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SOME PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS ON THE NOTION OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Summary. First, the text outlines the historical context of the evolution of the “social development” concept. It could be divided into four phases (the last one is still open). Second, we undertake an ontological analysis of this notion. It starts from the general notion of change and development, and ends with a tripartite typology of ideas labelled with the phrase “social development”. Third, we discuss the specific historical context in which the concepts of value and of axiology came to the fore. We try to demonstrate how this context is related with the evolution of the notion of social development. We end the text with remarks on intellectual and moral autonomy and on some conditions of public debates.

Keywords: change, development, social development, reflexivity, ontology, axiology.

KILKA FILOZOFICZNYCH UWAG O POJĘCIU ROZWOJU SPOŁECZNEGO

Streszczenie. Tekst ten, po pierwsze, zarysowuje historyczny kontekst ewolucji pojęcia „rozwój społeczny”. Można by ją podzielić na cztery fazy (ostatnia jest jeszcze otwarta). Po drugie, przeprowadzamy ontologiczną analizę tego pojęcia, która rozpoczyna się od ogólnego pojęcia zmiany i rozwoju, a kończy się trójelementową typologią idei związanych z frazą „rozwój społeczny”. Po trzecie, dyskutujemy szczególnie historyczny kontekst, w którym pojawiły się pojęcia wartości i aksjologii. Próbujemy pokazać, w jaki sposób kontekst ten jest powiązany z ewolucją pojęcia rozwoju społecznego. Kończymy tekst uwagami na temat intelektualnej i moralnej autonomii oraz na temat pewnych warunków debat publicznych.

Słowa kluczowe: zmiana, rozwój, rozwój społeczny, autorefleksyjność, ontologia, aksjologia.

1. Introduction

Quite recently (March 2014) the Committee “Poland 2000 Plus” of the Polish Academy of Sciences (responsible for the future-studies) organized a conference on “Information revolution and intellectual crisis”. One of the authors of the present text read at this conference a paper in which he analyzed the very concept of “intellectual crisis” (with the intention of turning it into at least *quasi*-operational term) and concluded that, assuming the outlined definition of this concept, one can maintain that hypothesis of ongoing intellectual crisis can be regarded as empirical one i.e. one open to verification or falsification. Of course, verification (or falsification) of an empirical hypothesis (especially if a complex one) calls for rather elaborate empirical studies. Since no systematic studies on intellectual crisis have been undertaken (or at least are not known to the present authors) no precise evaluation of the hypothesis in question can be offered. Nevertheless we risk a tentative evaluation (based on various personal observations, on piecemeal empirical studies etc.): the hypothesis is “essentially” true (“essentially” means here: it is very likely that – as result of more systematic empirical research – the hypothesis will have to be made more precise, supplied with reservations etc. but nevertheless its “core” will be preserved). As part and parcel of the contemporary intellectual crisis can be regarded a phenomenon/process that was metaphorically characterized as “balkanization of science” (or knowledge or culture). The process is dangerous not only (and even: not mainly) from the point of view of the “internal” interests of science (knowledge, culture): first of all it is dangerous from the point of view of the practical challenges generated by the process of globalization in general, and by the process of growing complexification of the global social/civilizational/natural system. In our opinion, one of the most important tasks of philosophy is to contribute to overcoming the above mentioned crisis by constructing models of the global system. (How the conceptual models which philosophy normally produces are to be compared/linked with the formal models necessary in computer modelling – it is an interesting question which cannot be debated here. It surely deserves profound analysis.) Constructing such models is a difficult task that should be undertaken by groups of philosophers rather than individual philosophers. But individuals can undertake partial tasks of delivering some, perhaps very small, elements of such (future) models.

The present text is just conceived of as an element of such a model. We are going to analyze the notion of social development – a notion which is both a theoretical category and a term of ideological/political language. We are not going to offer any arbitrarily constructed definition of this concept. We will rather try to understand how various intuitions, philosophical presuppositions, moral positions and ideological/political convictions related to this concepts result in its possible logical/methodological weaknesses. We will proceed in three steps. First, we are going to look at this concept from a historical perspective. Secondly,

we will try to identify the place it occupies in a network of ontological concepts. Thirdly, we are going to look at this notion as an axiological concept. Some final remarks will be formulated.

