Toehold purchase problem: a comparative analysis of two strategies

• Autorzy: Banakh I. , Banakh T. , Vovk M. , Trisch P.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Toehold purchase, defined here as purchase of one share in a firm by an investor preparing a tender offer to acquire majority of shares in it, reduces by one the number of shares this investor needs for majority. In the paper we construct mathematical models for the toehold and no-toehold strategies and compare the expected profits of the investor and the probabilities of takeover the firm in both strategies. It turns out that the expected profits of the investor in both strategies coincide. On the other hand, the probability of takeover the firm using the toehold strategy is considerably higher comparing to the no-toehold strategy. In the analysis of the models we apply the apparatus of incomplete Beta functions and some refined bounds for central binomial coefficients.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

toehold; tender offer; mixed strategy; takeover; beta function

• Wydawca: Polish Academy of Sciences, Branch in Lublin
• Czasopismo: ECONTECHMOD : An International Quarterly Journal on Economics of Technology and Modelling Processes
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: Vol. 4, No 1
• Strony: 3--10
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 21 poz., wz.

Twórcy

autor

Banakh I.

• Department of Functional Analysis Ya. Pidstryhach Institute for Applied Problems of Mechanics and Mathematics 3b Naukova Str., 79060 Lviv, Ukraine

autor

Banakh T.

• Institute of Mathematics, Jan Kochanowski University Swietokrzyska 15, 25-406 Kielce, Poland, and Department of Geometry and Topology, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv 1 Universytetska Str., 79000 Lviv, Ukraine

autor

Vovk M.

• Department of Higher Mathematics Institute of Applied Mathematics and Fundamental Sciences Lviv Polytechnic National University 12 Bandera str., 79013 Lviv, Ukraine
• [e-mail]

autor

Trisch P.

Bibliografia

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