and responsibilities of the division level operations center and its function in Multinational Division Central- South activity in the Republic of Iraq during the 10th Polish Rotation. Based on own observations and mission experience, standard operating procedures , the author shows the TOC structure, responsibilities of functional members and the reporting system, which is commonly used in multinational structures.

Key words: *Tactical Operations Center, Multinational Division Central – -South, Polish Military Contingent in Iraq*

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the decision of the President of the Republic of Poland of 6 June 2003 on the participation of the Polish Military Contingent (PMC) in Iraq as part of Coalition Forces (CF)[1] and after the transfer of authority from US forces on 3 September 2003, the Polish Army took responsibility for the central-south part of Iraq. This is

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[*]   kpt. mgr inż. Zbigniew ZIELONKA – Instytut Dowodzenia Wyższej Szkoły Oficerskiej Wojsk Lądowych

[1]   *Postanowienie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dn. 6 czerwca 2003 roku o użyciu Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w składzie Międzynarodowych Sił Stabilizacyjnych w Republice Iraku*, [in:] „Monitor Polski rok 2003", nr 30, poz. 410 z dn. 09.06.2003 r.

how the most important mission of the Polish Military undertaken after WW2 commenced, which lasted five years.

Poland, as "a lead nation", created the Multinational Division Central-South (MND CS) with 24 contingents from 24 countries[2]. The number of contingents and troops kept changing in accordance with tasks, decreasing the area of responsibility (AOR), from 8,500 to 1,200 soldiers from 9 contingents at the moment of the division dissolution on 4 October 2008. Within 10 rotations of the PMC, approx. 15,000 Polish soldiers served in the MND CS. During 5 years of the MND CS activity, its structure and mission's nature was undergoing alterations a number of times.

This article is an attempt to present, among other things, the functions and tasks of the tactical operations center (TOC) within the multinational division of MND CS TOC during the 10th Polish Rotation.

1. MND CS TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER

The MND CS Tactical Operations Center as an internal G-3 cell was one of the rare cells whose main tasks and responsibilities remained unchanged in the whole period of MND CS existence[3]. As the center serving 24/7 and 12/24, it ensured continuous monitoring and assessment of current operations, controlled the actions taken by subordinate formations in accordance with (IAW) MND CS CDR's decisions and kept the commander and the staff posted on the current situation in the AOR[4].

The TOC accomplished its mission by performing the following tasks[5]:

- Monitoring and assessing current operations;
- Reacting IAW situation development, especially in emergency situations where a quick decision was required to avoid danger to troops;
- Monitoring the situation, location, status and actions of own/other forces in the AOR;
- Providing and coordinating inputs for Warning and Fragmentary Orders for subordinate formations and conducting the staffing of these;
- Providing updated briefings as required (IAW Battle Rhythm);
- Maintaining close contact with Liaison Officers;
- Monitoring and assessing incoming/outgoing information; the TOC maintained the TOC INCIDENTS LOGBOOK on the net, in a folder on a shared drive, which was accessible to all members of the HQ Staff;

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[2] R. Strzelecki, *Lessons Learned: Multinational Division Central-South,* [in:] "Military Review", November – December 2005, pp. 32.

[3] This article is a compilation of MND CS TOC documents being in force during the 9th and 10th Polish rotation and the author's experience as a Reporting Officer and Senior Watch Officer in MND CS TOC during the 10th Polish Rotation.

[4] A. Tyszkiewicz, *Doświadczenia i wnioski z przygotowania i udziału I zmiany Dywizji Międzynarodowej w misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku,* [w] „Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych", dodatek do nr 8, Warszawa 2004, pp. 30.

[5] *Headquarters Multinational Division Central-South, MND CS Operational Order 008-1: SOP – Tactical Operations Center*, Divaniyah, Iraq, February 2008.

- Conducting the planning process if execution of the operation did not exceed 24 hrs[6];
- Preparing proposals to resolve problems that could affect current operations;
- Keeping all TOC members informed of critical incidents as soon as possible (ASAP);
- Managing reports and returns with higher, lower and adjacent HQs;
- Monitoring aviation situations in the AOR, managing airspace and calling for air support if necessary.


