Russia's new nuclear doctrine : Russian policy of deterrence

• Autorzy: Kleszcz Sławomir

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.37055/pno/161830

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Objectives: The main purpose of the article is to address the issues arising from the new nuclear doctrine of Russia. An attempt to analyze the document is "Russia's Nuclear Doctrine" as a new tool for the Russian Federation's nuclear deterrent policy. The performance changes over the years in Russia's approach to the use of nuclear weapons in the new doctrine in the times of the Soviet Union in global terms, as well as in the micro-region of Central Europe, especially during the war in Ukraine. Methods: The article is theoretical and descriptive. The main research methods and techniques included in the work are: analysis and synthesis of literature; comparative method; inductive and deductive method. Results: An attempt was made to analyze the document "Russia's Nuclear Doctrine" as a new tool for the Russian Federation's nuclear deterrent policy. A presentation of how Russia's approach to the use of nuclear weapons has changed over the years. Conclusions: The Russian approach to nuclear deterrent policy is changing and is often used as flexibly as Russia's policy towards the West is forged in a given situation - to build its own political interests. All this is very efficiently and sophisticatedly applied in society by means of propaganda and media controlled by the authorities, with which the rulers manipulate public opinion. According to the decree, the threshold for Russia's use of nuclear weapons remains unchanged and is relatively high. The essence of the Russian doctrine is the uncertainty of a potential adversary as to when it will be used.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

nuclear weapons; nuclear doctrine; Russian nuclear safety; radiation protection; Russian Federation's nuclear deterrent policy

PL

broń jądrowa; doktryna nuklearna; Rosyjskie bezpieczeństwo jądrowe; ochrona przed promieniowaniem; Polityka odstraszania nuklearnego Federacji Rosyjskiej

• Wydawca: Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna im. Jarosława Dąbrowskiego
• Czasopismo: Przegląd Nauk o Obronności
• Rocznik: 2022
• Tom: R. 7, Nr 15
• Strony: 138--160
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 18 poz., il.

Twórcy

autor

Kleszcz Sławomir

• Faculty of Security, Logistics and Management, Military Technical Academy, Poland

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1866-4775

Bibliografia

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