Coordination Games with Communication Costs in Network Environments

• Autorzy: Nishizaki I. , Hayashida T. , Hara N.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this paper, we deal with a coordination game in a network where a player can choose both an action of the game and partners for playing the game. In particular, a player interacts with players connecting through a path consisting of multiple links as well as with players directly connecting by a single link. We represent decay or friction of payoffs with distance as communication costs, and examine the effect of the communication cost on behavior of players in the game and network formation. We investigate properties of equilibrium networks by classifying the link cost and the communication cost, and show diversity of the equilibrium networks.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

communication costs; coordination games; equilibrium; networks

• Wydawca: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
• Czasopismo: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
• Rocznik: 2010
• Tom: nr 2
• Strony: 88--98
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 14 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Nishizaki I.

autor

Hayashida T.

autor

Hara N.

• Department of Electrical, Systems, and Mathematical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Hiroshima University, 1-4-1, Kagamayama, Higashi-Hiroshima, 739-8527, Japan,

Bibliografia

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