Completing these introductory remarks, let's stress that the area delimited by the title of this paper is rather vast. Therefore the paper is but a sketchy presentation of the results of its initial exploration. In spite of its character, this text should help to prepare longer and more systematic "expeditions" to this in various ways important territory.

2. The notion of social development in a historical perspective

We think that for proper and sufficiently profound understanding of a theoretical/philosophical concept analysis of its history is desirable. And not a narrow, "bibliographical"/"biographical" one, but a history presenting the social/cultural development of the context of a concept.

The history of the of the concept of social development can be very schematically (! – we do agree that other images of this history could be presented) into four phases: [1] 1650-1750, [2] 1750-1850, [3] 1850-1950, [4] 1950-?

As regards the first phase (1650-1750, approximately), which overlaps the time of early Enlightenment, to mention are the two most important processes: the rise of modern economics (mercantilism) and the rise of statistics (let's note the state-derived meaning of the word!). And Giambattista Vico in his *Scienza nuova* – starts a new branch of philosophy – philosophy of history (1725).

In the case of the second phase (1750-1850) the most important point is surely the social/cultural proliferation of the concept of progress (of course, already the Ancient Greeks..., but at least if we are taking into account the "real-world" significance of concepts and ideas, the role of mid-18th century in the popularization of "progress" is indisputable). And to be stressed is the role of French Revolution 1789 (even if we do not fully agree with Immanuel Wallerstein who maintains that the importance of this revolution consists mainly in the changes in geo-culture: in the "normalization" of social change). This period can be also regarded as crucial for the development of social sciences: classical economic (A. Smith, D. Ricardo), the beginnings of sociology (A. Comte, A. Quetelet) and of "scientific" (critical) history (L. Ranke). On the other hand, the development of philosophy of history: Voltaire who introduced in 1765 this term, Kant, Hegel, Comte, Marx...

The third period (1850-1950): We should speak first about intellectual developments linked with the names of Darwin, Spencer, and Marx (and Engels). The biological theory of evolution presented in 1859, and general theory of evolution Spencer outlined in 1858. From a perspective, the rise of Marx's historical materialism (popularized by F. Engels, especially

in his 1878 *Anti-Duhring*) plays a part in the same process in which – despite of all important differences – participate Darwin and Marx. Rather different events should also be mentioned: We think here about the development of statistical institutions (France – already in 1833, USA – 1903, in Poland – 1918...), and the development of various statistical ideas: of Francis Galton and Alfred Binet – psychometrical tests (e.g. IQ tests). But first of all we should speak here about Great Crash of 1929. One of the consequences of this was introduction of the accounting of national income (1934 – Simon Kuznets, 1971 Nobel in economy) which resulted in the development of the notion of Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

As regards the last period (started in 1945, no end of this period can be defined), we should speak about three processes: First, about the development of statistics: on one hand – scientific, on the other – institutional. Both developments resulted in enormous growth of “simple” and overworked data. Secondly, the development of mass media: radio, TV, press and – recently – Internet. This development was instrumental in making statistical data (particularly about GDP, levels of unemployment etc.) And third: the “third wave of democracy” (to avail of the phrase coined by S. Huntington) – started with the Portugal revolution of 1975, culminating in 1989, and more controversially continued in Georgia, Ukraine and Near East. In democratic societies statistics plays a special political role

Let’s comment these observations in a somewhat more theoretical way. To achieve this goal, we’d like to avail of some ideas developed by George Soros in his book *The Crisis of Global Capitalism*. (Let us note that G. Soros, though not a professional philosopher, studied under Karl R. Popper, has wide philosophical knowledge and combines it with his first-hand acquaintance with world economy, world finance in particular, and with the global politics. Thus his ideas deserve, in our opinions, to be appreciated by philosophers). Perhaps the most fundamental concept used by Soros in this book is that of “reflexivity” which “*occurs only when a situation has thinking participant*” [Soros: 31]. He stresses that – contrarily to what might be supposed – “[s]ocial phenomena are not always reflexive” [Soros: 31]. Further he sketches a “shoelace theory of history”. The somewhat ridiculous name given to this theory is justified in the following way: “*When a situation has thinking participants, the sequence of events does not directly from one set of facts to another; rather it connects facts to perception and perception to facts in a shoelace pattern. But history is a shoelace a very particular kind of shoelace. The two sides of the shoe are not made of the same material; indeed, only one side is material – the other consists of the ideas of participants*” [Soros: 60] Interestingly enough, Soros acknowledges that “*this shoelace theory of history is a kind of dialectic between our thoughts and reality. It can be interpreted as a synthesis of Hegel’s dialectic of ideas ad Marx’s dialectical materialism.*” [Soros: 60]

To put it very briefly: In the last two-three centuries human societies have undergone great many very profound social (civilizational, political etc.) transformations. Among them it has been the process of very radical deepening of self-reflection (deliberately using this

phrase “radical deepening” we want to stress that we are going to avoid both the supposition that before 18th century humanity totally lacked and self-reflection and the supposition that the 18th - 20th centuries faced but “smooth” growth of self-reflexivity.

