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National Defensive and Defense Strategies. Selected Planning Problems

Abstract

The overall objective of undertaken research is to present national reflection on defense in Poland, in particular an image of the defense planning culture. The article focuses on issues of defense strategy planning as a part of the complete state defensive strategy and indicates the necessary directions for changes in the essence of defense planning in the light of changes in the security and defense environment of Poland in the 21st century.

In the study use has been made of an analysis and a critical review of normative documents, strategies and doctrines. The collected data allow the indication of changes of an application nature (projection method) to the theory of strategic planning in the field of national defense. This allowed proving that the future desired position of Poland in regional and even continental Europe depends on the anticipated direction of development of Polish defense potential, defense system, and of course, a clearly expressed strategy. The most important element of the three listed ones is naturally the strategy, the preparation of which requires regular cycles of strategic reviews, which are unfortunately not feasible in Poland. The article also emphasizes the importance of assuring the stability of the planning system, the basic element of which are experts, and whose regular fluctuation as a result of constant political changes causes a considerable destabilization of the planning system. Finally, attention is drawn to the fact that the defense strategy must take into account the complexity and unpredictability of the security environment – which are its basic features today.

Keywords: defensive strategy, defense strategy, strategic planning

Narodowe strategie obronności. Wybrane zagadnienia planistyczne

Abstrakt

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie narodowej refleksji nad obronnością w Polsce, w szczególności obrazu kultury planowania obronnego. W artykule skupiono się na zagadnieniach

planowania strategii obronnej – części zupełnej strategii obronności państwa i wskazano niezbędne kierunki zmian istoty planowania obronnego w świetle zmian w środowisku bezpieczeństwa i obronności Polski w XXI wieku.

W artykule zastosowano analizę i krytykę dokumentów normatywnych państwa, jego strategii i doktryn. Zebrane dane pozwoliły wskazać konieczne zmiany w teorii planowania strategicznego (metoda projekcji) w zakresie obronności państwa. W efekcie udało się wykazać, że przyszła, pożądana pozycja Polski w wymiarze regionalnym, a nawet w skali Europy, czyli kontynentalnej, zależy od jasno określonego kierunku rozwoju potencjału obronnego kraju, systemu obronnego i oczywiście jasno sformułowanej strategii. Najważniejszym elementem spośród trzech wymienionych jest oczywiście strategia, której przygotowanie wymaga regularnych cykli przeglądów strategicznych, których w Polsce nie ma. Artykuł podkreśla również znaczenie stabilności systemu planowania, w którym eksperci są podstawowym elementem, a których regularna fluktuacja na skutek ustawicznych zmian politycznych, skutkuje głęboką destabilizacją systemu planowania. Na koniec zwraca się uwagę na fakt, iż strategia obronna musi uwzględniać złożoność i nieprzewidywalność środowiska bezpieczeństwa – które są dzisiaj jego podstawową cechą.

Słowa kluczowe: strategia obronności, strategia obronna, planowanie strategiczne

1. Introduction

The defensive strategy¹ is one of the most important doctrinal documents of the state, which determines its military security. Meanwhile, Poland does not have such a strategy at disposal, because the last one was released back in 2009. When I started working on this article, I wondered if such a strategy is a document that could serve as a reference point for comparisons, analyses and assessments executed in this part of the work.

1 In the first place defensive and defense strategies need to be clarified. In NATO countries there is almost only a concept of defense, which means the ability of a state to confront military threats. In Poland, in military science, two concepts have been developed: defensive and defense. The defense strategy comprises problems associated with the preparation of the State to oppose any possible military threats, but also a set of activities aimed at creating and taking chances in this field. The concept of defense is, however, narrower, more functional, mainly in opposing, but already specific, identified military threats. In this sense, the concept of defense is narrower and is part of a collection of defense problems, and is part of it.

Initially I decided that it did not make sense – a document of merely a doctrinal nature dating ten years back has at most a museum value and could be an interesting source of knowledge for historians dealing with the history of strategic thought. However, a reflection hit me some time later that something should be referred to, that although the strategy has a retrospective value, yet it is the only one that can be analyzed and assessed. Someone might say that as a result of the 2016 Strategic Defense Review, the Defense Concept of the Republic of Poland was developed and published (May 2017). And yes, it was published, however, it was not the Polish Defensive Capability Strategy, but a defense concept, and that is not quite the same thing. The crucial point here is that in Poland these two concepts are notoriously confused and in general I get the impression that the system of concepts and meanings is getting worse despite the years that have passed since their dissemination. I will try to explain these differences in the second point of this article, preceding them with a general reflection on the defensive capability of our state in part one, and finally, in part three, I will point out selected problems of defensive capability planning. The purpose of this article is to present the main problems of non-compliance of the Polish defense strategy with conditions of the modern and projected state security environment. Using the method of analyses and critical reviews of literature, source materials as well as existing strategies, I put forward the presumption that the scope of problems solved in the defensive strategic documents is absolutely incompatible with the challenges faced by the state in the 21st century.

