PREDICTORS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF POLAND

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Abstract: The concepts of good governance and effective government have been at the top of the public management agenda over the last decade. Good governance is seen as a central factor in growth and development. The aim of this paper was to analyse the relationships between effective government and predicting variables including GDP per capita, HDI, government spending, accountability, corruption control, political stability and rule of law. A quantitative econometric modelling methodology was utilized for the determination of long and short-run relationships using an ARDL model. Although a long-run relationship was established, of more importance was the short-run causality relationship. It was found that in most cases, effective governance causes changes in the other variables in the model. Effective government leads to strong public institutions. The results of this study, as well as the literature review, indicate effective government plays an important role in economic growth and development.

Key words: effective government, good governance, public management, Poland

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Introduction

This paper has the aim to identify some of the predictors of good governance and effective government, as well as to quantify the impact of such predictors on good governance. According to the World Bank (2000), ineffective governance and public institutions play critical roles in poor economic growth and development performance. While on the other hand, good governance is at the centre of growth and development. Good governance is one of the requirements for political stability and the way to achieve good governance is through strong and effective institutions (Abdellatif, 2003; Grindle, 2007). The concept of good governance has been difficult to define due to the qualitative nature of the concept. Effective governance and good governance has been used as interchangeable concepts and this relationship has been used to assist in explaining both concepts (Andrews, 2008). According to Andrews (2008), effective government needs to ensure fiscal discipline, have a decentralized governance system, respond to the needs of citizens and also formulate and implement enabling environment policies. Literature review indicates limited analysis of the concept of effective or good governance, especially using a quantitative methodology indicating a gap in the research.

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A number of studies have attempted to identify indicators or variables to explain good governance and effective governance (Arndt and Oman, 2006; Hood et al., 2007; van de Walle, 2006). Globally, the most recognized attempt at defining and measurement of good governance is the World Governance Indicators (WGI) as developed by the World Bank (World Bank, 2018). This index consists of six indicators including effective governance. In terms of the WGI, the score within the index ranges between + 2.5 to – 2.5, with a score above zero indicating effective governance and a score below zero indicating ineffective governance. Poland has been selected as the study region due to the fact that the country has transitioned in the early 1990s from a socialistic country to a modern democratic country (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009). Poland has successfully navigated during this period over a two decade time frame as a leading country in central and Eastern Europe. Poland was the only European country that facilitated strong positive economic growth during the 2008 to 2009 global financial crises. Poland's economy has over the last decade shown strong growth with good and effective macro-economic policy. Poland is classified by the UN as a high income developed country and is the 6th largest economy in the EU region (UN, 2017). Structural change in the early 1990s allowed Poland to transform its economy into a leading economy in Europe. Economic transformation actions included trade liberalization, business development incentives, reduction of regulations and substantial investments in critical economic sectors such as infrastructure, defense, and energy. Governance issues such as political influence on the judiciary and existence of corruption are problems that need to be addressed. Aspects for continued growth include the removal of backlogs in infrastructure (roads, rail and energy), and relaxation of strict labour regulations, and solutions to migration of young people to other EU member states (THF, 2017; CIA, 2017).

Table 1. Key indicators: Poland *(CIA, 2017; NationMaster, 2017; United Nations, 2017; World Bank, 2016)*

Indicator	**Poland**
GDP per capita	$12 700
Gini Index (a value closer to 0 indicates income equality)	31.9
HDI (values between 0 and 1)	0.860
Population (growth in brackets)	38.4 million (-0.1%)
Life expectancy	76.9
Youth unemployment	19.9%
Economic Freedom index (values between 0 and 100)	68.3 (45)*
Global competitiveness index (values between 0 and 10)	4.56 (36)*
Happy planet index (values between 0 and 100)	27.3 (62)*
Global entrepreneurship index (values between 0 and 100)	50.4
Global corruption index (values between 0 and 10 with a higher value indicating lower levels of corruption)	6.3
Global efficient government index (values between 0 and 100)	87.8
Global political stability index (values between -2.5 and 2.5)	0.88

