O kojarzeniu małżeństw i rekrutacji kandydatów do szkół

• Autorzy: Świtalski Zbigniew

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.14708/wm.v44i01.5084

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

EN

In the paper we describe the model of Gale and Shapley concerning marriage matchings and college admissions (American Mathematical Monthly, 69 (1962), 9-15). We review some results and applications of the Gale-Shapley theory. We also analyze problems of recruitment of candidates to schools in Poland from the point of view of this theory.

• Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
• Czasopismo: Wiadomości Matematyczne
• Rocznik: 2008
• Tom: T. 44, Nr 1
• Strony: 35--46
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 29 poz.,

Twórcy

autor

Świtalski Zbigniew

• Wydział Matematyki, Informatyki i Ekonometrii Uniwersytet Zielonogórski ul. Szafrana 4a, 65-516 Zielona Góra

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7098-6229

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

PL

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MEiN, umowa nr SONP/SP/546092/2022 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2022-2023).