Supertypes of voters in a model of general elections

• Autorzy: Ekes M.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The paper examines a model of general elections with electorate composed of infinitely many voters classified into a finite number of types. We focus on the problem of aggregation of different types of voters into supertypes for two cases of voting: with and without the possibility of abstention.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

general elections; preference-indifference relations; supertypes of voters

• Wydawca: Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Control and Cybernetics
• Rocznik: 2008
• Tom: Vol. 37, no 3
• Strony: 607--615
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 4 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Ekes M.

• Warsaw School of Economics Al. Niepodleglości 162, 02-554 Warszawa, Poland,

Bibliografia

• EKES, M. (1999) Models of economy with infinitely many consumers and producers classified into a finite number of types. Thesis (in Polish), Warsaw School of Economics.
• EKES, M. (2003) General elections modelled with infinitely many voters. Control and Cybernetics 32, 163-173.
• WIECZOREK, A. (2004) Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets. Applicationes Mathematicae 31, 79-96.
• WISZNIEWSKA-MATYSZKIEL, A. (2002) Discrete time dynamic games with a continuum of players I: decomposable games. International Game Theory Review 4(3), 331-342.