** Indicates global ranking in brackets where applicable*

Literature Review

Good governance is defined by Besancon (2003) as the effective provision of services to all citizens. Such services could include security, rule of law, civil freedom, health care, education, infrastructure, fiscal system, and an enabling regulatory environment. Good governance plays an important role in development studies and presents a shift in the way governments are managed and also includes quality of governance (Abdellatif, 2003). Many different definitions exist for good governance, indicating uncertainty on the meaning of the concept. According to the UNDP (1997), good governance includes the following components: good management processes; the implementation of political and administrative management; effective institutions with quality systems; and a focus on best practice principles such as public participation, openness, accountability, effectiveness and rule of law. According to Andrews (2008), an effective government should have the following components: It should be small in extent with limited intervention in the economy; a clear vision and processes; committed quality personnel that can formulate and implement policies and projects; comprehensive participation with the public; efficient financial management; responsive, transparent and decentralized structures and political stability. The key concepts defining good governance also include ensuring rule of law, efficiency, accountability (IMF, 2005), political stability, implementable government policy, macro-economic policy (DFID, 2001), democracy, citizen participation, and anti-corruption (USAID, 2005). The large number of definitions for good governance indicates the problem of measurement and what factors predicts the concept. This paper adds to the body of knowledge by the quantitative measurement of some of the predictors of good and effective governance. From a theoretical point of view, the focus is on what is known as "formal rule-bound governance" with well define roles and functions which provides an enabling environment for the private sector to prosper and have confidence in government (Andrews, 2008). In addition, Kaufmann et al. (2007) state that good governance relates to limited government intervention, just providing inputs in the growth and development in social and developmental factors. Many researchers have listed characteristics of good governance (Arndt and Oman, 2006; Thomas, 2006; Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2005) and may include: limited government interventions (Sutopo and Siddi, 2018); formal structures with roles and functions; quality non-political officials; effective implementation of policy and service delivery; fiscal discipline; red-tape reduction processes; pro-business; decentralized and participatory (Meyer and Meyer, 2016). Nash et al. (2006) formulated a set of criteria for institutional success. Factors of importance include stable macro-economic policy including debt and fiscal stability; secure property rights; strength in budget control; quality in overall governance; accountability; prevention of corruption; creation of an enabling environment for business development; and social protection.

With regards to empirical results from similar and previous studies, a large volume of results are available in the literature. According to Chong and Calderon (2000),

a bi-directional causality exists between strong and effective institutions (good governance) and economic growth. This finding is supported by Levine (1997). Evans and Rauch (2000) also found a significant correlation between effective governance and economic growth. Kaufman and Kraay (2002) found that good governance is crucial for economic growth and in fact causes economic growth. Al-Marhubi (2004), confirmed that economic growth is one of the factors that have a significant impact on good governance. Kurtz and Schrank (2007) state that effective government could only be achieved by means of effective public management and economic growth can lead to more effective government. Cooray (2009) also found that good governance has a positive effect on economic growth. Abizadeh and Yousefi (1998) state, that a large ineffective public sector can have a negative impact on economic growth. Government size and interventions should be limited. Barro (1991) confirmed that political instability has a significant negative impact on good governance and economic growth. Alesina et al. (1996) found that countries with high levels of political instability have significantly lower levels of good governance and economic growth. Political instability is also a push-factor in attracting investment which is needed for growth (Fosu, 2001). Political instability also can increase policy uncertainty (Rodrik, 1991) and lead to more opportunities for corrupt activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The lack of democracy, existence of corruption and high levels of political instability could lead to poor governance, and eventually poor economic performance (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016).

Research has also confirmed that corruption is associated with weak governance and related low levels of economic growth and investment (Friedman et al., 1999; Mauro, 1995). Corruption is any activity in the public sector that is used to the benefit of individuals and could include aspects such as bribery, nepotism, and theft of public resources (Drury et al., 2006). The impact of corruption could also negatively impact the effectiveness of government (Mauro, 1997), and has a limiting impact on economic growth (Meyer et al., 2016), but Aidt (2009) also found that economic growth lead to less corruption. The existence of law and order, protection of property rights and policy certainty also attracts growth and investment (Knack and Keefer, 1995). This finding is confirmed by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, (2004) which indicated that good governance is possible when all components of law and order exist which include property rights and civil rights.

