Pricing Rules Comparison in the Context of Bandwidth Trade

• Autorzy: Pałka P. , Toczyłowski E.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this paper we compare two pricing rules in the context of bandwidth trade. Allocation and pricing rules, together with a set of signals received from independent agents, constitute a market mechanism. In the paper we analyze two pricing rules: well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves rule (VCG) and the parametric pricing rule (PPR).We apply these pricing rules to the allocation rule specified by the balancing communication bandwidth trade model (BCBT).

Słowa kluczowe

EN

communication bandwidth trade; mechanism design; pricing rule

• Wydawca: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
• Czasopismo: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
• Rocznik: 2010
• Tom: nr 2
• Strony: 61--66
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 17 poz., tab., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Pałka P.

autor

Toczyłowski E.

• Institute of Control and Computation Engineering, Warsaw University of Technology, Nowowiejska st 15/19, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland,

Bibliografia

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