Two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a priori unions

• Autorzy: Alonso-Meijide J. M. , Casas-Mendez B. , Fiestras-Janeiro G. , Holler M. J.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper introduces two variations of the Public Good Index (Holler, 1982) for games with a priori unions. The first one stresses the public good property which suggests that all members of a winning coalition derive equal power. The second variation follows earlier work on the integration of a priori unions (Owen, 1977 and 1982) and refers to essential subsets of an a priori union when allocating power shares. Axiomatic characterizations of both indices are discussed. Numerical examples, one of them taken from a political setting, illustrate the new power indices presented in this paper.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

simple game; coalition structure; Public Good Index

• Wydawca: Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Control and Cybernetics
• Rocznik: 2010
• Tom: Vol. 39, no 3
• Strony: 839--855
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 31 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Alonso-Meijide J. M.

autor

Casas-Mendez B.

autor

Fiestras-Janeiro G.

autor

Holler M. J.

• Department of Statistics and Operations Research, University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain

Bibliografia

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