Fig. 1. Multinational Division Central – South Staff structure during 10th Polish Rotation

1 - Chief of Staff; 2 - Deputy Chief of Staff; 3 - Human Intelligence; 4 - Communications Intelligence; 5 - Liaison Officers; 6 - Psychological Operations; 7 - Information Operations; 8 – Force Protection; 9 – Air Operations; 10 – Iraqi Security Forces; 11 – Military Transition Team; 12 – Engineering Division; 13 - Provincial Joint Cooperation Center; 14 – Multinational Logistics Command; 15 – Communications Security; 16 – Automated Data Processing; 17 – Civil-Military Cooperation.

Source: Own development based on OPORD 008-1 and MND CS TOC UPDATE presentation

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[6] MND CS executed the planning process in two ways: deliberate planning and quick decision-making process (QDMP). The TOC was responsible for QDMP and the Planning Board (with planning officers from proper G division) for long-term planning. Source: Z. Antczak, *The Multinational Division: Is it viable in Peace Enforcement Operations?* Strategy research Project, U.S. Army War College, Pennsylvania 2005, pp. 10.

The TOC cooperated while executing the above tasks with:

- the Joint Operations Centre of Multinational Corps – Iraq (MNC-I JOC);
- the 8th Division Iraqi Army Tactical Operations Center (8 Div IA TOC);
- MND CS units and cells;
- The Health Service and Logistic Branch in case of emergency (ICE) (evacuation of wounded or killed soldiers).

2. MND CS TOC STRUCTURE

The TOC structure was modified and developed according to current needs. During the 9th and 10th rotations of PMC, the TOC was made up of three different structures: the TOC Branch, the extended TOC, and finally some officers "on call" from other HQ divisions and specialised branches, which did not have a permanent representative on the functional TOC[9].

TOC branch members were[10]:

(1) TOC Chief;

(2) Clerk;

(3) Three shifts, each one consisted of:

    (a) Chief of Operations **(CHOPS)**;

    (b) Senior Watch Officer **(SWO)**;

    (c) Reporting Officer **(REP OFF)**;

    (d) Information Officer **(INFO OFF)**;

    (e) Pol-Arab interpreter.

TOC functional members were:

(1) Air Operations **(AIR OPS)** Officer;

(2) Patient Evacuation Team Watch Officer **(PET WO)**;

(3) 8th Division Iraqi Army Liaison Officer **(8th Div IA LNO)**;

(4) Multinational Corps - Iraq **(MNC-I C-2 LNO)**;

(5) MNC-I **C-3 LNO**;

(6) Integrated Base Defense Security System Watch Officer **(IBDSS WO)**;

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[9]   *SOP – Tactical Operations Center*, op. cit.

[10] Typical US Army TOC personnel, responsibilities and duties are slightly others:

    (1) Executive Officer **(XO)** – synchronizes and coordinates the efforts of all staff sections;

    (2) Battle Captain – assists the XO in synchronizing the staff's effort;

    (3) Operations NCO/Shift NCO – ensures logistics support, movement and security of the TOC;

    (4) Radio Telephone Operators **(RTOs)**/Clerk Typist – monitors the radios, receives and records reports, assists in the publication of orders and graphics, etc.

    Source: *Tactical Operations Center (TOC)*, Newsletter no. 95-7, [online]. [Dostęp: 07.10.2009], Dostępny w Internecie: www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library /report/call/call_95-7_4wd.htm.

(7) Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Watch Officer (**C-RAM WO**).

MULTINATIONAL DIVISION CENTRAL - SOUTH	TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER

MND CS TOC ORGANIZATION

TOC CHIEF
Clerk

Three shifts, each one consisted of:
1. CHOPS;
2. SWO;
3. REP OFF;
4. INFO OFF;
5. (Pol-Arab) Interpreter.

TOC functional members:
1. AIR OPS Officer;
2. PET WO;
3. 8th Div IA LNO;
4. MNC-I C-2 LNO;
5. MNC-I C-3 LNO;
6. IBDSS WO;
7. C-RAM WO.

Officers "On call:
1. G-1 representative for rotation movements;
2. G-2 WO;
3. G-4 WO;
4. G-6 WO;
5. G-7 WO;
6. G-9 WO;
7. ENGDIV WO;
8. MNLC representative for rotation movements;
9. PMO representative;
10. PIO representative;
11. INFO OPS representative;
12. NBC Defence expert;
13. FP Officer;
14. PSYOPS representative;
15. POL SOT LNO;
16. US SF LNO.