2. Reflection on defensive matters

Some time ago, in 2001, the best book ever published was devoted to the Strategic Defense Review (Rutkowski, 2001). The thoughts, observations, and comments contained in it, at the time extremely to the point, I decided to read again in order to reflect on their current relevance. I have quoted selected fragments below to make the reader aware of how little, contrary to the author's hopes and expectations, has changed in the Polish reality since then. Among other things, we read that the established awareness of the necessity and purposefulness of socializing the process of shaping the state defensive capability could set a new and hopefully lasting political norm, a new standard of the attitudes assumed by people and groups from the ruling sphere. Such an approach reflects progressive changes taking place in the attitude taken by the society towards defensive capability and the army. These changes in consciousness and attitudes,

in turn, express an increasingly common and deeper understanding in managerial areas assuming that (Rutkowski, 2001, pp. 18–19):

- It is not the army that is responsible for defensive capability;
- It is not the General Staff that determines the size and shape of the army, resources, and defense preparations;
- It is not the army, but rather the state that will wage eventual wars;
- The defensive capability of the state, in spite of the present-day peace and the prospects for its maintenance, is a matter of ongoing concern that is of constant and fundamental significance for the fate of all of us, our values, interests, and the state;
- Making any choices and implementing any decisions related to defensive capability takes place at the expense of the whole society at the price of changes in other decisions regulating other spheres of life of the state, society;
- Failing in or delaying these choices also costs, often more;
- Today's army and today's defensive capability are the result of decisions and actions taken or not taken several years ago;
- If we entrust the government with the concern for our security, then we want to know and be convinced that it is able to provide us with the desired degree of security and that the implemented activities actually lead to this goal.

The first observations that came to my mind after reading the passage are such that our society is convinced that it is the army that is responsible for defensive capability, and that in the event of a conflict or war, it is only the armed forces that will take any defense action. But that is not true. War is waged by the state and its nation (Shurkin, Gordon, Frederick, Pernin, 2017, p. 3.). Always. The conviction that the armed forces would solve any problem of a possible war, unfortunately, is well grounded in the society and is also found among a large part of the political elite. Attempts at changing this state of affairs can be seen in activities of the current government, which, by implementing the plan to expand Territorial Defense Forces (Polish abbreviation: WOT), is placing emphasis on this aspect. I do not judge here the substantive rightness of the concept of creating WOT, this is not what this article is about, and I myself, considering the ongoing debate in this country with varying intensity at various times, do not intend to support neither side.

In Poland there is no system of strategic reviews at the state level, which results in a completely disordered, chaotic and ad hoc strategy planning system. However, it must be honestly admitted that attempts to build an integrated system of state strategies have been undertaken during the Strategic Review of National Security (Ministry of

National Development, 2012). Unfortunately, the concept proposed at that time did not come into full force. Accordingly, strategic decisions regarding defensive strategy, including the defense system as well as the development of the armed forces, are considered in a temporary, uncoordinated manner, in detached directions and often under the influence of the moment and sudden unexpected events, although scientific achievements and practice say something completely different, which is also the case in other countries (Cohen, 2018, pp. 1–2). It is not difficult to get the feeling that this very important area of state activity has at times been the subject of political propaganda, with various political groups that happen to be in power ascribing to themselves the merits, achievements, and spectacular successes. Meanwhile, coordination of defense efforts, more precisely, of all state defensive matters, must be comprehensive, systematic, connected into a coherent whole. It is impossible to repair the system by making modifications in selected areas, in fragments. This is first.

Secondly, the argument that today's army and the present defensive capability arise from decisions and actions taken or not taken several years ago (which is absolutely right) is so strong enough that it should also determine the way of thinking about the future. Yes, the present government decisions will determine Poland's defense capability over the next fifteen or twenty years. This leads to the following presumption: in order to streamline the whole system, one needs to build a coherent, defensive strategy that will take into account the expectations and needs of armed forces, but also other tools of state power. I emphasize once again: we are talking about the defense capability of the state, where the armed forces of states are only an important element, certainly of fundamental importance, but certainly one of many. The Polish Armed Forces belong to one of the two subsystems of the state defense system: the military subsystem and the non-military subsystem. Well, the essence of the state defensive policy, which is then expressed in the Defensive Capability Strategy, is to join all these elements together into a unified organism capable of operating under conditions of conflict and war. I will quote here a fragment of this outdated Defensive Capability Strategy of 2009 (Ministry of National Defense, 2009).

