Allocating Pooled Inventory According to Contributions and Entitlements

• Autorzy: Gerchak Y.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.7494/dmms.2015.9.1.51

• Konferencja: 10th Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING10)
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Inventory pooling, whether by centralization of stock or by mutual assistance, is known to be beneficial when demands are uncertain. But when the retailers are independent, the question is how to divide the benefits of pooling. e consider a decentralized inventorypooling scheme where a retailer’s entitlements to the allocation during a shortage depend on his/her contributions to the pool. We derive the Nash equilibrium and specialize it to symmetric cases.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

inventory pooling; retailer contributions; entitlements; Nash equilibrium

• Wydawca: AGH University of Science and Technology Press
• Czasopismo: Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: Vol. 9, no. 1
• Strony: 51--54
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 9 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Gerchak Y.

• Tel Aviv University, Department of Industrial Engineering, Israel

Bibliografia

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• 2. Cho, S.-H., Tang, C.S., 2014. Capacity Allocation under Retail Competition: Uniform and Competitive Allocations. Operations Research, Articles in Advance.
• 3. Friedman, J.W., 1984. Game Theory with Applications in Economics, Oxford University Press.
• 4. Gerchak, Y., Gupta, D., 1991. On Apportioning Costs to Customers in Centralized Continuous Review Inventory Systems. Journal of Operations Management, 10, pp. 546–551.
• 5. Gerchak, Y., Schwarz, G., 2014. Supply Chain Coordination with Multiple Rerailers and Non-Linear Production Costs.
• 6. Hartman, B.C., Dror, M., Shaked, M., 2000. Cores of Inventory Centralization Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 31, pp. 26–49.
• 7. Montruccio, L., Norde, H., Özen, U., Scarsini, M., Slikker, M., 2002. Cooperative Newsvendor Games: A Review. In: J. Choi (ed.), Handbook of Newsvendor Problems, Springer.
• 8. Müller, A., Scarsini, M., Shaked, M., 2002. The Newsvendor Game has a non-Empty Core. Games and Economic Behavior, 38, pp. 118–126.
• 9. Shao, J., Krishnan, H., McCormick, S.T., 2011. Incentives for Transshipment in a Supply Chain with Decentralized Retailers. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 13, pp. 361–370.