Fig. 2. MND CS Tactical Operations Center organisation

Source: R. Tyszko, Z. Zielonka (based on MND CS TOC UPDATE presentation)

Officers "On call" who were present in the TOC when the situation called for their advice:

(1) **G-1 representative** for rotation movements;

(2) G-2 Watch Officer **(G-2 WO)**;

(3) G-4 Watch Officer **(G-4 WO)**;

(4) G-6 Watch Officer **(G-6 WO)**;

(5) G-7 Watch Officer **(G-7 WO)**;

(6) G-9 Watch Officer **(G-9 WO)**;

(7) Engineering Division Watch Officer **(ENGDIV WO)**;

(8) Multinational Logistics Command **(MNLC) representative** for rotation movements;

(9) Provost Marshal Office **(PMO) representative**;

(10) Public Information Office **(PIO) representative**;

(11) Information Operations **(INFO OPS) representative**;

(12) **NBC Defence expert**;

(13) Force Protection **(FP) Officer**;

(14) Psychological Operations **(PSYOPS) representative**;

(15) Special Operations Team **(POL SOT) LNO**;

(16) Special Forces **(US SF) LNO**.

3. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY PERSONNEL

TOC CHIEF was responsible for organisation, supervision and control of appropriate work of all TOC personnel. He was directly subordinated to G-3 Chief and executed his tasks through Chief of Operations (CHOPS). TOC CHIEF supervised operational situations in the AOR and information flow as well as reacted in a way appropriate to the situation, IAW Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and orders[11].

CHOPS was directly subordinated to the MND CS TOC Chief, managed personnel appointed for daily/nightly TOC shift including permanent staff of the TOC organisational structure, functional members of TOC and "on call" members.
CHOPS was responsible for supervision and coordination of TOC shift activities, specifically he was ready at any time to[12]:

− Assess the current situation and make appropriate recommendations to the TOC Chief or higher superiors, including Commanding General (CG);

− Coordinate subordinate forces to support the mission, and when authorized, release messages pertaining to the operation that did not establish, or modify the policy;

− Coordinate the development of the operations with the TOC staff representatives and brief the Current Situation Assessment (CSA) for ongoing operations;

− React, using all available assets, according to situation development and established procedures, especially in an emergency situation, when a quick decision was required;

− Monitor incoming messages and take appropriate action if necessary. He was also responsible for the coordination of TOC update briefings, and activation of the Crisis Action Team (CAT).

Moreover, in case of loss of communiation with troops operating in the MND CS AOR, CHOPS could send helicopters to support troops' activities and ensure communication with them.

SWO, as the main CHOPS collaborator, was the director of all activities performed by the TOC as the whole organization. He was responsible for the efficient activity of TOC during his shift, including control of personnel appointed to work in the TOC and their tasks, revising incoming messages and taking appropriate action if necessary. Additionally, SWO was obligated to maintain the higher and MND CS HQs appraisal of the current situation, and keep subordinate units informed of any circumstances that could have an operational impact in their AOR.

In the performance of his duties, SWO would record every action taken in the TOC by using the "LOGBOOK" of the following format:

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[11] *SOP – Tactical Operations Center*, op. cit.

[12] Ibidem.

MND CS TOC SWO – CAPT. ZIELONKA Zbigniew
010800CJUN09 – 012000CJUN09

UNIT	TIME	DESCRIPTION	ACTION TAKEN	END STATE
TF LYNX	010900CJUN09	On 010900CJUN09 PJCC LNO in Ad DIWANIYAH reported that on 010815CJUN09 two (2) policemen were attacked with SAF in Hospital in ASH SHAMIYAH /38R MA 71992 46411/. Two (2) policemen were wounded. No damages were reported.		2 x ISF WIA

Fig. 3. An example of LOGBOOK's format

UNIT: The unit/person that reports an incident or asks for support
TIME: When the SWO gets the information
DESCRIPTION: Short summary of what has happened or been requested
ACTION TAKEN: Short summary of actions taken, orders given and information passed to other officers in the HQ or other units.
END STATE: To fill when the situation has been solved, explaining how it has been finished.

