Aircraft vulnerability to politically motivated Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) in Eastern Europe

• Autorzy: Westbrook Tegg

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.35467/sdq/178249

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Countries in Europe have experienced radio frequency interference from Russian electronic warfare units, affecting navigation systems without discrimination. Interference has been identified as coming from the Russian mainland, Kaliningrad, and in the areas where it is engaged in conflicts abroad, creating serious hazards for aircraft. Previous research has identified the technical vulnerabilities to aviation from radio frequency interference, but it has yet to be contextualised in light of the ongoing geopolitical tensions. Using literature review analysis, the aim of the article is to place the jamming and spoofing threat in the context of ongoing political tensions between Russia and the region and to establish worse-case scenarios based on the former’s motives. Focusing on the threats to aircraft, it finds that the likely motivations are to (1) complement political narratives of Western aggression; (2) to deny service for intimidation, harassment, economic loss, and to portray a dominant Russian cyber influence; and (3) to use spoofing to enable hostage diplomacy via the seizure of people and assets. It argues that reporting mechanisms for aviation risks assumes geographical staticism, which does not correspond adequately to the threat. It also creates arbitrary “predictability” in otherwise unpredictable environments, which could ultimately affect vigilance and due diligence in the areas not considered problematic.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

electronic warfare; cyber security; geopolitics; satellite navigation systems

• Wydawca: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej
• Czasopismo: Security and Defence Quarterly
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: Vol. 46, No. 2
• Strony: 104--117
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 54 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Westbrook Tegg

• Department of Safety, Economics, and Planning, University of Stavanger, Kjell Arholms Gate 41, 4021, Stavanger, Norway

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9889-3673

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