Methodology

The empirical section of the study is based on a quantitative process. The study analysed the country of Poland regarding good governance and its relationship with a number of predictive independent variables. The study uses annual data from 1996 to 2017. Good governance with effective government is regarded as the dependent variable, while the other variables are considered independent variables. All data were converted to natural logarithms. Table 2 provides a summary of the

variables included in the study. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank (2018) forms the basis for the data set.

Table 2. Summary of variables includes in study

Name of variable	Abbreviation for variable	Data source	Detail description
Effective governance index (part of good governance)	LEFFGOV	The World Bank (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)	Indicates of the quality of service delivery, civil service performance, policy formulation and implementation.
GDP per capita	LGDPCAP	The World Bank (2018)	GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided by the total population
HDI	LHDI	UNDP (2018)	The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and has a decent standard of living.
Government spending	LGOVSPEND	Data from the Global Economy (2018).	Government spending is defined as the government budget expenditure as reported in the final government accounts.
Government accountability index	LACCOUNT	The World Bank (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)	Indicates the level of accountability, participation in government, the freedom of expression, and free media.
Corruption control index	LCORRUPT	The World Bank (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)	Indicates the level to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as "capture" of the state.
Political stability index	LPOLSTAB	The World Bank (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)	Including the absence of violence and terrorism, and measures the likelihood of political instability
Rule of law	LRULELAW	The World Bank (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)	The extent to which citizens abide by the rules of society, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

An Autoregressive Distributed Lag model (ARDL), an econometric time series model, as developed by Pesaran and Shin, (1996) and amended by Pesaran et al. (2001) was utilised to analyse the relationship amongst variables. This model has many benefits which include a stable model even when limited number of observations is included in the model. The following model was formulated to determine the relationship between good governance using effective government as the proxy and other economic and governance variables**:**

$$\Delta LEFFGOV = f(\Delta LGDPCAP + \Delta LHDI + \Delta LGOVSPEND + \Delta LACCOUNT + \Delta LCORRUPT + \Delta LPOLSTAB + \Delta LRULELAW) \quad (1)$$

With the model formulated, the first step is to test for the level of stationarity by means of unit root tests. This test confirms the model selection. Secondly the Bounds test is used to test for any long-run relationships between variables. The test aimed to compare the estimates of the F-value and the critical value from the Pesaran et al. (2001) table.

The next step in the estimation methodology is the evaluation of the error correction model (ECM). Based on its accuracy, regardless of the size of employed data, Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion was chosen to determine the maximum number of lags to be used by the study (Brooks, 2014). Additionally, a number of diagnostic tests, i.e. serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, normality and stability, were performed.

Results and Discussion

This section provides details of the results of the estimation of the model and discussion of results, linked to previous empirical results. Unit root tests are important econometric tests in the process of selection of the specific model in testing for stationarity. The tests were conducted by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The results of the test are presented in Table 3. The results show that all variables passed the unit root test at either levels I(0) or at 1st difference I(1). Therefore the ARDL model could be estimated as it was designed to be used in the case where there is a mixture of variables.

Table 3. Unit root tests

Variables	Stationarity		Result
	ADF levels I (0)	ADF 1st difference I (1)	
LEFFGOV	0.6157	0.0225*	I (1)
LGDPCAP	0.5249	0.0172*	I (1)
LHDI	0.0237*	0.0338*	I (0)
LGOVSPEND	0.4596	0.0048*	I (1)
LACCOUNT	0.0403*	0.0192*	I (0)
LCORRUPT	0.3190	0.0001*	I (1)
LPOLSTAB	0.1140	0.0006*	I (1)
LRULELAW	0.6843	0.0131*	I (1)

**denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 5% level of significance*

Lag length selection is important to avoid spurious rejection or acceptance of estimated results as well as the power of rejection of hypothesis. The lag length for the model was estimated and all selection criteria by for instance the Akaike information criterion; Schwarz information criterion and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion, suggest a lag of 1. The long-run relationships between variables were estimated using the Bound test of cointegration. According to