Source: Own development based on MND CS SOP – REPORTING SYSTEM

REPORTING OFFICER was subordinated directly to the CHOPS. He prepared and executed (by using logbooks) reports according to the Reporting System[13] between MND CS HQ, developed reports to higher level superiors, developed daily CDR's Situation Reports (SITREPs).

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[13] Reporting System included ***Routine Reports*** and ***Required Reports***:

ROUTINE REPORTS covered specific time periods on a periodic basis. These reports were addressed and submitted in a standard way, IAW appropriate SOP. The main way of delivering the reports was Centrixs. Because the addresses in this system were related to the name of the users and not to a Branch or to an organization, each branch used to develop its own procedure to assure that the message was delivered to the proper person on time. Although the Centrixs was the main way of sending messages, alternative channels were arranged. In case of a failure of Centrixs the order of the alternative procedures was: radio; telephone; fax.

REQUIRED REPORTS sent either because of a request of the higher echelon or because of the need of sending information that had to be reported urgently, or it was not suitable to routine reports. In this case, the report was sent to the appropriate branch or the Liaison Officer. If it was an urgent message, it used to be reported by the fastest device e.g. telephone, aside from sending a written report by Centrixs, (ASAP). Source: *Headquarters Multinational Division Central – South, MND CS Operational Order 008-1:SOP – Reporting System,* Divaniyah, Iraq, February 2008.

According to the Reporting System, in cooperation and coordination with the TOC Staff Representatives, REP OFF would prepare and send with CHOPS' approval to the dissemination by INFO OFF the following TOC products[14]:

(1) COMMANDER'S DAILY SITREP;

(2) Input to OPERATIONAL BATTLE UPDATE FOR MNC-I (BUA);

(3) OPERATIONAL SUMMARY(24h and 12h);

(4) QRF & RESERVE FORCES READINESS REPORT;

(5) FIELD MESSAGE (FM) - *if the situation required*;

(6) SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT (SIR);

(7) OPS STORY BOARD;

(8) TOP TEN REPORT;

(9) CONVOY/PATROL/ESCORT REPORT;

(10) TROOP TO TASK REPORT (T2T);

(11) WEEKLY UPDATE FOR G3 CHIEF;

(12) MORNING ASSESSMENT REPORT;

(13) IED REPORTS (IED SPOT REPORT and IED POST PATROL DEBRIEF);

(14) THE ATTACKS AND EVENTS (TACSAT);

(15) SPOT REPORT (SPOTREP);

(16) INDIRECT FIRE REPORT (IDFR);

(17) LOGBOOK - *in cooperation with SWO*;

(18) WEEKLY REPORT TO MILITARY ASSISTANT;

(19) TOC WEEKLY UPDATE;

(20) DRILL DOWN PRESENTATION;

(21) SNIPER ACTIVITY;

(22) MONTHLY REPORT TO G3 CHIEF;

(23) SPECIAL UPDATE BRIEFINGS;

(24) INCIDENT LIST;

(25) WEEKLY UPDATE OF MND CS ACTIVITIES FOR MNC-I;

(26) FRAGMENTARY ORDER (FRAGO) – *if required, in cooperation with SWO and CHOPS;*

(27) QRF REQUEST- *if the situation required, in cooperation with SWO;*

(28) INPUT TO „MELDUNEK O SYTUACJI W POLSKIM KONTYNGENCIE WOJSKOWYM W IRAKU";

(29) POST OP SUMMARY STORY BOARD;

(30) Input to „MELDUNEK TYGODNIOWY DOWÓDCY MND CS";

(32) AIR MISSION REQUEST - *if the situation required, in cooperation with SWO;*

(33) AIR SUPPORT REQUEST - *if the situation required, in cooperation with SWO;*

(34) MEDEVAC/CASEVAC REQUEST - *if the situation required, in cooperation with SWO;*

(35) EOD REQUEST- *if the situation required, in cooperation with SWO.*

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[14] *Headquarters Multinational Division Central – South, MND CS Operational Order 008-1: MND CS SOP – Reporting System,* Divaniyah, Iraq, February 2008.

