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THEORIES OF WAR IN PRACTICE: CAUSES AND TERMINATION (IN THE EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR)

ABSTRACT: Most military operations, military campaigns and wars in history have lasted longer than expected. Why do wars last longer than expected? In general, what factors determine the duration of the war? These are some of the questions that researchers think about the most. It should be noted that in order to draw reasonable conclusions about the duration of wars, they must be grouped according to their characteristics. Wars vary in intensity and scale. While some wars lasted for years, even decades, others lasted only a few days. Some wars involved only two countries, some took on a global scale. In some wars, limited battles took place and some have been engraved in history with heavy destruction. In many cases, while countries mobilize the whole society for war, some do not see the need for it. The article depicts the essence of the theories of war regarding the causes and termination, substantiates the link between them and highlights the factors that affect the duration of the war. The results of the analysis of the the Second Karabakh War and the conditions of peace have been presented. Opinions have been put forward about the outcomes of the war.



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KEYWORDS: “War termination” theory, the Second Karabakh War, victory, defeat, concession.

INTRODUCTION

The great wars are mainly accompanied by more pronounced results and changes. As a rule, ending a war is more difficult than starting it. For example, in mid-1944, it was already known that Germany would be defeated, but it did not surrender until May 1945. The Korean War lasted for three years, even though the fate of the war was decided in the 12th month. Although the failure of coalition forces in Afghanistan had been known since 2006, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continued until 2014.¹ In fact, in order to make any assumptions about the end of war, it is important to conduct a thorough scientific research, to evaluate various factors, which must be accompanied by serious mathematical calculations. Although much study has been devoted to the planning and conduct of warfare, the number of studies on the termination of war is almost limited. However, several prominent researchers touched upon different aspects of the presented problem. James L. Foster and Garry D. Brewer examined pre-war policies which may affect the ability to terminate a potential war on acceptable terms and at acceptable costs.² Branislav L. Slantchev, analyzing the interstate wars of 1816–1991, made certain considerations about their duration and conditions of peace.³ Linda Legier-Topp examined three wars – World War I, the Vietnam War and the 1991 Gulf War to highlight historical linkages in war termination problems.⁴ Jack S. Levy presented the causes of war and the conditions of peace.⁵ He tried to shed light on the questions, like why wars occur and what it takes to terminate a war. Michael C. Griffith discusses the theory and doctrine of war termination and evaluates their application during the Persian Gulf War.⁶ According to Elizabeth A. Stanley, war is a two-level game and thus understanding belligerents’ domestic

¹ Christopher Tuck, “Theoretical Perspectives on the Ending of Wars”, International Forum on War History: Proceedings. Sep 30, 2015 <https://bit.ly/3H0xurb>.

² James L. Foster and Garry D. Brewer, *And the clocks were striking thirteen: The termination of war* (The Rand Corporation and Yale University, 1976).

³ Branislav L. Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (October 2004): 813-829.

⁴ Linda Legier-Topp, “War Termination: Setting Conditions for Peace”. February 2009. <https://bit.ly/3Av7zWr>.

⁵ Jack S. Levy, “The causes of war and the conditions of peace”, *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 1 (1998) :139-165. <https://bit.ly/3r0aseC>.

⁶ Michael C. Griffith, *War Termination: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice* (School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992).

politics is crucial for explaining what makes interstate wars continue and what finally makes them end. While bargaining models of war suggest that war ends when an overlapping bargaining space develops, Stanley suggests how, when and why this space develops. The author offers real insights about the timing of war termination, including the under-theorized category of protracted wars, which rationalist models have had little success in explaining.⁷ Sam Allotey and et al. examined different termination concepts and theories, established a common framework regarding conflict termination theories, analyzed some prominent wars through the history, such as World War I, World War II, Vietnam War and Desert Storm, provided insight into practical application of recommended termination concepts.⁸

