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The dynamics of the distribution of co-authors

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Warianty tytułu
PL
Dynamika dystrybucji współautorów
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
In the present paper, the case of a database of scientific articles is described. There can be observed the quantitative effects of the increasing strength of cooperation between scholars. It is manifested in time-related features changes of the numbers distribution of a single co-authors’ article. The distribution of the number of co-authors of an article recorded in the database evolves with time from a profile with no more than one author to a profile with several authors. A social dilemma model is proposed to explain the dynamics of changes in the distribution of the number of co-authors. The most successful strategy of the three considered alternative strategies of cooperation is selected.
PL
W niniejszym artykule, na podstawie bazy artykułów naukowych, opisano ilościowy efekt wzrostu współpracy uczonych, która objawia się zmianami cech rozkładu liczby współautorów artykułu w czasie. Rozkład liczby współautorów artykułu dostępnego w bazie danych zmienia się w czasie z maksimum dla jednego autora do maksimum kilku autorów. Do wyjaśnienia dynamiki zmian rozkładu liczby współautorów zaproponowano model dylematu społecznego. Spośród trzech została wybrana jedna strategia współpracy odnosząca największe sukcesy.
Rocznik
Strony
85--103
Opis fizyczny
Bobliogr. 38 poz., wykr., wz.
Twórcy
  • Institute of Computer Science and Computer Mathematics, Jagiellonian University
autor
  • Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
autor
  • Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
  • Department of Automatics and Biomedical Engineering, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Automatics, Computer Science and Biomedical Engineering, AGH University of Science and Technology
  • Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
autor
  • Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
autor
  • Institute of Nuclear Physics, Polish Academy of Sciences
autor
  • Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
autor
  • Institute of Telecomputing, Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology
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Uwagi
PL
Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-adaba751-9d02-4170-94d4-71406556d053
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