“Defense tasks, as part of the tasks in the field of national security, include undertakings implemented by executive organs and other state institutions and entrepreneurs as well as the citizens concerned with the preparation of the state, for efficient survival and action under the conditions of external threat, crisis and war to the state, the implementation of specific operational projects in these conditions, as well as removal of effects after the threat is over, aimed at restoring the state of normal functioning of

the state” (Ministry of National Defense, 2009, p. 15). The quoted passage applies to the present. However, the essence of the strategy is to look for solutions for the future. This strategy does not mention it. The cited above general postulate (which, by the way, should be detailed in subordinately submitted strategic implementing directives) might also find a place in the new Defensive Strategy; however, since this is not available, then probably the subordinately submitted documents are very outdated today. There are opinions in political milieus that the current National Security Strategy (National Security Bureau, 2020) provides solutions. Unfortunately, that is not true. The Security Strategy is a document of a different type, different scopes of problems, and defense issues are outlined in it in a very general way. The role of this strategy is also different, it is also not the essence of this article.

Returning to the mainstream of this article, let us imagine a situation that there is an armed conflict with the Russian Federation, let it be a localized conflict other than war (on a scale below the threshold of war). Let us also imagine a relocation of a developed mechanized division of the Polish Army from the west to the east in conditions of growing panic, chaos and disinformation. Someone has to organize this movement to the fighting area, ensure all logistics, enable road and rail traffic to flow more smoothly, etc. I am afraid that this could be catastrophic – cooperation at this level is only theoretical. And we are talking here merely about the cooperation of the armed forces with selected elements of the non-military system. But that does not exhaust the problem. In Poland there is quite a large uniformed formation: the Border Guard for example. How should cooperation of border guards and armed forces be like in the conditions of conflict and war? Well, it is not quite clear. The document that should specify the basis for the deployment and operation of all elements of the state defense system is the defensive strategy along with the resulting subordinate directive and implementation documents. At the present day we only have a decision of the Minister of National Defense of March 14, 2020 on the use of troops and subunits of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland to assist units of the Border Guard (Ministry of Defense, 2020). On the basis of the decision in question, the Minister of National Defense ordered to assign subunits of the Polish Armed Forces to the Border Guards to protect the border, including open and closed border crossings. However, such a decision does not constitute a component of a comprehensive defensive strategy. It does not solve the problem of armaments, equipment, common command system, etc. (Jagnieža, 2020). Rather, doing this is like repairing individual parts of a system without considering all its complexity. It is an ad hoc and chaotic action. It definitely has nothing to do with strategic thinking.

The presented general reflections on the defensive capability strategy of the Republic of Poland have convinced me to provide a short systematization of concepts related with the defensive capability and the defense categories.

3. Defensive strategy and defense strategy

The defensive strategy of the state is its field of activity, the whole spectrum of actions directed at and counteracting military threats to the security of the state using all necessary (military and non-military) resources, means, tools and methods specified in the concept (strategy) of security directly subordinated to the security policy. Its essence is now limited to answering two questions:

- how should the state operate in conditions of potential military threats?
- how does the state intend to oppose military threats?

As may be seen, reactive attitude to the state activities in the field of security is dominant here, and that has nothing to do with contemporary conditions of security. Meanwhile, much more emphasis should be put on creativity, anticipatory actions, of course not rejecting reactive ones (Garetto, 2019). For the time being, the logic of thinking about a defensive strategy, in which the state and its institutions and tools prepare only for a few types of reaction situations, has already become obsolete. Since the number of possible combinations: forms of activities, participating entities, combat measures, tools, etc. is difficult to predict and describe today, it will be more productive to design activities based on identified chances and opportunities. According to this approach, the pre-determined definition could be formulated as follows: state defensive is its field of activity. Its overall activities aimed at creating and exploiting opportunities and countering any military threat to state security with the use of all necessary (military and non-military) resources, means, tools, and methods specified in the concept (strategy) of security, directly subordinated to the security policy. The essence of the defensive strategy is therefore to maximize chances of preserving the existence (survival) in conditions of military threats, and then optimization of the functioning of the state, all areas of its activity in conditions of anticipated threat of occurrence and/or of real occurrence of military threats (Dawidczyk, 2019, pp. 74–75). One should bear in mind that the primary determinant of defensive capability strategy is to maximize the chances of preservation of existence, hence undertaking conceptual and development-gearred actions of creative nature, not just response nature. However, Polish thinking about defense is to wait for possible aggression of a potential

opponent, active preparation for the existence of a specific form of conflict and/or war according to a strategic framework of the scheme. I therefore believe that the vision of state defense could be extended to a more creative approach, which is expressed in the following questions: what new political agreements should be strived at, what new coalitions, what joint political and military activities, and what new forms, ways, tools for doing things should be adopted? What new technologies could be adopted in defense activities? This list can be expanded or made more detailed. Adopting the following orientation also has the advantage of enabling the preparation of the state to carry out operations for which we would be much better prepared than for forced operations imposed by a potential opponent, as confirmed by D. Ochmanek's comment (Ochmanek, 2015).