The autumn of 2020 was also marked by the Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. From the first day of the war, various opinions were expressed about the date of its end, predictions were made and finally, forty-four days later, the war ended with the victory of Azerbaijan. During this period, the glorious Azerbaijani Army liberated 5 cities, 4 settlements and 286 villages.⁹ Was this period too much or too little for such a war? For instance, Uzi Rubin claims that, the Second Karabakh War was not a blitzkrieg, but a grindingly slow ground campaign probably due to Armenia's stubborn defense. The distance from the point of counterattack to its farthest western reach is about 100 km and that distance was covered in four weeks. The distance from the point of attack to its most northern point is about 80 km and it took six weeks for the Azerbaijani Army to maneuver. According to the researcher, the key to Azerbaijan's ultimate success was its amazingly sophisticated air campaign.¹⁰ In order to answer the stated question with solid facts, the wars with similar characteristics that took place in the last 120 years (1900–2020) have been analyzed.

THEORIES OF WAR. FROM REASONS TO TERMINATION

International relations theorists generally define war as large-scale organized violence between political units. Peace, which is analytically distinct from justice, is usually defined as

⁷ Elizabeth A. Stanley, "War Termination in Theory and Practice". 2009. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804772372-013>.

⁸ Sam Allotey and et al. *Planning and execution of conflict termination* (Air Command and Staff College, 1995)

⁹ "Azərbaycan Ordusunun işğaldan azad etdiyi ərazilər – TAM SİYAHİ". <https://bit.ly/3kpZqcd>.

¹⁰ Uzi Rubin, "The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: A Milestone in Military Affairs", *Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 184*. December 2020. <https://bit.ly/3fTV0KG>.

the absence of war.¹¹ As it was mentioned in the introduction, historians, military analysts and defence policy critics have concentrated almost exclusively on the issues of war initiations, war conduct and the requirements of deterrence, while ignoring the questions of how wars end and how pre-war policies may affect the ability to terminate a potential war on acceptable terms and at acceptable costs. James L. Foster and Garry D. Brewer suggested three alternative conditions, each implying a particular strategy of force employment, as sufficient for achieving acceptable war termination: 1) attrition of the adversary's war fighting capabilities or will; 2) protracted stalemate; 3) imposing or threatening unacceptable damage to the adversary to change his perception of the potential costs and benefits of continuing the conflict.¹² We will apply the third approach regarding the war theories that we find conducive to our case study.

War theories have a great impact on warfare. Usually they place things already known into systems, provide ways and advice regarding conduct of wars and use of armed forces. Many people believe that once a theory no longer applies or fits the situation a new theory emerges and replaces it. Generally, modern war theories are based on strategic cultures, historical lessons learned by observing past wars and technology.¹³ Wars need to have clear political ends with complementary war termination strategies defined at the beginning of hostilities that can be refined over the continuum of war.¹⁴ However, before discussing the termination of the war, it is important to describe the theories of the causes that generate wars. As stated by Mario Coccia, there are several historical theories that focus on specific factors generating a disagreement between nations and different populations that can lead to war. These theories are grouped under the following categories:¹⁵

1. Historical theories:
 - Theory of no economic advantage of wars by Norman Angell;
 - Theory of wars based on historical causes by James Novicow;
 - Theory of natural human combativeness by Nietzsche and other theorists;
 - Theory of biological and sociological necessities to protect nations from decline;
 - Theory of psychological diversity between populations;

¹¹ Jack S. Levy, *Ibid.*

¹² James L. Foster and Garry D. Brewer, *Ibid.*

¹³ Li-Sheng Kuo, "Sun Tzu's War Theory in the Twenty First Century", Master's thesis (U.S. Army War College, 2007).

¹⁴ Linda Legier-Topp, *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Mario Coccia, "Theories and the reasons for war: A survey". *Journal of Economic and Social Thought*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2019): 115-124. <https://bit.ly/3fTVLn0>.

- Theory of demographic causes of war by Gini and other scholars.
- 2. Modern theories:
 - Theory of the failure in bargaining;
 - Theory of the democratic peace;
 - Theory of endogenous power;
 - Theory of global leadership.