3. Ontology of social development

It is quite interesting that you cannot find in (some?) encyclopedias of philosophy the entry “development” (it is so in the “Cambridge” one of Audi and the “Oxford” one of Hondereich; in Internet Stanford Encyklopedia of Philosophy there is an entry “developmental biology” but no – “development”) In spite of its popularity in political/media language, and the popularity in sciences of its various derivative forms (“economic development”, “developmental psychology” etc.) the general term has received rather little attention from philosophers; not so much as it – in our opinion – deserves. One of the (Let’s take as an example the very good textbook of Władysław Stróżewski “*Ontologia*” [“Ontology”]; it is completely devoted to “structural” problems, there is no chapter on “dynamical” aspects of reality/Being.) However, in 20th century philosophy we should mention Alfred N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.

Happily, in Polish philosophical literature we have found a text of Krajewski in which interesting and quite precise definition of development is given. Besides this definition, this text contains an elaborate debate on possible scope of application of this concept. We are going to summarize Krajewski’s the definitional considerations, referring the Reader, who is interested in this more substantial debate, to his text. Krajewski starts his analysis of this term with locating in a set of concepts: As most general (and perhaps “primitive”) regards the notion of interrelation (its denotation comprises both temporally ordered interrelations and structural/functional ones). “Eliminating” the structural interrelations he obtains the notion of movement (or change – these two notions he regards as coextensive). And finally, he is looking for a way of distinguishing development as a specific form of movement (change). Leaving aside his analyses, we will just cite their final result: the three alternative (complementary) versions of his definition. In the first formulation: “development – it is long lasting unidirectional structural change or monotonic sequence of the changes of a structure” [Krajewski: 25]. In the second: “development – it is an irreversible monotonic sequence of structural changes” [ibidem] In the third “ development – it is an irreversible spontaneous monotonic sequence of changes” [Krajewski:26]

Let’s look now to the textbook of Piotr Sztompka “*Socjologia*” [Sociology]. (Interestingly, five parts of these book, 18 chapters, are mainly devoted to structural/functional problems. Only the sixth part, the last seven chapters are devoted to the historical/dynamical issues.) He starts with the notion of change and distinguishes five types

of social change [Sztompka: 437-438]. Then he introduces the concept of social process [ibidem:438-440] and among other types distinguishes directional process [ibidem:439]. Afterwards, Sztompka introduces the notion of social development [ibidem: 440-441] which he subdivides – firstly – into unilinear and multilinear, and alternatively – into “continuous” and “leap”-development [ibidem:441] Finally, he introduces the notion of social progress. He defines progress as such a type of social development the direction of which is positively evaluated.[ibidem: 441-444] Finally, Sztompka summarizes his consideration presenting a nice table. Vertically, the sequence of sociological concepts (from most general to most particular) is presented: change, process, trend (directional process), development, progress. Horizontally, the list of definitional traits is presented: temporal difference, sequence of temporal changes, direction, endogenous change, realization of accepted values [ibidem: 442] - Sztompka presents these notion in clear, well-ordered well. Still, as we have seen, he goes not very far from the analyses of Krajewski. But his reflections specifically devoted to the notion of progress are much more original (and – as it always is with original ideas – more controversial). Sztompka says: *„the capability of a society to **creative self-transformation**, transcending its own limits, overcoming encumbrances, self-perfecting – just this is its progressive character. And disappearance or decrease of such capability – it is stagnation or regressive character.”* [Sztompka:449] We must say that we like this image of progressive society. But it should be noted that – as any other visions of progress – Sztompka’s vision is heavy values-laden: neither creativity, nor proclivity towards undertaking social obligations is a “natural” human tendency. For some people they are positive values for some others (we suppose: today much more numerous) are not, or even are negative values.