Defense is part of the state defensive strategy. While the former refers to actions aimed at creating and exploiting opportunities and countering any military threat to state security, defense is already an action against (but only and exclusively) specific military threats. This situation limits the choice of the problems, orienting it and assigning it with a strict scope. The product of the analysis in the field of state defense is therefore a closed set of situations entailing the potential deployment of armed forces in political activities of the state, usually described using a certain number of them (in different countries there are generally three to six, even seven this type of situations). As regards Poland, it can be, for example, an independent, strategic defensive operation against the Russian Federation, or in relation to the same state, conducting a joint, combined defense operation together with NATO forces, etc. Therefore, the state prepares specific variants of actions (types of actions), based on forecasts of political, economic, social, and other processes generally taking place in the immediate vicinity of the state. One has to bear in mind that the concept of state defense, although also carried out by the latter, already involves selected resources, tools, and means allocated to these operations. The concept of state defense is therefore narrower as compared to the concept of the state defence. The above remarks are significant because, since the Defense Concept was established in Poland in 2017 as a result of the Strategic Defense Review carried out in 2016, it does not replace the Defensive Strategy of 2009. It might be solely perceived as being of a complementary nature. Furthermore, as regards this Concept, one more problem should be pointed out, in fact related primarily to terminology, but also highlighting the relative weakness of the entire review system and strategy. It seems that this Defense Concept is actually explicitly the Concept of Military Defense of the State, the essence of which is to oppose specific military

threats with the use of military means and tools. Therefore, if it were a defense concept, subsequently in relation to specific directly mentioned military threats selected in it, it would also allocate other instruments of the state defense policy, e.g. the Police, Border Guard, but also even local government or entrepreneurs assigned with the obligation of executing tasks for the defense of the state. But that did not happen.

As a matter of fact, the document mentions these issues; however, it does not develop them (cited)... “The future Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland must be ready to cooperate with other services in crisis management operations, both on the territory of Poland as well as in allied countries. This task is particularly important in the context of the growing use of irregular activities in our neighborhood. Some situations may require a coordinated response from the military and non-military institutions” (Ministry of National Defense, 2017, p. 41). This appears to be obvious, as they are elements of the non-military system of the state, without which there is no question of defending in the broad sense. In summary, defensive capability, defense, and military defense are concepts belonging to the same set, but with different weight and with different scopes. It should be borne in mind when planning strategies at the state level. In the next third part of the article, I am going to present selected problems of planning the state defensive strategy. Let us start with choosing a general concept.

When Poland joined NATO exactly 20 years ago, both politicians and the military were wondering themselves about how would the state be functioning in the Alliance. This concerned the general concept of national defensive of the country in war, but also in conditions of conflict below war threshold or participation in other allied operations. Do we have a problem with this? Definitely we do. Focusing solely on defense, the considerations of that time could basically be reduced to three basic concepts, which were as follows:

- Polish defense capability exclusively within the Alliance;
- Defense capability mainly within the Alliance and the defined (though never specified) defense independence;
- Finally, defense independence enhanced by Alliance funds.

These three general concepts have always been the subject of political disputes between various political groups, but the vast majority of parties opted for defense capability exclusively within the alliance. NATO uncritical apologists, as the only remedy for Polish security problems, strongly advocated the first option claiming that at any rate Poland had no chance anyway in a clash with a much stronger opponent (such as the Russian Federation) and it is not worth trying any independent actions.

The second option, taken by more enlightened minds, rarely received clear and explicit support and even when it found itself on fertile political grounds, it usually lost to short-term thinking and economic problems (after all, we cannot afford it and our army is too small). The third option has never been taken into account as the basic concept of defensive war in Poland, for it is obvious that our country, as a key player, with merely the support from the allies, is unlikely to win. And this is not about the classified plans to use the Polish armed forces, of which of course I am not familiar with, but about a general vision of national defensive capability. I do fear we still do not have it, or at least it is not sufficiently detailed. It should be emphasized that in countries with already defined political and strategic culture the problem of defensive capability is relatively constant. Regardless of who is in power, the vision remains the same. In Poland, the vision of defensive capability is the vision of party in power, although it must be admitted that even the United States have a problem with political consensus (Foster, 2019). Representatives of one group emphatically sent Polish armed forces abroad “strengthening the image of allied credibility”, usually at the expense of the potential left behind in the country. On the other hand, another group wants stronger defensive capability within the state, greater defense independence. Basically this view can be agreed with; however, it could have been useful if there had been political consensus, agreement across the political parties and a common Polish vision of defensive capability. This is the first, but also a fundamental problem. As I write this, I am overwhelmed by pessimism. While taking part in the meetings of the Parliamentary Forum of National Defense at the Parliament in the 8th Term, I clearly observed the interest and involvement of representatives of certain parties and a total lack of interest and participation of other ones: not participating as a matter of principle. Hence defensive capability and defense problems that should absolutely override political divisions are not as they should be. So how to find a common vision in this respect? As for the choice of the concept of national defensive capability, I personally lean towards the second of the above-mentioned options, assuming that Poland should gradually evolve towards the third. This is certainly a process that takes years, but the vision that Poland’s defensive strategy should be Polish seems possible and, given the circumstances discussed, in my opinion, necessary. The only problem is whether there are politics who would strive for this state of affairs consistently for many years. Let us wait and see.