Jack S. Levy focuses on two theories regarding the cause and termination of the war: balance of power theory and hegemonic theory (power transition). Balance of power theory predicts that states will balance against those states that constitute the primary threats to their interests and particularly against any state that threatens to secure a hegemonic position. Balance of power theorists argue that the balancing mechanism – which includes both external alliances and internal military buildups – almost always successfully avoids hegemony, either because potential hegemons are deterred by their anticipation of a military coalition forming against them or because they are defeated in war after deterrence fails. Hegemonic theory is a structural theory that incorporates power transition theory and hegemonic stability theory and that downplays the importance of anarchy. Hegemons commonly arise and use their strength to create a set of political and economic structures and norms of behavior that enhance the stability of the system while advancing their own security.¹⁶

In order to conduct the analysis of the Second Karabakh War from the viewpoint of war termination theory the involved actors in the region should be examined.

There are three ambitious powers in the neighborhood of the South Caucasus: Turkiye, Iran and Russia. Turkiye, the staunch ally and the linchpin of NATO in Central Asia and the Caucasus is the driving force behind most of the regional cooperation projects. Unlike Turkiye, Iran is diametrically opposed to the integration of the region into Western community and does not approve Turkiye's close engagement and excludes the participation of non-regional powers in the processes taking place in the South Caucasus. As the former "ruler" and most powerful state in the post-Soviet area, Russia is very much engaged in the South Caucasus, despite not

¹⁶ Jack S. Levy, *Ibid.*

having unlimited influence there, but still retains substantial leverage and has been reasserting its influence in the area.¹⁷

Apart from regional actors, there are some other global actors and organizations engaged in the region and endeavor to protect their interests, such as, the US, China, EU, NATO, etc.¹⁸ The US wants to see the South Caucasus as a Western-oriented region. The US considers the region as a part of Europe and is interested in incorporating the countries into European institutions. Through the Eastern Partnership (EaP) program, the EU has become a major investor and actor in the South Caucasus countries. An aim of the EU is to promote stability and development in the region and forge closer ties. There is a significant overlap of interests regarding the region between the EU, Turkiye and the US, which primarily aims to keep the permanent and unobstructed flow of oil and gas from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to the West (bypassing Russia and Iran). China is foremost an economic actor in the South Caucasus. China does not play an important role in the domestic affairs of the South Caucasus countries, as do Russia and the EU. Therefore, it does not jeopardize Russian dominance in the region. Because its influence is not accompanied by a political and military presence unlike the West.¹⁹

THEORIES OF WAR IN PRACTICE: THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR

Regarding the Second Karabakh War, Armenians try to highlight the “theory of wars based on historical causes by James Novicow”. According to this theory, wars persist and are repeated because of historical causes. This theory simply states that current and future causes of wars are due to an individual and social routine of human behavior, though wars do not generate any advantage for winners and losers.²⁰ Throughout the war, armenians wanted to attract the attention of the international community that, it was not Azerbaijan, which was fighting against

¹⁷ Khayal Iskandarov, Piotr Gawliczek, “Hybrid warfare as an instrument of political leverage (With a special focus on the South Caucasus)” in *The Russian federation and international security* edited by Miroslaw Banasik, Piotr Gawliczek and Agnieszka Rogozinska (Poland: Difin publishing house, 2020), 169-180.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Khayal Iskandarov, Sadi Sadiyev, “The escalation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan: Possible reasons and implications”, *The European Geopolitical Forum*, 06 August 2020. <http://gpf-europe.com/forum/?blog=security&id=360>

²⁰ Mario Coccia, Ibid.

