Secure Docking Station and its protection against hardware attacks

• Autorzy: Fournaris A. P. , Fournier J. , Hein D. , Reymond G.

Warianty tytułu

PL

Moduł Secure Docking Station oraz jego ochrona przed atakami sprzętowymi

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Security and Trust in communication systems where very sensitive information are exchanged is achieved and retained through hardware means. In the SECRICOM project where seamless, interoperable crisis management communication is required, we have developed a security and trust managements mechanism based on a smart card like hardware structure called Secure Docking Module (SDM). However, given the highly secure and hostile environment (emergency, crisis situation) where the SDM needs to function, this security module can be the subject of many attacks. While cryptanalytic attacks on the SDM security are impossible due to the employed strong cryptographic algorithms, attacks targeting the SDM implementation constitute a pragmatic threat that cannot be neglected. In this paper, we address possible hardware issues of the SDM chip and focus on the Hardware attack protection mechanisms especially on the SDM RSA and AES cryptographic accelerators. We present the research work that was done through the SECRICOM project on the above issues and analyze the basic concept behind the protected RSA-AES structures that complement the SDM architecture. Those hardware structures are fully compatible with the SDM protocols and offer strong protection against hardware power attacks and fault attacks while retaining high performance characteristics.

PL

Bezpieczeństwo i zaufanie w systemach łączności, gdzie są przetwarzane informacje niejawne, jest zapewniane za pomocą rozwiązań sprzętowych. W projekcie SECRIOM, w którym jest wymagana interoperacyjna oraz "bezszwowa" łączność w zarządzaniu kryzysowym, wytworzono mechanizm zapewniania bezpieczeństwa oraz zaufania oparty na rozwiązaniu typu kart inteligentnych - Secure Docking Module (SDM). Biorąc jednak pod uwagę wysoki poziom zagrożenia środowiska łączności w sytuacjach kryzysowych, sam moduł SDM może być przedmiotem wielu ataków. Pomimo że ataki kryptoanalityczne na SDM są niemożliwe ze względu na zastosowane silne algorytmy kryptograficzne, zagrożenie wynikające z ataków na implementację SDM nie powinno być zaniedbywane. W artykule opisano możliwe problemy rozwiązań sprzętowych w chipie SDM oraz wyeksponowano mechanizmy zapobiegania atakom sprzętowym, szczególnie skierowanym na SDM RSA i akceleratory kryptograficzne AES. Zaprezentowano ponadto struktury RSA-AES, które uzupełniają architekturę SDM z punktu widzenia wzmocnienia ochrony. Te struktury sprzętowe są w pełni kompatybilne z protokołami w ramach SDM i oferują silną ochronę przed atakami fizycznymi, jednocześnie nie obniżają wysokich właściwości użytkowych.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

hardware; Security Module; Physical attacks; AES; RSA; security counter - measures

PL

mechanizm bezpieczeństwa; Secure Docking Module; SDM; atak sprzętowy

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego w Olsztynie
• Czasopismo: Technical Sciences / University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn
• Rocznik: 2012
• Tom: nr 15(1)
• Strony: 123--138
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 34 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Fournaris A. P.

autor

Fournier J.

autor

Hein D.

autor

Reymond G.

• Electrical and Computer Engineering Dpt, University of Patras, Rio Campus, Greec

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