4. Poland's defensive capability could be asymmetrical

An ensuing problem is the choice of a critical path along which the state will move in search of its identity and some defense separateness. First of all, it is worth paying attention to the motto at the beginning of this chapter (cited) ... "A country like France, if it happens that it must wage war, must wage its own war. It has to be seen to it that defense of France must be French" ... Citing this fragment of the statement of Ch. De Gaulle, it may be worthy to ask the question: could Poland also wage its own war in its own way? Is this even possible? If we look at this issue only through the point of view of our armed potential, there is nothing to talk about. Russia is both a conventional and an atomic power, and the superiority in terms of people, equipment, and technology is incomparable. Yet we are talking here about a defensive strategy and about conducting a possible, future (what type of?) war. Does it, therefore, have to be conducted only in a classical form? Conventional? Should Poland try to counterbalance Russia's potential through a smaller but more modern potential? Is that really the point? There are many forms and methods of conducting warfare, but the principle according to which it is waged is constant: war makes sense only when the anticipated profits outweigh the anticipated losses several times over (Ho, 2015). The question remains whether Poland is able to build potential, not necessarily numerically equivalent, is it able to find the tools that, if used, would discourage and even scare away any potential aggressor? It seems this is so. Modern technology, in combination with some informal, not always recognized forms of action, can be a counterweight to conventional operations. So, if without going into details and technicalities, a potential aggressor starting a war that leads to destruction on a massive scale should reckon with the fact that subsequently, somewhere deep on its territory, an adequate number of its citizens will die. Here we are talking about special actions using one of the unconventional types of weapons (Maxwell, 2014). In a situation where their own state is a victim of aggression, will anyone have the moral right to evaluate such actions later on? It seems so, developing classic military capabilities is important and needed – to scare away and assure defense as long as possible; at the same time awaiting for the support of the Alliance, which we did not join without a reason, and which, in the event of war, would, apart from military support, legitimize the defense operations of the attacked state. But Poland should, like no other, take into account the situation in which it will be alone. That is when even the best, most modern, conventional armament and war concepts prove to be insufficient. Consequently, another problem is the issue of choosing own vision of

national defensive strategy and, looking a little more selectively, forms, methods, and tools for defense in the conditions of overwhelming competitive edge of a potential opponent. This is the question, the solutions of which, especially original, innovative, should be reached so that an opponent is aware that any aggression against Poland will never pay off. Therefore, our problem is to opt for access to technology that gives one the possibility of threatening or actually retaliating in the event of setbacks in classic actions and/or lack of support from your allies. And it does not have to be a nuclear weapon. The current options are much wider and more accessible than they have been twenty years ago (Egel, Robinson, Cleveland, Oates, 2019). Presently cyberspace is today an area of conflict and war and will continue to be that, only to an even greater extent, in the years to come. Poland today recognizes this dimension and is taking the necessary actions to achieve appropriate capabilities, not just by the armed forces alone. It is progressing slowly, but all the same it is progressing, at least in the armed forces. As I mentioned above, the world is asymmetrical. War is asymmetrical too (Long, 2008). Poland's defensive strategy could also be asymmetrical (Cohen *at al*, 2020).

5. In the search for an opponent

An attentive analysis of the 2017 Defense Concept shows among others that Russia is seeking to reinforce its position in the global balance of power with the use of diverse methods. Or that Moscow is ready to destabilize the situation in other countries and to undermine their territorial integrity, explicitly violating international law etc. (Ministry of National Defense, 2017, p. 23). This naturally creates a direct threat to Poland and other countries of the NATO eastern flank. The authors of the Concept also touched on the problems in North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus (because of Russia), possible migrations and terrorism. All that is quite clear, but I think that this is a very one-sided approach. The aggressive policy of the Russian Federation is evident, not only for Poland, but also for its allies (United States Department of Defense, 2018, pp. 1–2). The only problem is that when building its defensive capability, the state does so with the intention described in the long, even very long forecast period. The point is that building specific capabilities of the armed forces and other instruments of state power, the specific concepts of use and operation arising from them, the consistently designed and deployed implementation structures and, finally, the subsequent investments in armaments and equipment is a process whose full effects may be experienced by the army in about fifteen or even twenty years. Naturally we are talking about the target