Armenia, but Turkiye and Azerbaijan in tandem as a result of a century-old enmity between Turks and Armenians.²¹

However, the primary reasons of the outbreak of the Second Karabakh War were the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories, ignored UN resolutions (which demanded an immediate withdrawal of Armenian troops) and failure of negotiations between the countries. These reasons are covered under a modern theory of “failure in bargaining”. Armenia eschewed the negotiations, the international law did not work and Azerbaijan was obliged to implement the resolutions of UN on its own. Questions arise, why 2020, not any other years, for instance 2016, when Azerbaijan had an opportunity to continue the offensive operations. The answers are debatable, however, the reality is that, timing is of utmost importance while making any decision. As Carl Von Clausewitz stated: “*No one starts a war or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it*”.²² Having considered a plethora of factors, 2020 was the best time to launch an operation in order to liberate the occupied territories. Otherwise, this war would have continued not for weeks but years. Therefore, the termination of war is inextricably linked with the initiation of the war.

Mario Coccia depicts several different factors in order to understand bargaining failures.²³ We will examine these factors on the example of the Second Karabakh War:

– Asymmetric information about the potential costs and benefits of war. Armenian side believed that they would not only defeat Azerbaijani Army, they would also capture extra land. In late March 2019, after Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's first official meeting with President Ilham Aliyev, then-Armenian Minister of Defense David Tonayan called on his country to prepare for a “new war for new territories”.²⁴ However, the Second Karabakh war inflicted serious damage not only on Armenian military, but overall economy.

– A lack of ability to enforce a bargaining agreement and/or a lack of the ability to credibly commit to abide by an agreement. As it was mentioned in the paper that, the UN had four resolutions (822, 853, 874 and 884). These resolutions demanded the immediate and

²¹ Khayal Iskandarov, Piotr Gawliczek, “The impact of social media on the war. Case study: The Second Karabakh War” in *Information, Media, Security Environment* edited by Miroslav Banasik, Piotr Gawliczek, Agnieszka Rogozinska (Warsaw: Difin, 2020), 162-178.

²² Michael C. Griffith, *Ibid*, 1.

²³ Mario Coccia, *Ibid*.

²⁴ Heydər Piriyyəv, Rəşad Tahirov, Xəyal İskəndərov, *İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsi. Hərbi-siyasi təhlil* (Bakı: Hərbi Nəşriyyat, 2022), 32.

unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the occupied Azerbaijani lands. However, Armenia demonstratively refused to implement these resolutions;

– Indivisibilities of resources that might change hands in a war, so that not all potentially mutually beneficial bargaining agreements are feasible. This factor has been substantiated by the following reasons, which turned the tables in the Second Karabakh War and necessitated Azerbaijan's victory:²⁵

- a) political will of the Azerbaijani leadership;
- b) military potential of the Azerbaijani Army;
- c) the determination of the Azerbaijani soldier;
- d) solidarity of the Azerbaijani people.

Armenian side miscalculated all these factors and precipitated their defeat.

– Agency problems, where the incentives of leaders differ from those of the populations that they represent. Nikol Pashinyan's dilettante behavior with regard to the status of Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrated that Armenian authority at the highest level was not explicit about what they wanted, which plunged them into ludicrous and unpleasant position on the international arena. In one of his most bellicose interviews, the Armenian prime-minister argued for the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. According to Joshua Kucera, the forceful appeal indicated that Pashinyan was taking a harder line on Karabakh even as he had made efforts to revive the negotiations with Azerbaijan over settling the conflict. In just another speech, Pashinyan insisted the participation of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent "republic" in the negotiations, which contradicted his previous statement.²⁶

– Multilateral interactions where every potential agreement is blocked by some coalition of states or constituencies who can derail it. It is also a well-known fact Armenia pulled out all the stops in order to involve the third parties in the war. As Armenia expected, Russia was the most probable country that would intervene in the war, since both are in the same military bloc – CSTO.²⁷ However, Russia admitted that the war was going on in the

²⁵ Ibid, 32.

²⁶ Rashad Tahirov, Khayal Iskandarov, Sadi Sadiyev, "The Updated Madrid Principles in the "Karabakh Knot", *The European Geopolitical Forum, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Research Digest. How to Break the Current Deadlock in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Resolution: Strategic Dialogue on the Peace Process within a Boosted Peace Context?* September 30, 2020. <https://bit.ly/3ibHErW>.