We think that the concept of social development calls for further investigations. These investigations should (as always) start with more profound analysis of what has already been achieved. In our opinion three groups of ideas concerning the notion of development could be distinguished and scrutinized.

The first group could be called “spencerian” since comprises ideas which in most clear way (and, perhaps, in this form for the first time) were formulated by Herbert Spencer. More substantially this group could be called “structural”. Various conceptions belonging to this group present development (of life, of society, of a person) as an (endogenous) process of growing differentiation (specialization) of elements of a system. The counterpart of this process is that of growing integration of a system. These two processes result in growing complexity of the given system

A different idea of development could be derived from biological theory of evolution. In this perspective development is to be regarded mainly as a process of adaptation of a system (a man, a species, a society...) to its environment. The same (?) idea, but formulated on the ground of psychology, could be presented with other words. The best is perhaps the word “autonomy”: to become more and more autonomous means to be less and less dependent on the vicissitudes of environment, and to be more and more self-steering/self-controlling.

And a third group of ideas could be called (somewhat awkwardly, but we have not found any better word) “statistical”: We take for its basis the assumption that each (“normal”) human being can develop. The development of society could be defined in this perspective as the growing possibility of individual development for growing number of individuals. (This approach can be found for instance in the work of Amartya Sen.)

It seems to us that each of the aforementioned groups of notions of “(social) development” reflects some pre-theoretical intuitions related to this word. On the other hand, we suppose that these three types of notion are not coextensive. A systematic study of relations between them are necessary. Such a study should give insights into the complexities of development (developments) much more profound than that we have at our disposal today.

Such a study is a large, separate task which cannot be undertaken here. Nevertheless, we would like to make some comments on one aspect of the notions belonging to the “spencerian” group. We want to say that, contrarily to quite widespread opinion, “spencerian” notion by no means implies teleology. We would risk the following general hypothesis: the more complex a system the more differentiated set of its possible future developments.

Let us use the word “life” as synonymous with “individual organism’s history”. There is little doubt that the life of a bacteria is well defined/determined, the life of a bird much more complex in comparison with the life of bacteria but still very simple if compared with human life. Almost the same we can say if limit ourselves to humans. The life of an individual in say Neolithic times was rather simple (though very complicated if compared with the life of representative of any other species of Primates), in Medieval times – more complicated, and today (at the turn of millennia). – This short and sketchy analysis should make our hypothesis more clear and to some degree validate it. We tend to think that more or less that same could be said about social development. For the lack of time and place, let’s confine our attention to analysis of an example. Let us assume that the initial steps of cosmonautics had been (in various and complex way) determined. Further developments are not determined: Let us consider the question: will we exploit the Moon?, and if so – in which ways? Let’s assume (in our opinion not very risky assumption) that the development of computers will not be stopped. But what will be the path of further development of Artificial Intelligence? If to read opinions of experts in this field, quite a few very different paths of further development are possible. Which of them will be taken? Who knows?

To sum up, in our opinions both “extreme” images of human history are simply false: History is neither a realization of any pre-established scenario (of whatever – “celestial” or “mundane” – origins and of whatever “plot”) or a chaotic sequence of events without any regularities.

It is necessary to understand that our actions (in various ways determined by the past and by the situations in which we perform them, and yet – always to a degree free) both create necessities and open new possibilities. The space of possible theories of History is sufficiently

great, thus a lot of work is necessary to explore it. To spend time and energy on criticizing the obviously false theories could be regarded as a form of intellectual waste

We think that as a starting point for these exploration we could avail (at the outset – metaphorically, later on – more literally, in accordance with mathematics) of the concept of game.

4. Axiology of social development

We would like to commence this chapter with a few rather general comments on axiology/values. Let us start from a remark. The very term “axiology” seems to have been created by Eduard von Hartmann in 1887 [https...Axiologie]. In the beginning of 20th century is began to gain some popularity. The rise of this philosophical notion seems to have large and attention-deserving roots. First of all, in philosophy. It should be observed that around mid-19th century philosophy adopts/adapts the concept of “value” (*Wert* in German). And in the case of Neo-Kantianism, this concept gains even centrality. In quite different way the concept of value gets some prominence in Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought (let us revoke only the famous phrase about *die Umwertung aller Werte* /revaluation of all values/ explicitly formulated in *Die Antichrist*, published in 1895, but expressed in other words also in his earlier books). Thus it should be analyzed also in the context of the history of nihilism in which the German philosopher plays a significant role.

