Methods to assess effects of cable failures caused by fire

• Autorzy: Piljugin E. , Herb J. , Röwekamp M. , Berg H, P.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

It is state-of-the-art that a Level 1 PSA also includes a fire PSA for all plant operational states. In performing Fire PSA not only the malfunction of the components has to be assessed but also all supply systems and cables have to be traced for a given component. In the past it was assumed in the case of a fire in a compartment that all components and cables in that compartment are not functional anymore. However, this is in many cases a too conservative approach and could lead to overestimated fire induced core damage frequencies. Therefore, a method is necessary to assess in a more realistic manner the effects of cables failures caused by fire. Such a procedure requires a sound data base on equipment, list of cables and their properties as well as cable routing. Two methods are described which are currently developed. One of them is a cable failure mode and effect analysis which is easier to apply in practice.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

cable failure; fire; probabilistic risk assessment; FMEA

• Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Bezpieczeństwa i Niezawodności
• Czasopismo: Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association
• Rocznik: 2011
• Tom: Vol. 2, No. 1
• Strony: 163--170
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 11 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Piljugin E.

• Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, Köln, Germany

autor

Herb J.

• Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, Köln, Germany

autor

Röwekamp M.

• Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, Köln, Germany

autor

Berg H, P.

• Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Salzgitter, Germany

Bibliografia

• [1] Collins, H.J. et al. (1976). Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire, NUREG-0050, U.S. NRC.
• [2] Electric Power Research Institute – EPRI (2002). Spurious Actuation of Electrical Circuits Due to Cable Fires: Results of an Expert Elicitation”, EPRI 1006961, Palo Alto, CA, USA.
• [3] Electric Power Research Institute – EPRI (2005). EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities, NUREG/CR-6850, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
• [4] Hosser D. et al. (2005). Durchführung von weiterführenden Kabelbrandversuchen einschließlich der Präsentation der Ergebnisse im Rahmen des internationalen Projektes ICFMP, Schriftenreihe Reaktorsicherheit und Strahlenschutz des Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, BMU, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn, Germany.
• [5] Keski-Rahkonen, O. et al. (1997). Derating of cables at high temperatures, VTT Publications 302, Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, Finland.
• [6] LaChance, J. L. et al. (2003). Circuit Analysis – Failure Mode and Likelihood Analysis. NUREG/CR-6834, prepared for Division of Risk Analysis and Applications Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
• [7] Mangs, J. et al. (1999). Failure distribution in instrumental cables in fire, OECD/STUK Workshop on Fire Risk Assessment, Helsinki, Finland.
• [8] Riese, O. et al. (2006). Evaluation of Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications. Benchmark Exercise No 5, Flame Spread in Cable Tray Fires”, Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, GRS – 214, Köln, Germany.
• [9] Scott, R.L. (1976). Browns Ferry Nuclear Power-Plant Fire on Mar. 22, 1975. Nuclear Safety, Vol. 17, No.5.
• [10] Türschmann, M. et al. (2010). Methoden zur Durchführung von Brand-PSA im Nichtleistungsbetrieb, GRS-A-3579, Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Köln, Germany (published in German).
• [11] Wyant, F.J. &. Nowlen, S.P. (2002). Cable Insulation Resistance Measurements during Cable Fire Tests, NUREG/CR-6776, U.S. NRC.