²⁷ Khayal Iskandarov, Piotr Gawliczek, "The impact of social media on the war. Case study: The Second Karabakh War", Ibid.

internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan and refrained from overt intervention, even though its covert support to Armenia was observed throughout the war.

Linda Legier-Topp states that, war termination, from the victor's point of view, is defined as the last stage in a war once basic political objectives of the war are within reach. A successful war termination strategy is important in the short-term sense of minimizing military and civilian casualties and loss of human life while meeting political objectives, but also in the long-term sense of terminating war with an eye towards shaping a lasting peace.²⁸

According to the theory of "war termination", the duration and outcome of the war are closely linked with the desire to make concessions. This desire is also determined by the course of the war. Leaders can change their demands by assessing the factors that influence the concessions of the other side – strength, determination and financial resources and reconsider the goals of the war, depending on whether expectations of military outcome are justified on the battlefield.

There are two terms that are often confused: conflict termination and war termination. Using these two terms interchangeably is an egregious mistake. Because a termination of the war may not be a termination of the conflict at the same time. Sam Allotey and et al. stated, while the war may be terminated, the seeds of future hostilities persist because the conflict remains unresolved.²⁹ For instance the "Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" had continued for almost 30 years. Two major wars (First and Second Karabakh wars) took place in this period. While the first war resulted in the temporary loss of Azerbaijan's control over the 20% of its territory, the second war was terminated with Azerbaijan's victory. Although every conflict differs, most follow a similar pattern. This pattern first recognized by Richard Barringer³⁰, shows how a conflict may progress across the following four phases: 1) dispute; 2) pre-hostilities; 3) hostilities; 4) post-hostilities (settlement or continuation of the dispute). This framework provides a model for understanding how conflicts develop and result in wars, how wars terminate with or without resolving the conflict.³¹ Post-hostilities are mostly followed by peace whether the conflict is settled or not. It in turn, affects the duration of the peace. In case the conflict is solved, then it is more probable that there will be a lasting peace. Otherwise, the

²⁸ Linda Legier-Topp, Ibid.

²⁹ Sam Allotey and et al. Ibid, 12.

³⁰ Richard E Barringer, *Patterns of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1972), 17-31.

³¹ Sam Allotey and et al. Ibid, 9-10.

peace agreement is always susceptible to violation. While both Armenia and Azerbaijan were under soviet regime, even though there was a discord between the nations, an open hostility did not occur. Then in late 80s, the nations were involved in a dispute and it was immediately followed by pre-hostilities. Hostilities began with Khojali massacre, when Azerbaijanis were indiscriminately slaughtered by armenians on February 26, 1992. In some cases, hostilities refer to the period when active armed confrontation takes place. However, in the case of the “Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” hostilities continued for almost 30 years. Now both nations undergo the period of post-hostilities, in which all problems might be settled and ensued with enduring peace. The Armenian revanshicm is a primary obstacle to this process, which in turn will ensure the prosperity of both nations.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, estimates of predicting the end of the war and the conditions of peace were formed mainly due to the loss of personnel. A suggested hypothesis was that there was a very serious correlation between the loss of personnel and the outcome of the war. This approach was reflected in researches conducted in the 60s and 70s of the twentieth century. Thus, Levis Richardson notes that if a party with a smaller population loses 0.05–5% of the total population, then its defeat is inevitable.³² According to Klingberg, a party that loses about 3-4% of its population tends to surrender.³³ However, from the 1980s onwards, researchers began to argue that this approach was incorrect. For example, Steven Rosen, who disagreed with Richardson, noted that “in only two of the 77 wars of nearly two centuries the countries that lost more than 5% of their population were defeated. In 23 of the 77 wars, the losing side lost less than 0.05% of the total population”.³⁴ As a result, researchers of that period began to focus not only on the number of personnel, but also on the total military power. It is known that military power depends on three main factors: 1) personnel, 2) weapons and equipment, 3) organizational structure. At the same time, Rosen emphasized the soldier's self-sacrifice.³⁵ Thus, from the 1980s onwards, the success of the war in researches was directly linked to military skill and technology. Since the end of the last century, researchers have begun to study the origins of war, diplomacy during and immediately after the war.