Pesaran et al. (2001), the estimated F-statistic should be compared with the lower and upper bound value at the significance level. The F-statistic was 3.8651 with the upper bound value at 5 percent significance at 3.50. It can therefore be concluded that the F-statistic is higher the upper bound value; hence the null hypothesis is rejected. The study concluded that there exists a long-run relationship exists between the variables. Equation (2) presents the long-run relationship.

$$LEFFGOV = +0.075 + 0.0017*LGDPCAP + 0.002LHDI + 0.354LGOVSPEND + 0.099LACCOUNT - 0.004LCORRUPT - 0.052 LPOLSTAB + 0.081*LRULELAW \quad (2)$$

The results are interesting from a management point of view. Most of the variables have a limited impact on the dependent variable at below 0.01%, especially LGDPCAP, LHDI, and LCORRUPT. For example if LGDPCAP increases by 1%, the impact on improved LEFFGOV could only be 0.002%. Variables LACCOUNT, LPOLSTAB and LRULELAW also have limited impacts but slightly higher at approximately 0.1%. Of all the variables LGOVSPEND has the highest long-run impact. A 1% increase in LGOVSPEND could lead to a 0.4% improvement in LEFFGOV. The short-run empirical results are indicated in Table 4. The ECT is negative and significant as required, which indicates a long-run causality from the independent variables to the dependent variable. All variables in the model are therefore cointegrated. This means that it will take approximately 0.62 (1/1.6177) periods (years) for changes in the independent variables to affect government efficiency.

Table 4. Short-run relationship and error-correction results

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	P-value
D(GDPCAP)	-0.0011	2.5855	0.9997
D(HDI)	-0.0019	14.6360	0.9999
D(GOVSPEND)	0.5729	0.7372	0.4535
D(ACCOUNT)	-0.1593	0.2703	0.5675
D(CORRUPT)	-0.0056	0.0767	0.9430
D(POLSTAB)	-0.0843	0.0529	0.1395
D(RULELAW)	0.1308	0.2177	0.5601
Coint Eq (-1)	**-1.6177**	**0.1870**	**0.0031***

**rejection of null hypothesis at 5% level of significance*

Table 5 provides a summary of the Granger Causality results indicating short-run causal relationships between variables. The empirical results of the Granger Causality tests based on Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology. This method is used in cases where a mixture of variables exists regarding stationarity. The results indicate strong causality involving the main dependent variable and GDP per capita. It is interesting to note that effective governance causes all the other variables to change on the short-run, while bi-directional causality exist between

effective government and GDP per capita, HDI, and rule of law. Rule of law, corruption control and political stability cause GDP per capita.

Table 5. Toda-Yamamoto Causality Test results

Null hypothesis	Chi-sq	p-value
LDGPCAP does not granger cause LEFFGOV	9.1078	0.0025*
LEFFGOV does not granger cause LGDPCAP	14.1996	0.0002*
LHDI does not granger cause LEFFGOV	8.9486	0.0028*
LEFFGOV does not granger cause LHDI	2.9885	0.0839**
LEFFGOV does not granger cause LHDI	2.9288	0.0870**
LEFFGOV does not granger cause LGOVSPEND	4.9576	0.0260*
LEFFGOV does not granger cause LACCOUNT	3.6323	0.0567**
LEFFGOV does not granger cause LCORRUPT	4.8722	0.0276*
LEFFGOV does not granger cause LPOLSTAB	17.0890	0.0023*
LEFFGOV does not granger cause LRULELAW	8.3847	0.0038*
LRULELAW does not granger cause LEFFGOV	4.2764	0.0387*
LACCOUNT does not granger cause LGDPCAP	11.1092	0.0009*
LCORRUPT does not granger cause LGDPCAP	4.8670	0.0274*
LPOLSTAB does not granger cause LGDPCAP	7.3747	0.0066*

**rejection of null hypothesis at 5% level of significance and ** rejection at 10% level*

Residual diagnostic tests were performed to confirm the correctness and stability of the results. The Breusch-Godfrey LM Test was performed to test for serial correlation, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test was estimated to test for heteroscedasticity amongst the variables and the Jarque-Bera Test was performed to test for normal distribution. The results revealed that for the series as used, the residuals are not auto-correlated; the series was homoscedastic and also normally distributed. Lastly, the CUSUM test was applied to assess parameter stability and a test result indicates stability for the model. This indicates that the findings are trustworthy.

