Designing Auctions: A Historical Perspective

• Autorzy: Karpowicz M.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Auction is a form of organization of competition that leads to the assignment and valuation of resources based on the information obtained from the competing agents. From the perspective of systems science it is a distributed resource allocation algorithm applied in the environment with information asymmetry, i.e., where the interconnected and interacting subsystems have different information about the system as a whole. This paper presents an overview of the historical development of mathematical theory underlying modern approach to auction design. Selected practical applications of the theory are also discussed.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

auctions; game theory; mechanism design

• Wydawca: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
• Czasopismo: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
• Rocznik: 2011
• Tom: nr 3
• Strony: 114--122
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 109 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Karpowicz M.

• Research Academic Computer Network (NASK), Wąwozowa st 18, 02-796 Warsaw, Poland,

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