³² Arthur A. Stein, Bruce M. Russett, “Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences” in Ted Robert Gurr eds. *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research*. – New York: The Free Press,– 1980. – p. 399-422.

³³ Frank L. Klingberg, “The historical alternation of moods in American foreign policy”, *World Politics*, No 4, (1952): 239-273.

³⁴ *Peace, War and Numbers*, Bruce M. Russet (ed.), (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972), 179.

³⁵ Heydər Piriyeu, Rəşad Tahirou, Xəyal İskəndərou, “Müharibənin bitmə müddəti və sülh şərtləri (İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsinin nümunəsində)”, *Hərbi bilik*, No. 4 (2020): 5-13.

The duration of the war is extended from its official declaration until the peace or ceasefire agreement is signed (the cessation of decisive hostilities). For each of the parties, the war can have one of the following four outcomes: – defeat; – concession; – gain; – victory. Although very rare in some sources, a stalemate is cited as an outcome of war.³⁶ The question arises, whether it is possible that, both parties achieve the same outcome. For instance, both parties emerge victorious or admit defeat. There are historical examples, in which both parties claimed to gain victory, such as the Gulf War. There are also examples, in which a party won all battles, but lost the war and vice versa. For example, there is not any particular battle engraved in history that, the US Army lost in Afghanistan. However, we cannot say that the US emerged victorious in this country. Britain won an almost unbroken string of tactical military victories during the war against the Republic of Indonesia in the 1960s, yet it proved difficult to translate this into strategic success.³⁷ In the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan achieved the highest of presented outcomes – victory.³⁸ Because the determination of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the capabilities of Azerbaijan Armed Forces, the unity of people allowed it to achieve this outcome. Thus, on November 10, 2020, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation signed a joint statement on the termination of the war. With this statement, the victory of Azerbaijan and the capitulation of Armenia were unequivocally declared. If before the war, Armenia had an opportunity to gain from the conflict (granting autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh), in the first stage of the Second Karabakh War (when Azerbaijani Army launched counter-offensive operations and broke the enemy's line of defense) it was apparent that, Erevan was completely deprived of the last two consequences. From the first days of the war, Azerbaijan began to lay down conditions. It should be noted that official sources show that, the loss of personnel of the Armenian army was around 3500. However, it is a fact that the Armenian leadership hid the number of casualties from the people, refused to take hundreds of corpses left on the battlefield, and presented the dead soldiers as missing or fugitives. As early as mid-October, Turkish and Russian media reported that the Armenian army had lost about 8,000 men and in

³⁶ Branislav L. Slantchev, *Ibid.*

³⁷ Christopher Tuck, *Confrontation, Strategy and War Termination Britain's Conflict with Indonesia* (Routledge, 2013).