Conclusion

Literature studies and empirical results from previous studies indicate the importance of good governance for growth and development. The main objective of this study was to determine the impact of different types of variables on effective government by means the use of an econometric model. The results indicate a long-run relationship amongst the variables. In the short-run however, interesting and unexpected result be found in that effective government significantly Granger causes most of the variables included in the model. It was expected that the independent variables would mostly cause the dependent variable to change. The results indicate a strong bi-directional causality between effective government and GDP per capita, which has also been confirmed by other studies (Chong and Calderon, 2000; Levine, 1997; Evans and Rauch, 2000; Al-Marhubi, 2004; Kurtz and Schank, 2007; Cooray, 2009). The implications of the study is that

effective government, through strong public institutions, play a significant role in economic growth and development, as well as in reducing corruption; improved government spending and accountability; strengthening political stability and contributes toward improved rule of law. The limitation of the study is that the time frame of the study is only from 1996 due to availability of data.

Future research should include different variables such as government risk factors and comparative studies. In terms of comparative studies, it planned to do an analysis of the Visegrad countries, and also to compare these countries to other European countries as well as with leading developing countries such as South Africa and the BRICS group of developing countries. In conclusion it is confirmed via the results of the stud that good governance is critical in achieving growth and less corruption and political instability. All effect should be made to ensure good public institutions which are transparent, accountable, limited interference in the economy, and that can ensure rule of law.

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CZYNNIKI PROGNOZUJĄCE DOBRE RZĄDZENIE I SKUTECZNE ZARZĄDZANIE RZĄDEM: PRZYPADEK POLSKI

Streszczenie: Koncepcje dobrego rządzenia i efektywnego rządu są w ostatnim dziesięcioleciu na czele publicznej agendy zarządzania. Dobre rządzenie jest postrzegane jako główny czynnik wzrostu i rozwoju. Celem artykułu była analiza zależności między skutecznymi wskaźnikami rządowymi a przewidywaniami, w tym PKB na mieszkańca, wskaźnikiem rozwoju społecznego, wydatkami rządowymi, odpowiedzialnością, kontrolą korupcji, stabilnością polityczną i praworządnością. Wykorzystano ilościową metodologię modelowania ekonometrycznego do określenia relacji długo i krótkoterminowych z wykorzystaniem modelu ARDL. Chociaż ustalono długoterminową relację, ważniejsze

były krótkookresowe związki przyczynowe. Stwierdzono, że w większości przypadków skuteczne rządzenie powoduje zmiany w innych zmiennych w modelu. Skuteczny rząd prowadzi do silnych instytucji publicznych. Wyniki tego badania, a także przegląd literatury wskazują, że skuteczny rząd odgrywa ważną rolę we wzroście gospodarczym i rozwoju.
Słowa kluczowe: skuteczny rząd, dobre rządzenie, zarządzanie publiczne, Polska

良好治理和有效政府管理的预测:波兰的案例

摘要:在过去十年中，善政和有效政府的概念一直是公共管理议程的重中之重。善政被视为增长和发展的核心因素。本文的目的是分析有效政府与预测变量之间的关系，包括人均GDP，人类发展指数，政府支出，问责制，腐败控制，政治稳定和法治。使用定量计量经济学建模方法，使用ARDL模型确定长期和短期关系。虽然建立了长期关系，但更重要的是短期因果关系。结果发现，在大多数情况下，有效治理会导致模型中其他变量的变化。有效的政府导致强大的公共机构。这项研究的结果以及文献综述表明，有效的政府在经济增长和发展中发挥着重要作用。
关键词:有效政府，善治，波兰，公共管理。