The CAN bus in the maritime environment – technical overview and cybersecurity vulnerabilities

• Autorzy: Kessler G. C.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12716/1001.15.03.05

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus standard was developed in the 1980s and is in widespread use in automobile, vehicular, aviation, and other networks. The CAN bus was introduced in the maritime environment with the adoption of the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) 2000 standard in the late-1990s. Many papers have been written about the CAN bus protocols and security vulnerabilities but there is sparse literature about use of the CAN bus in the maritime environment. Part I of this paper is a technical overview, describing CAN bus standards and operation, with particular attention to its use with the NMEA 2000 maritime communications standard. Part II of this paper describes security vulnerabilities in terms of loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information (such as eavesdropping, denial-of-service, and spoofing), and mitigations specific to the maritime environment.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

controller area network; national marine electronics association; cyber security; maritime communication standard; security vulnerabilities; CAN Bus; maritime environment

• Wydawca: Faculty of Navigation, Gdynia Maritime University
• Czasopismo: TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: Vol. 15 No. 3
• Strony: 531--540
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 31 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Kessler G. C.

• Fathom 5, Ormond Beach, Florida, USA

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa Nr 461252 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2021).