³⁸ Branislav L. Slantchev, *Ibid.*

early November about 13,000.³⁹ These numbers include wounded as well. Because in case the soldier is injured and cannot continue his active duty, then he is a loss for the country. With Richardson's approach, Armenia (about 2.5 million) lost more than 0.05% of its population in early November, which was one of the main reasons for its defeat. Armenia, which suffered a large loss of personnel and military equipment, could have prevented the subsequent loss by accepting the terms of the Azerbaijani side at that time. However, the unstable political leadership of Armenia could not make a realistic assessment of the situation. Thus, Armenia faced the worst outcome of the war. In this war, Azerbaijan won a decisive victory. However, there are those who claim that the Azerbaijani Army could have liberated other occupied territories by continuing the attack. In our opinion, this is an unprofessional approach. The geographical relief of Kalbajar and Lachin, fortifications in the direction of Aghdara–Aghdam were the most challenging, even insurmountable obstacles for the advance of Azerbaijani Army. Undoubtedly, the victorious Azerbaijani soldier would be able to fight and liberate these territories from occupation. However, it is also clear that these operations would have not been possible without losses and the weather conditions would have a negative impact on the advance of the Army. Therefore, at this juncture, Sun Tzu's the "battle-avoidance theory" (winning without fighting a battle) was put into action: *"Winning one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill"*.⁴⁰ President Ilham Aliyev's diplomatic efforts paid off and other lands were liberated from Armenian control without incurring additional losses. As Clausewitz stated: *"War ought to be thought of not as an isolated phenomenon with its own standards of success and failure but instead as one more instrument for pursuing national objectives that also get pursued through diplomacy or other instruments"*.⁴¹ Richard Simpkin also supports limiting the use of military force. He observed: *"The proper aim of conventional armed forces may therefore be not to defeat the enemy, but to the situation at some different level, thus allowing negotiation or mediation to resume ... In sum, diplomacy becomes a continuation of war by other means"*.⁴² Azerbaijani leadership wanted the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from occupied territories and the "agreement of November 10th" stipulates it. Therefore, this is a document,

³⁹ Heydər Piriyyəv, Rəşad Tahirov, Xəyal İskəndərov, "Müharibənin bitmə müddəti və sülh şərtləri (İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsinin nümunəsində)", Ibid.

⁴⁰ Li-Sheng Kuo, Ibid.

⁴¹ Paul R. Pillar, "The American Way of War and Delusions of 'Victory'". August 17, 2021. <https://bit.ly/3nZNbrs>.

⁴² Michael C. Griffith, Ibid, 10.

which was signed sharp on time in favor of Azerbaijan. Another cause for concern is the temporary deployment of Russian troops in Karabakh. There is a claim that, *“If the war had continued until the last Armenian soldier was withdrawn from the occupied territories, there would have been no need to deploy Russian troops”*. This is not the right approach. Again referring to Clausewitz: *“As the war progresses, it is possible to establish a new aim in response to perceived stalemate, success, or failure”*.⁴³ Where competing objectives of warring nations are concerned, one or possibly both nations must adjust aims if the war is to be terminated. If the original aims were mutually attainable, the war would have been unnecessary. Clausewitz noted that political ends and therefore military ends do require change. This changing of strategic aims has been suggested as the rule rather than the exception as the war progresses.⁴⁴ The aim of the political and military leadership was to expel the Armenian occupiers, the Armenian soldiers and the Army successfully carried out this duty. Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh are Azerbaijani citizens. Expelling them from their place of residence has never been envisaged in the Azerbaijani political course. As President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly stated, 90% of the military forces fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh were Armenian citizens. The temporary deployment of Russian troops in Karabakh might not be on the table while the war was going on. However, it became a necessity in order to terminate the war. Therefore, the deployment of Russian troops in the Armenian-populated part of Karabakh serves the purpose of Azerbaijan as a whole. Because if there were no Russian soldiers on the ground, no one could guarantee that the provocateurs from Armenia would not try to create the image of “Azerbaijanis killing the poor armenians” by murdering some of the Armenians living in Karabakh, as they did in the past. The composition of the temporarily based troops is another question, whether they have to be comprised of Russians or other nations. This question might be addressed depending on the performance of current soldiers. From this point of view, Azerbaijan's military and diplomatic victory should not be overshadowed. Furthermore, a center comprised of Turkish and Russian military personnel was created on January 30, 2021 to monitor the peaceful situation in Karabakh Economic Zone. That is also a strong deterrence against further escalation of any conflict emanating from Armenia.

⁴³ Michael C. Griffith, *Ibid*, 8.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*.