SPOTREP 001

From: MND CS
To: MNC-I
DTG: 240930CJUN09
AS OF: 240815CJUN09

INFO: SAF

  a) MND CS

  b) On 240900CJUN09 PJCC LNO in Ad DIWANIYAH reported that on 240815CJUN09 two (2) policemen were attacked with SAF in Hospital in ASH SHAMIYAH, grid /38R MA 71992 46411/. Two (2) policemen were wounded. No damages were reported. No more information has been given so far.

  c) 2 x ISF WIA.

  d) No influence.

  e) None.

CHOPS TOC
MAJ GABRYCH Miroslaw

Fig. 4. An example of SPOT REPORT

Source: Own development based on MND CS SOP – REPORTING SYSTEM

QRF REQUEST FORM

1.   **LOCATION OF INCIDENT** (*Grid + name closest city, road and direction*)
   FOUR KM NORTH AS SUADYR (38R MA 9521)
2. **REINFORCEMENT REQUEST** (*Info about needs*)
   SEARCH FOR THE SPOT
3. **CALL SIGN** (*at hot spot*)
   99400 UHF / 099245 (HARRIS) JAGUAR
4. **TARGET DESCRIPTION** (Description: *what the target is;* Composition: *number of elements*; Activity: *what the elements are doing*)
   POSSIBLE CACHE - 13 ROCKETS / 2 LAUNCHERS
5. **TARGET LOCATION** (*Describe where a target is in relation to convoy or unit under fire using geographic directions as reference*)
   NONE
6. **TYPE OF TARGET MARKING** (*pyrotechnic signal – colour, tracers etc.*)
   NONE
7. **IDENTIFICATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES** (Size: *aprox. number of elements;* Marking of friendly forces: *smoke signal – colour, panel etc.*)
   RADIO SIGNAL
8. **REMARKS AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION** (*as appropriate*)
   - 13 ROCKETS AND 2 LAUNCHERS ARE STOCKPILED APPROX. FOUR KILOMETERS NORTH
       OF AS SUDAYR //38RMA9521/ . THE WEAPONS CACHE IS APPROX. 10 METERS WEST OF A
    MOSQUE
          LOCATED BETWEEN AS SUDAYR AND AD DIWANIYAH, APPROX. 150 METERS
          EAST OF A RIVER NAMED SHATT AD DIWANIYAH. NO FURTHER INFORMATION.
   FROM 2000 TO 2100 RECCE FLIGHT WAS CONDUCTED ABOVE THE POINTED SPOT – NSTR.-
   - POSSIBLE IP, IA PATROLS PRESENCE IN THE AOI,
   - ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AOI – HAS NOT OBSERVED, UNKNOWN.
   - NO CF TROOPS IN THE SPOT.

JAGUAR, JAGUAR, JAGUAR

CHOPS TOC
MAJ GABRYCH Miroslaw

Fig. 5. An example of QRF REQUEST FORM

Source: Own development based on MND CS SOP – REPORTING SYSTEM

INFO OFFICER was directly subordinated to the CHOPS. He was responsible for appropriate selection, terminable distribution and saving of all information (reports) to and from MND CS TOC. Most of the information was incoming to the TOC from subordinate formations or other external and internal sources. In order to organise and publish the information, INFO OFF used Web technology (Centrixs). He cooperated strictly with REP OFF, SWO and CHOPS.

TOC functional members and officers "On call" (LNOs) were subordinated to theirs commanders, but functionally during the shift in TACON to CHOPS. They assisted in coordinating activities throughout the AOR, advised CHOPS/SWO in use of subordinate units and monitored their status. They ensured communications and exchange of information between subunits/branches they were from and the MND CS TOC.

According to the requirements, TOC functional members had to be officers in the rank from captain to lieutenant colonel, with good English command (2222 – 3333), experience of working in NATO structures and who completed high specialist course or, in case of TOC Chief and SWO, post-diploma operational and tactical studies.

The majority of the above requirements were fulfilled during the 10th rotation. Everyone knew English at least at the 2222 level and some TOC members had a mission experience. However, there were some difficulties in understanding American soldiers because of American English, especially military language, full of abbreviations used in speech and writing. Presumably, for the majority of Polish soldiers, some reports in the Reporting System were quite unusual, as these reports were mostly familiar to soldiers with mission experience only.