Not only the second half of the 19th century but the whole age deserves the name (surely: one out of many it rightly can be given) “the age of history”. It would be a fascinating goal of studies to analyze the multiple forms the interest in and availing of history took place in the pre-previous age. Unfortunately, even the shortest analysis is here beyond our reach. We would like to mention but one element of this large phenomenon, namely the growing philosophical interest in history, and particularly in historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of values. This problem was studied by many, but most important contributions were offered by Wilhelm Dilthey (in particular, in his studies on *Weltanschauungen*.) – So, very briefly said, we noted in 19th.

Very similar, if not identical, lesson was given by the study of social space. The acceleration and intensification of European expansion (which resulted in the European /and American – to a relatively small degree/ domination over Asia and Africa). As a side-effect of this process we can regard the development of the study of other civilizations/cultures in general, and of the “people without history” – in particular. The studies took the institutional shape of such disciplines as ethnology, social and cultural anthropology etc. And just in this (rather vast and internally differentiated) intellectual area the concept of cultural relativism. It is Franz Boas who is credited with the first formulation of its basic ideas in 1887. But the

phrase “cultural relativism” came into use a few decades later: first noted use was in 1924 [https...Cultural_relativism] And since one of the most central theoretical concepts of these disciplines has been the concept of culture, and the latter has been usually based (in this or that way) on the notion of values, thus cultural relativism has had to imply (implicitly or explicitly, never mind) axiological relativism.

There are great many characteristics of “modern times” (in the broadest sense: from, say, Renaissance; or in the medium-size time-span: from, say, Enlightenment, or in the narrowest sense: from, say, the 1848 Spring of Nations). Among them one of the least indisputable of the labels is that of “time of individualism”. As a both a manifestation and an element of the process of the development of individualism we can interpret the rise of psychology as a autonomous discipline. It seems to us that from general, theoretical (and not – strictly methodological) point of view, we could characterize the transformation of psychology from a branch of philosophy into a science, as a transformation from various theories of the “nature of humane psyche (soul)” – common to all humans into various theories of “individual psyche”. (We should note that as a symbolic “birth-moment” of experimental/scientific psychology is most often regarded the establishment psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879 by Wilhelm Wundt.) As one of important elements of this process we can regard the growing popularity of the category of “personality”. Interestingly, this category is perhaps a psychological term most widely used by social/cultural anthropologists. (Quite often regarded as a counterpart of “culture.” They have been created great many theories of personality. We are going to mention but one: a theory built on the “borderline” between philosophy and (scientific) psychology. In the theory of Eduard Spranger presented in his *Lebensformen* (Forms of life, 1921) six types of personality (theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, religious) were distinguished. These types are defined by the basic value attitudes characteristic for various individuals. Let us leave aside the “details” of this theory (six or, say, eight types of personality...; the /in/precision of the borderlines between them,... etc.). But the key idea of Spranger seems to us to be of the greatest importance: the plurality of possible value-hierarchies as ontological prerequisite for profound differentiation of personalities.

The issues we have just discussed are of its philosophical importance. They are also so from the point of view of (general) history. But in the present context they should be regarded as relevant for political philosophy. This relevance was best demonstrated by Isaiah Berlin in very clear words “[b]oth liberty and equality have been among ultimate goals people have tried to achieve for ages....[but] absolute liberty for strong and capable is irreconcilable with the right to decent existence for weak and less capable” [Berlin: 34]

Let us add to this part of our considerations with some remarks on the relations between social development (more precisely: the variety of types/directions of social development) and market (more precisely: the various levels /theoretically: from 0% to 100%/ of market-regulating). Two points seem to be beyond any rational discussion: First, there are possible

various types (“paths”) of social development (or, if you prefer, progress). Second: various levels (the meaning of the word “level” – as used here – would deserve separate analysis, impossible here) are “best” (most optimal) for various types of social development.

As regards the first point: We need a systematic analysis of the set of (all – ?: perhaps too ambitious task...) possible types of social development. In other words we need a set of utopias.

As regards the second point: We need economical/sociological analysis which would go beyond the opposition of pro-market and pro-interventionist theories (and even beyond various forms of “theoretical/political compromise” between these two extremes). In other words: we need a theory which studies not only the actual social world but also possible social worlds. To put it still differently: we need social theory studying utopias (their content, and not them alone as a social phenomenon – this late type of studies constitutes an interesting and deserving attention fragment of the sociology of knowledge, but we think here about completely different approach to utopias – about regarding utopias as theoretical instruments to be used in social theory).

