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Digital Sovereignty Strategies for Every Nation

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Digital Sovereignty must be on the agenda of every modern nation. Digital technology is becoming part of our life details, from the vital essentials, like food and water management, to transcendence in the Metaverse and Space. Protecting these digital assets will, therefore, be inevitable for a modern country to live, excel and lead. Digital Sovereignty is a strategic necessity to protect these digital assets from the monopoly of friendly rational states, and the threats of unfriendly Malicious states and behaviors. In this work, we revisit the definition and scope of digital sovereignty through extending it to cover the entire value chain of using, owning, and producing digital assets. We emphasize the importance of protecting the operational resources, both raw materials and human expertise, in addition to research and innovation necessary to achieve sustainable sovereignty. We also show that digital sovereignty by autonomy is often impossible, and by mutual cooperation is not always sustainable. To this end, we propose implementing digital sovereignty using Nash Equilibrium, often studied in Game Theory, to govern the relation with Rational states. Finally, we propose a digital sovereignty agenda for different country’s digital profiles, based on their status quo, priorities, and capabilities. We survey state-of-the-art digital technology that is useful to make the current digital assets sovereign. Additionally, we propose a roadmap that aims to develop a sovereign digital nation, as close as possible to autonomy. Finally, we draw attention to the need of more research to better understand and implement digital sovereignty from different perspectives: technological, economic, and geopolitical.
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Bibliogr. 88 poz., rys., tab.
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  • Resilient Computing and Cybersecurity Center (RC3), Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Sciences and Engineering Division (CEMSE), King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST)
Bibliografia
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Uwagi
Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MEiN, umowa nr SONP/SP/546092/2022 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2022-2023).
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-9f51b20d-9d7b-41e3-941e-ca59cd811e5f
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