state, the desired projection. And now Poland is preparing for a possible war with Russia, forgetting that this country is not our only problem. It is not without reason that I emphasized above that the world is unpredictable. So, what if America leaves the NATO and the NATO breaks down, for example in five years (The Economist, 2019)? And what if the European union also falls apart (Taylor, 2019)? Can our vision of enemies and friends remain unchanged? It is like Lord Palmerston said: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow” (Oxford Essential Quotations, 2016). Below are some selected types of possible situations broken down into those conducted within, as well as those conducted outside Poland (Rutkowski *et al.*, 2004, p. 105–107). Some examples are given below, but there are many more. For example, it is worth paying attention to the recently published book by J. Bartosiak, which describes the shape of the new world order including the place of Poland (Bartosiak 2019). However, let us consider the following (Table 1).

Table 1. Possible involvement

On the territory of Poland	
1.	Aggression of a neighboring state against Poland against the background of territorial demands as a result of the breakup of the Alliance (Significant proportions of people surveyed stated a war between EU countries was a realistic possibility over the next decade – Taylor, 2019). The aggressor in coalition with the current “permanent” opponent of Poland. FORM: GENERAL WAR
2.	Secession in a part of the country’s territory against the background of national minority activities, caused by the collapse of the European Union and the rise of hostile political attitudes and behavior in the neighboring country. FORM: INTERNAL CONFLICT ON A SCALE BELOW THE WAR THRESHOLD (CONFLICT OTHER THAN WAR)
3.	Mass migrations to Europe and, consequently, to Poland against the backdrop of climate change in Africa, as well as internal wars going on there and in the Middle East, leading to internal conflict below the war threshold, necessitating the use of armed forces. FORM: INTERNAL CONFLICT ON A SCALE BELOW THE WAR THRESHOLD (CONFLICT OTHER THAN WAR)

Table 1.

On the territory of Poland	
4.	Acts of armed violation of the state border of the Republic of Poland as a result of a conflict between states bordering Poland and/or an attempt to draw Poland into a conflict (the example of Belarus). FORM: EXTENDED MILITARY PRESENCE / LIMITED ARMED CONFLICT
5.	The political upheaval in Poland as a result of deepening internal crisis against the background of deep political, but also economic and social, divisions. FORM: INTERNAL POLITICAL CRISIS LEADING TO ANARCHY.
Outside of the territory of Poland	
1.	Persecution and acts of extermination of the population of Polish origin in the eastern territories of neighboring countries. Forced, limited independent actions due to the formal lack of grounds for the use of armed forces by NATO. FORM: ARMED INTERVENTION OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF POLAND – CONFLICT ON A SCALE OF LIMITED WAR
2.	Evacuation of Polish citizens from territories of countries affected by war or a deep crisis accompanied by acts of violence. FORM: SELF-EVACUATION OPERATION
3.	Special actions of retaliation nature oriented at equipment and installations of critical infrastructure (including nuclear power plants), telecommunications systems, devices of strategic importance for the aggressor as a result of offensive actions undertaken by them. These actions are accompanied by a total lack of political will in NATO and the EU and fear caused by possible retaliatory action on their countries' territories. FORM: SPECIAL ACTIONS – LIMITED ARMED CONFLICT
4.	Actions disrupting and disorganizing reconnaissance (satellite, space, radio-electronic) of hostile countries without the participation of NATO. FORM: SPECIAL ACTIONS – CONFLICT OTHER THAN WAR

Source: author.

As can be seen, the presented set of situations of possible deployment of the Polish armed forces can be divided into those carried out in the country as well as those implemented outside its territory, at a war level and also those below war threshold. Of course, the number of these situations could be higher. I have presented here an

example of a fairly broad spectrum of these situations in order to prove that defending a state against possible aggression from Russia is not our only concern. And that the spectrum of these situations should not be limited to a narrow part of realities surrounding us. Let us take a look at some of them.

Planning situation No. 1: War with a current ally, a member state of NATO. Can this be ruled out? I do not think so. The sustainability of the Alliance has already been severely strained today by Turkey's, the eastern anchor of NATO, rather ambivalent attitude. Moreover, it is not about Turkey, but about the instability of the safety environment in the long term. So, can today's ally be tomorrow's enemy? It is enough to recall the Second World War and *Operation Catapult* and as part of it, among others, the British attack the French fleet gathered in Mers-el Kebir on July 3, 1940. I do not say that the Alliance will fall apart, I mention only that this is one of the possibilities.

Planning situation No. 2: Secession of a part of Poland. The minorities in Poland constitute a small percentage of the population; however, secessionist tendencies are visible in whole Europe. Of course, it is impossible to compare the situation to that in Catalonia, yet it is impossible to predict what the position of minorities in Poland could be under the influence of profound geopolitical changes taking place on the continent, under the influence of a radical change in the existing order, new alliances.

