Dining Cryptographers with 0.924 Verifiable Collision Resolution

• Autorzy: Franck Ch.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The dining cryptographers protocol implements a multiple access channel in which senders and recipients are anonymous. A problem is that a malicious participant can disrupt communication by deliberately creating collisions. We propose a computationally secure dining cryptographers protocol with collision resolution that achieves a maximum stable throughput of 0.924 messages per round and which allows to easily detect disruptors.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

dining cryptographers protocol; algorithms; stable throughput; collision resolution; anonymity

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo UMCS
• Czasopismo: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio AI, Informatica
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: Vol. 14, no. 1
• Strony: 49--60
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 14 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Franck Ch.

Bibliografia

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