Regarding the outcome of the Second Karabakh War, we may highlight four factors suggested by Rudolph J. Rummel, which precipitated its termination (Table 1).⁴⁵

Table 1. Factors that precipitate termination of war
(in the example of the Second Karabakh War)

Factors	Country	
	Azerbaijan	Armenia
domestic coherence	+	-
consistent expectations of the outcome	+	-
shift in military power	+	-
ideological devaluation	+	-

Table 1 shows that all four factors were in favor of Azerbaijan, which makes it a primary actor that dictated the terms of termination. There is not any single factor out of four, which was in favor of Armenia. Thus, domestic opposition was immediately apparent in Armenia, after Azerbaijani Army liberated the town of Shusa. In the contrary, Azerbaijanis demanded further advancement of the Army namely towards Khankendi, which in fact affected the moral of Armenians nationwide and made several thousand soldiers desert their military units. Regarding the second factor, as we mentioned earlier, armenians were claiming “new territories” before the war. However, they were disillusioned just at the outbreak of the war. The expectations of the Azerbaijani leadership was to liberate all occupied territories with minimum loss and it was achieved by the signing of November 10, 2020 agreement. According to the Global Fire Force 2020 Index, Azerbaijan had 5 times superiority in tanks and 50% in other systems, such as Air Defence, self-propelled artillery, towed artillery, MLRS and APC.⁴⁶ Having considered that, the Azerbaijani Army had destroyed about 400 tanks and other armored vehicles, 1,000 guns and howitzers, 80 air defense systems of the Armenian armed forces and taken huge number of trophies, the difference in military power had been dramatically increased in favor of Azerbaijan. Regarding the last factor, it should be mentioned

⁴⁵ Rudolph J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War: War, Power, Peace* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1979).

⁴⁶ Global Firepower 2020. <https://www.globalfirepower.com>.

that, there was an Armenian ideology, which was based on delusion. Armenians had been manipulated throughout decades by the myth of “Great Armenia – from sea (Black) to sea (Caspian)”. In the Second Karabakh war, this myth was shattered and the ordinary people faced the stark reality – the ideological devaluation.

CONCLUSION

The war can be prolonged if there is a balance between the opportunities and capabilities of the parties. However, the reality is that, even though having considered Armenia’s illegally formed arsenal, there was a significant difference between the armed forces of the parties in favor of Azerbaijan in terms of strength, power and capabilities. The number of weapons and equipment destroyed by the Azerbaijani Army shows that not only the resources available in the Armenian Army were devastated, but also the weapons and equipment provided illegally by their supporters were exhausted. This made possible only two of the options regarding the outcome of the war for the Armenian leadership: concession and defeat. In early November, Pashinyan said that no concessions could be made. However, Pashinyan proved that he was wrong in almost all his decisions throughout the war. The main reason for this was that the entire military elite, including the Minister of Defense deceived him. Second, counterintelligence agencies acted inefficiently. The fact that the heads of these bodies have resigned or been removed from office proves our argument. In fact, Armenia's “resistance” and the mobilization of the remaining personnel were intended to save the government. Pashinyan and his team wanted to create the image of “We did our best” to absolve themselves of responsibility for the historic defeat. However, this approach was more dangerous than accepting the terms of Azerbaijan. Considering the real situation on the battlefield, the difference between the available resources, the determination of the Azerbaijani soldier and the despondency of the Armenian army, Armenia’s “resistance” would not have lasted long. The political and military leadership of Armenia knew it very well. Ordinary Armenians were unaware and believed in the leadership's tales about the war. Therefore, most ordinary Armenians were surprised when the Armenian government signed the capitulation agreement. Undoubtedly, the Armenian leadership saved itself from complete defeat by accepting the

conditions of Azerbaijan and making concessions. As Pashinyan himself admitted, if the war had not stopped, 20,000 to 30,000 Armenian soldiers would have perished on the battlefield.⁴⁷

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⁴⁷ Pashinyan doesn't want the war to stop - President Ilham Aliyev. November 4, 2020. <https://www.e-huquq.az/en/news/politics/20404.html>.

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