Planning situation No. 3: Mass migrations to Poland. For now this situation remains relatively calm, but the apogee of migration from 2015 (over a million migrants in one year) is merely a preview. According to UN and World Bank estimates, nearly 150 million people will be forced to migrate by 2050. It is unlikely that aging European societies, including those in Poland (according to the Central Statistical Office of Poland in 2050, there will be 34 million 856 thousand inhabitants, and thus a decrease of about 8% as compared to the present size of the country) would be able to stop this strong tendency.

Planning situation No. 4: Acts involving armed violation of the state border of the Republic of Poland as a result of a conflict between states bordering Poland and/or an attempt to draw Poland into a conflict (the example of Belarus). The possibility of an armed conflict breaking out in the territory of a neighboring country is very high. Especially when one considers what is happening in Ukraine and Belarus. Russia can take advantage of these countries' internal problems and seek to expand its influence in Europe. A conflict involving NATO border states may be a good solution.

Planning situation No. 5: Political upheavals in the Republic of Poland as a result of a deepening internal crisis. Each of us, even a not-very-careful observer of the political

scene, should be able to see, with the naked eye, the level of mutual sympathy of Poles and kindness in connection with breakdown of political sympathies. Could this even lead to anarchy? Hopefully not. But this could easily happen. Use of armed forces? Certainly.

There is one more situation that needs to be considered, which concerns the use of armed forces outside the territory of the Republic of Poland, i.e. special actions of retaliatory nature on equipment and installations of critical infrastructure (including nuclear power plants), etc. Well, writing about the need to search for tools of strategic advantage, access to 21st century technology, talking about asymmetrical activities, I also meant the situations of the possible use of No. 3 from the group of activities outside the territory of the Republic of Poland. Poland must really search for solutions that in situations threatening not only the loss of sovereignty, but by and large the general independent existence of the nation and state, would be able to deter and even respond adequately. And no classic methods, measures, or tools could help here. I will not expound on the other situations mentioned above, leaving them to be developed by the reader's imagination. Additionally, I would like to make the reservation that this is not a closed number, but rather a set of basic information that could be the subject of research, evaluation, and further development or refinement.

In conclusion, I believe that the set of such planning situations should be as extensive as possible. I also do believe that the philosophy of thinking about defense of a state should deviate from accepted conventional patterns, with solutions that are obvious to us, but I fear they are equally obvious to a potential opponent. But clearly they should not be that.

6. The objectives of defensive strategy and defense policy

The goals of a Polish Defense Strategy are well known. However, it is not known what is the content of the defense policy goals resulting from the 2017 Defense Concept mentioned here. It is not known, because these goals have not been made available in the generally accessible part. In the document you can find out what tasks are to be performed by the armed forces; however, the objectives of the policy have not been included. The content of the objectives can be guessed, but not so much of defense or defense policy as the content of the military objectives. For example, we read: (cit.) ... "By 2032, the Polish Armed Forces will be one of the most modern and most numerous armies in Europe". (Ministry of National Defense, 2017, p. 60). So, the objective of

defensive strategy could be (as one of many objectives regarding various aspects of the functioning of the state and its instruments, including the armed forces) as follows: to build by 2032 an army that would be in the top five of the most modern European armies. If had sounded like that, it would have been great. Or (cit.) ... "We will invest in the development of technologies that would enable us to reduce the strategic asymmetries" (Ministry of National Defense, 2017, p. 47). Great. Consequently the goal could be formulated as follows: implementation, for the use by the armed forces, of technologies enabling impact on the enemy's critical infrastructure and limiting the possibilities of conducting offensive operations in cyberspace and from space. Therefore these objectives can be formulated in a more expressive and clear way. Well, I wrote what I would expect from objectives at this level of state activity. I would like to emphasize once again that the above-mentioned is a fragment of a wider reality, which is the set of goals of the defensive policy and strategy of the entire state and not only of the armed forces.

The article has already mentioned the questionable values of objectives contained in the 2009 defense strategy. This is because they speak mostly of obvious issues, or in a superficial way talk about nothing. There are seven in total, but if they had not been there, nothing terrible would have happened. The first two are so obvious that writing about them actually loses meaning. They include the following (Ministry of National Defense, 2009, pp. 7–8):

- ensuring the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Poland, its integrity, and inviolability of borders;
- defense and protection of all citizens of the Republic of Poland;

Does every defense doctrine require such self-evident aspects? And for what purpose? Let us go further, however, because the next three strategic objectives are equally unconvincing:

- creating conditions for ensuring the continuity of tasks implementation by public administration bodies as well as other entities competent in the field of national security, including those responsible for the functioning of the economy and other areas significant to the life and security of citizens;
- creating conditions for increasing the state defense capabilities, as well as ensuring readiness to implement defense measures in the national and allied system;
- developing military partnership with other countries, especially neighboring one.