Fig. 6. MND CS Tactical Operations Center layout during X Polish Rotation

1 - A global data network enterprise used by US, coalition and allied forces to share classified operational and intelligence information, region-to-region, for combined planning, unity of effort, and decision superiority in peacekeeping and contingency operations; 2 - Polish tactical communication system; 3 - Defense switching network; 4 - Voice over Internet Protocol; 5 - Data-packet-network; 6 - Intelligence; 7 - Operations; 8 - Task Force; 9 - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle; 10 - Crisis Action Team; 11 - Camp Commander; 12 - Communication and Information System.

Source: R. Tyszko, Z. Zielonka (based on MND CS TOC UPDATE presentation)

4. INFORMATION FLOW

Managing information flow was one of the principal functions of the TOC. In order to ensure that the actions were timely and appropriate, the TOC disseminated information rapidly through its functional area representatives to all functional areas required to execute or support a particular action, and to subordinate commanders if needed[15]. The Chief Operations used to apply the most effective mechanisms to sustain situation awareness across the members of the TOC. The mechanisms included[16]:

- – Voice announcements within the centre;
- – Person-to-person info exchanges;
- – Map boards;
- – Electronic Journals;
- – Computer network, common drive databases and reports format;
- – Radio/telephone communications;
- – Presentations;
- – Hardcopies.

As an ordinary procedure, when something significant happened in the MND CS AOR, the SWO informed the personnel in the TOC what the situation was, in this way every watch officer could start working on the solution of the event. After that, the SWO would do the following things[17]:

(1) Alert the units or HQ personnel who needed to know;

(2) Study the situation with the support of TOC experts on the subject;

(3) Take appropriate action, including PET, QRF, MEDEVAC alert, or unit he foresaw could have the capacity to solve the situation;

(4) Keep informed of all action taken to CHIEF OPS / SWO, and others HQs involved;

(5) Maintain a visual presentation of the current status of the event, using the projector and the map;

(6) Report to MNC-I, when the situation was finished.

5. INTERNAL BATTLE RHYTHM & BRIEFINGS

The Watch Post of the TOC maintained a 24 hours watch, operating in three 12 hour shifts. The battle rhythm in the TOC was fulfilled according to appropriate procedures and documents: i.e. MND CS SOP – Battle Rhythm, Tactical Operations, Information Flow, Reporting System. Therefore schedule of work was as follows: the day shift started at 0800 local time (LT) and the night shift started at 2000LT; handover periods of 30 minutes duration overlapped the shift periods between 0730LT and 0800LT and between 1930LT and 2000LT.

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[15] *Headquarters Multinational Division Central – South, MND CS Operational Order 008-1: MND CS SOP – Information Flow,* Divaniyah, Iraq, February 2008.

[16] *SOP – Tactical Operations Center*, op. cit.

[17] Ibidem.

The time after duty (next 24 hours) was divided into two periods:

a) 12 hours out of duty (time for rest);

b) 12 hours on call.

Although every TOC member had to be prepared to provide a situation update over his designated area of interest at any given time, there were some procedures ensuring appropriate information flow:

‒ HANDOVER PROCEDURES (TOC MORNING/EVENING UPDATE)[18]: The TOC handover and update comprised of two parts: a collective briefing and an individual update. A collective one, 30 minutes update, was conducted either as a by-product of the daily CDR morning update, or as a stand alone TOC internal update according to schedule:

(1) Location: MND CS TOC

(2) Time:

   (a) In the morning: 0730LT to 0800LT

   (b) In the evening: 1930LT to 2000LT

(3) Participation / Organization:

   (a) Chairman: CHOPS

   (b) OPR[19]: SWO

   (c) Participation: TOC shifts

(4) Products developed: Power Point presentation

(5) Timeline/Coordination:

   (a) NLT[20] 0700 (1900) LT – Slides from all contributors were sent electronically to Reporting Officer by Centrixs

   (b) 0700-0720 (1900-1920) LT – SWO reviewed all slides

(6) Agenda:

SITUATION	RESPONSIBILITY	TIME
1. INTSUM[21] events in MNC-I theatre - last 24 hrs 2. Assessment of the situation in MND CS AOR	G-2 LNO	3 min.
1. Significant events last 12 hrs in MND CS AOR 2. Activities of the 8th IA DIV in MND CS AOR 3. Documents received and issued during last 12 hrs 4. Activities for the next 24 hrs	SWO	3 min.
1. Mission accomplished - last 24 hrs 2. Planned missions for next 48 hrs 3. HELO status 4. Weather forecast	AIR OPS	2 min.

