On the “cracking” scheme in the paper “A directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system” by Gunn, Allison and Abbott

• Autorzy: Chen H.-P. , Kish L. B. , Granqvist C. G. , Schmera G.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.2478/mms-2014-0033

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Recently, Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf] proposed a new scheme to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. We proved in a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450016] that GAA’s mathematical model is unphysical. Here we analyze GAA’s cracking scheme and show that, in the case of a loss-free cable, it provides less eavesdropping information than in the earlier (Bergou)-Scheuer-Yariv mean-square-based attack [Kish LB, Scheuer J, Phys. Lett. A 374:2140-2142 (2010)], while it offers no information in the case of a lossy cable. We also investigate GAA’s claim to be experimentally capable of distinguishing - using statistics over a few correlation times only - the distributions of two Gaussian noises with a relative variance difference of less than 10^-8. Normally such distinctions would require hundreds of millions of correlations times to be observable. We identify several potential experimental artifacts as results of poor KLJN design, which can lead to GAA’s assertions: deterministic currents due to spurious harmonic components caused by ground loops, DC offset, aliasing, non-Gaussian features including non-linearities and other non-idealities in generators, and the timederivative nature of GAA’s scheme which tends to enhance all of these artifacts.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

KLJN key exchange; information theoretic security; unconditional security

• Wydawca: Komitet Metrologii i Aparatury Naukowej PAN
• Czasopismo: Metrology and Measurement Systems
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: Vol. 21, nr 3
• Strony: 389--400
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 15 poz., rys., wykr., wzory

Twórcy

autor

Chen H.-P.

• Texas A&M University, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, College Station, TX 77843-3128, USA

autor

Kish L. B.

• Texas A&M University, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, College Station, TX 77843-3128, USA

autor

Granqvist C. G.

• Department of Engineering Sciences, The Angström Laboratory, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 534, SE-75121 Uppsala, Sweden

autor

Schmera G.

• Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego, CA 92152, USA

Bibliografia

• [1] Gunn, L.J., Allison, A., Abbott, D. (2014) A directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system. Manuscript http://arxiv.org/abs/1402.2709 (2014) versions 1 and 2.
• [2] Chen, H-P., Kish, L.B., Granqvist, C.G., Schmera, G. (2014) Do electromagnetic waves exist in a short cable at low frequencies? What does physics say? Fluct. Noise Lett. 13:1450016 (1-13), http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.4664, http://vixra.org/abs/1403.0964.
• [3] Kish, L.B., Scheuer, J. (2010) Noise in the wire: The real impact of wire resistance for the Johnson (-like) noise based secure communicator. Phys. Lett. A 374:2140-2142.
• [4] Nevels, R.D. This flaw of GAA’s [1], based on misusing Eq. 1 for steady-state signals instead of for pulses, was first pointed out by Dr. Nevels in private communications (March 2014).
• [5] Mingesz, R., Kish, L.B., Gingl, Z. (2008) Johnson(-like)-noise-Kirchhoff-loop based secure classical communicator characteristics, for ranges of two to two thousand kilometers, via model-line. Phys. Lett. A 372:978-984.
• [6] Horvath, T., Kish, L.B., Scheuer, J. (2011) Effective privacy amplification for secure classical communications, EPL (formerly Europhys. Lett.) 94:28002/1 -28002/6.
• [7] Kish, L.B., Abbott, D., Granqvist, C.G, (2013) Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme. PLoS ONE 8:e81810/1 - e81810/15.
• [8] Smuiko, J. (2014) Performance analysis of the “intelligent” Kirchhoffs-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange. Fluct. Noise Lett., in press.
• [9] Gingl, Z., Mingesz, R. (2014) Noise properties in the ideal Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure communication system. PLoS ONE 9:e96109/1-e96109/4. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096109.
• [10] Mingesz, R., Vadai, G., Gingl, Z. (2014) What kind of noise guarantees security for the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson-noise key exchange? Fluct. Noise Lett., in press. http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.1196.
• [11] Rényi, A. (2007) Probability Theory, Dover Publ., Mineola, NY, USA.
• [12] Mingesz, R., Kish, L.B., Gingl, Z., Granqvist, C.G., Wen, H., Peper, F., Eubanks, T., Schmera, G. (2013) Unconditional security by the laws of classical physics. Metrol. Measurem. Syst. XX:3-16. http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/mms.2013.20.issue-1/mms-2013-0001/mms-2013-0001.xml.
• [13] Kish, L.B. (2013) Enhanced secure key exchange systems based on the Johnson-noise scheme. Metrol. Measurem. Syst. XX:191-204. http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/mms.2013.20.issue-2/mms-2013 0017/mms-2013-0017.xml.
• [14] Kish, L.B., Horvath, T. (2009) Notes on recent approaches concerning the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise-based secure key exchange. Phys. Lett. A 373:2858-2868.
• [15] Kish, L.B, (2006) Totally secure classical communication utilizing Johnson(-like) noise and Kirchhoffs law. Phys. Lett. A 352:178-18.