The formulation "to create conditions" is particularly impressive. What lies behind the magical nature of these words? Or of, "ensuring continuity"? Or of yet another

one, “raising abilities”? After all, these are not the policy objectives of the state, but some general demands. It is worth bearing to mind that a goal is the future desired state of affairs, achievable in a given time or period of time. It can be described factually, temporally, spatially, and even process-wise, but none of the above ephemeris constitute this. Therefore, when talking of a specific goal, I not only mean its essence, but also its relations with specific national needs and anticipated conditions of state functioning. Hence, is the goal “to develop cooperation, and attention, particularly in partnership with neighbors”? Is this the real goal of Poland’s defensive strategy in the 21st century? It is not. And finally, the last two of the seven goals:

- implementation of obligations arising from Poland’s membership in NATO and the European Union;
- participation in international crisis response operations conducted, in the first place, by NATO and the EU, as well as by the United Nations or in the framework of ad hoc coalitions.

Nonetheless, implementation of obligations arising from Poland’s membership in NATO and the EU results from agreements with these institutions. Should the national defensive strategy emphasize this? And for what reason? Finally, involvement in international crisis response operations was also our strategic goal. And probably this last goal could be comprised by the new Strategy, probably also somewhere at the end of a definitely a longer list. The objectives should express the nation’s and state internal aspirations and orient Poland’s defense efforts, not to reveal obvious things and to petrify the present state of affairs. To recapitulate: too much hype and too little substance. Below I have allowed myself to outline the range of objectives that could be found in this catalog. I would like to include the following in the set of objectives:

- the future, desirable position of Poland in the regional and even continental Europe,
- the expected direction of development of Poland’s defense potential,
- development of the management and command system for the entire defense and protection capability of the Republic of Poland,
- development directions of the armed forces, police, border guards, and uniformed formations,
- development directions of the state defense system,
- and probably more than a dozen others. Let us add, measurable, concrete goals. But this would already be a task for a team of experts planning the new Defensive Strategy of the Republic of Poland; appropriate for the 21st century.

Conclusion

The state's defense is perhaps the most difficult area of its activity. It is a more specific field than security in general, but also a zone where numerous obstacles to the planning process are being faced. The most difficult are:

- existing and non-existent but necessary legal regulations. There are very many functional areas of the state defense system, requiring legislative work. I will not be writing about them, I am not a lawyer, but during strategic reviews of both security and defense in which I had participated those problems tended to dominate the work of the teams;
- The problem of the level of expert's qualification, i.e. their professional preparation taking into account the constant replacements of experts after each parliamentary election. Such situations must be eliminated, because each new recruitment of potential officials and planners for the design of a new strategy constitutes not only a waste of time and money, but above all evidence of the ignorance of those making such decisions;
- it is high time for those responsible for preparing the Defensive Strategy to appoint experts with appropriate well-established knowledge in the field of security, defense, and the military. While studying individual doctrinal documents, I found out that the arbitrary use of concepts, terms, and the entire conceptual and semantic apparatus leaves a lot to be desired. And the complexity of matter is far greater;
- design of a complete, comprehensive Defensive Strategy must be preceded by an appropriate strategic review. This is a prerequisite for the development of a relatively effective strategy. Given to the shape of the national defense system and the number of institutions, departments, enterprises, the whole of military and civilian sphere involved in its functioning, the review should be started immediately upon publication of the latest National Security Strategy. This would simultaneously finally trigger a logical resultant strategic planning process in the country. The defense review should be followed by a document, that is, a strategy. Afterwards would be the right time for military strategy;
- It should be borne in mind that each strategy is based on specific objectives. The objectives serve as a basis for formulating the concept of their achievement and further planning of structures, instruments, resources, etc. Poorly designed goals lead to bad ideas that makes their achievement difficult;

- Defensive Strategy usually remains valid (should remain valid) for a few years, generally up to five. However, some of its provisions, especially regarding long-term investments, purchases of complex equipment, system reforms, etc. are applicable to a longer implementation period. It is all the more important that long-term plans, parts of the strategy, are subject to political consensus. The formulation of a completely new strategy, different from the one created by the predecessors, is not only detrimental to the State, but, as an effect, this causes a reversal in the development of the country in this area;
- A look at the scope of problems solved as part of the Defensive Strategy: a reality in which the state operates is chaotic, unpredictable. For this reason, the state should seek defense solutions going beyond the spectrum of classic situations of possible use of armed forces, such as in the discussed 2017 Concept, e.g. against Russia; much more creativity is needed, especially in respect of this particular country. Let us endeavor to act asymmetrically in an asymmetrical world. We need to treat asymmetry as a key success factor, not as a means to deepen our own uncertainty. Real, not apparent, use of chances, opportunities, thinking in the categories of: what can I do and not what can someone do to me, should help in this case.

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