Modele gry producentów energii elektrycznej na rynku spotowym

• Autorzy: Borgosz-Koczwara M. , Wyłomańska A.
• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

EN

The emerging electricity market behaves more like an oligopoly than a perfectly competitive market due to special features such as few producers, barrier to entry, transmission constraints. This makes it practicable for only a few independent power suppliers to serve a given geographic region. On this market each power supplier can extend his own profit through the application of the optimal bidding strategy. This paper compares a cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to analyzing the day ahead market as an example of a spot market. Recent work has shown that the profit maximizing problem of the power suppliers can be written as a mathematical model. By considering these two cases as a game theory problem, the existence of Nash points are analyzed in the Cournot model.

Słowa kluczowe

PL

teoria gier; model matematyczny; model Cournota; punkty Nash; rynek energii elektrycznej

EN

game theory; mathematical model; Cournot model; Nash points; electricity market

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Systems : journal of transdisciplinary systems science
• Rocznik: 2008
• Tom: Vol. 13, spec. iss. 1/2
• Strony: 141--147
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 8 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Borgosz-Koczwara M.

• Instytut Matematyki i Informatyki, Politechnika Wrocławska, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław

autor

Wyłomańska A.

• Instytut Organizacji i Zarządzania, Politechnika Wrocławska, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław

Bibliografia

• [1] LA. BARROSO, R.D. CARNEIRO, S. GRANVILLE, M.V.PEREIRA, M.FAMPA, Nash equilibrium in strategie bidding: a binary expansion approach, IEEE Trans. Power Syst, vol. 21 no.2: 629-638, 2006
• [2] M. BORGOSZ-KOCZWARA, A. WYŁOMAŃSKA, The equilibrium models in oligopoly electricity market. In: “The European Electricity Market EEM-04": 67-75, 2004
• [3] M. BORGOSZ-KOCZWARA, A. WYŁOMAŃSKA, Optimal bidding strategies on energy market under imperfect information, In: "The European Electricity Market EEM-05": 67-73,2005
• [4] C.J. DAY, B.E HOBBS, Oligopolistic competition in power networks: A conjectured supply function approach, IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol.17 no.3: 597-607, 2002
• [5] R.D. LUCE, H. RATFFA, Games and Decisions: An Introduction and Critical Survey, Willey & Sons, 1957.
• [6] J. NASH, Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of the USA 36(1): 48-49,1950
• [7] N.I. VOROPAI, F,.Y. IVANOVA, Shapley game for expansion planning of generating companies at many non-coincident criteria, IEEE Trans. Power Syąt, vol.21 no.4: 1630-1637, 2006
• [8] http://www.polpx.pl