Ending this chapter, we would like to make a remark on relations between some philosophical ideas and political decisions. In our opinion it can be said that among political manifestations of the awareness of plurality of essentially different values is the creation of Human Development Index (HDI). This index was constructed by a Pakistanian scientist, Mahhub ul Haq (importantly: a close friend of Amartya Sen), and since 1990 has been used as instrumental in preparing Human Development Reports (HDR) published annually by the United Nations Development Programme. Of course, in the case of such reports (and indices) there is not much room for taking into considerations many different parameters (or values represented/measured by these parameters). Only three have been taken: life expectancy, education possibilities and standard of life. But if viewed in a historical perspective, HDR should be regarded as an important step ahead.

5. Final notes

It is our profound conviction (both ethical and theoretical) that we can regard as a criterion (surely, one out of many) of social development/progress the increase/growth of autonomy – individual and collective. Consequently, we can regard the development of individual and collective (on various levels – from familial through national to global) self-consciousness (self-knowledge) as important part of social development. Thus to be an autonomous subject (individual or collective) means in particular to be aware of one’s moral ideals and convictions, or – to put it in different words – to be able to answer the question

“What should be like the society in which you would like to live most?” or “What is the best way of further development of the society/state you are member/citizen.

Surely: there is no non-trivial answer to such questions – answer which would be shared by (“almost”) all members of a society. Controversies over these matters are inevitable: conflicts make up an irremovable part of social life, and controversies are manifestations of conflicts (of interests, ambitions, worldviews... etc.). However, history proves it – beyond any rational doubt – that the forms of conflict (or, to put it alternatively, the ways of conflict resolving) vary dramatically: from the most cruel manslaughter to philosophical debate. It should be noted that even violent forms of conflict have tended to be circumscribed by ethos (e.g. of medieval chivalric code) or law (Geneva conventions). If the forms of physical struggle can change, then there is no reason why the forms of ideological (in a very broad sense of the word) struggle should not change. – The theoretical development of the discourse ethics and its wider and wider observance in public debates can (and in our opinion also: should) be regarded as a part of social development.

But one note on discourse ethic (a vast area of debates and studies): We subscribe to a thesis formulated once by the great Polish logician Jan Łukasiewicz: “Logic is ethics of thinking”. We could add: first of all, thinking about moral, ideological, political issues. – In these (very important) spheres of human life “logical cheating” is easier than in mathematics, mechanics and so on. Thus just in these spheres “logical care” should be particularly cultivated: The more political debates will observe the logical rules (of precision, of consistency, of relevance etc.) the better will be these debates from a moral point of view.

The problem of the direction of further social development is and will remain a subject of political/ideological conflicts. We do opt for progress towards more honest and rational debates conceived of as means resolving these conflicts: The transformation of the phrase “social development” from a political/ideological slogan to a precise category can be therefore regarded as an element of social development. We hope that our paper can be regarded as a contribution (no doubt very small one) to such transformation, thus – to social development.

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Omówienie

Po pierwsze, tekst przedstawia historyczny kontekst ewolucji koncepcji „rozwoju społecznego”. Może on być podzielony na cztery fazy: ok. 1650-1850, ok. 1750-1850, ok. 1850-1950, ok. 1950-?. Ewolucja ta przeplatana jest takimi procesami, jak: powstanie filozofii historii, rozwój teorii ewolucji biologicznej, proliferacja analiz statystycznych itd. Po drugie, podejmujemy ontologiczną analizę tego pojęcia. Zaczyna się od ogólnego pojęcia zmian i rozwoju, a kończy trójstronną typologią pomysłów określanych wyrażeniem „rozwoju społecznego”: „spenceriański”, „adaptacyjny” i „statystyczny”. Po trzecie, omawiamy konkretny kontekst historyczny, w którym do głosu doszły pojęcia wartości i aksjologii. Staramy się pokazać, jak ten kontekst jest związany z ewolucją pojęcia rozwoju społecznego. Poczyniliśmy kilka uwag na temat pojęć PKB i HDI. Tekst kończymy uwagami na temat intelektualnej i moralnej autonomii oraz pewnych intelektualnych warunkach debat publicznych.