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[18] *SOP – Tactical Operations Center*, op. cit.

[19] Officer Primary Responsibility.

[20] Not Later Than.

[21] Intelligence Summary.

SITUATION	RESPONSIBILITY	TIME
Guidance for further TOC activities	COS / DCOS OPS / G-3 CHIEF	2 min.
HANDOVER Procedures		20 min.

The individual update required that every individual TOC member had to brief his counterpart and hand over the responsibilities in a maximum of 20 minutes. The main focus of the individual handover was:

(1) Review of last 24 hours significant events (incident list);

(2) Ongoing events;

(3) Upcoming key events next 24 hours;

(4) Upcoming tasks;

(5) Preparation for briefings/meetings (Battle Rhythm).

– DCOS UPDATES: Senior Watch Officer used to prepare the current OPS portion of the CDR Daily Updates. His 2 minute presentation was based on situational slides put together by individual TOC Officers as per the format of Operational Summary.

The briefing cycle was outlined in the Daily Event Schedule (attachment to SOP) as MND CS BATTLE RHYTHM. The content and participation in these briefings were coordinated by the Senior Watch Officer in consultation with the Chief of Operations. Input to any briefings was required from TOC members NLT 1 hour before the scheduled briefing got started. The slides were collected by the Reporting Officer, approved by the Chief of Operations and forwarded to the briefing computer NLT 30 minutes prior to the scheduled respective briefing.

CONCLUSIONS

MND CS Tactical Operations Center served as the unit's command and control hub, assisting the commander in synchronizing operations. The TOC was the location where the majority of the planning, staff coordination, and monitoring of key events have occurred. The personnel manning the TOC were responsible for ensuring that all resources were in the right place at the right time. They had to function efficiently and effectively as team in a fast-paced, unforgiving environment[22].

Five years of Polish-led multinational division's activity confirmed that the MND CS TOC was the best placed organisation in MND CS HQ to provide a quick response and to tackle many events in a short period of time. In other words, it managed the division in fact[23]. Attacks against coalition forces, Indirect Fire alert, MEDEVAC and other events were solved just by the TOC.

During the preparations of Polish Military Contingents, the attention was put on training, cooperation and improving commands, headquarters and tactical operations centers. However, not from the beginning proper attention was paid to TOC - HQ's ele-

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[22] *Tactical Operations Center (TOC)*, Newsletter no. 95-7, op. cit.

[23] A. Tyszkiewicz, *Doświadczenia Wojsk Lądowych*, [w] „Trudna Stabilizacja" – materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej z inicjatywy i pod patronatem Ministra Obrony Narodowej, AON 2004, pp. 144.

ment, which existed on each level of command. At the start of Iraqi mission, G-3 TOC was organised hastily, mainly based on officers from other HQ's cells. This fact had an adverse impact on effectiveness of many rotations, in the first months at least[24].

Success of MND CS TOC during the 10th, last Polish Rotation was connected with conclusions (lessons learned) based on common problems that had taken place before, providing training under realistic conditions for all TOC personnel. Without doubt, personal matching in accordance with requirements, former mission and TOC work experience among TOC officers was significant to the quality of task execution. Moreover, for 9 months of the 10th rotation (approx. 200 combat tasks), a team of calm and confident in their job officers was created. In spite of falling into a routine and appearance of tiredness, they became and remained specialists until the very last day of TOC and MND CS activity. Using standardised reactions (worked out during 5 years of presence in the Iraqi theatre of operation and as an effect of some vital experiences) to deal with permanently changing situation produced excellent results. Success of the Tactical Operations Center was the success of the whole Multinational Division Central–South.

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[24] M. Prudzienica, *Przygotowanie, organizacja i funkcjonowanie sztabu Wielonarodowej Dywizji Centrum-Południe*, [in:] „Irak 2006 – osłona młodej demokracji" – materiały z konferencji naukowej, AON 2006, pp. 38