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Concept of deployment of military stationary logistic infrastructure in the rear area of activities

Koncepcja rozmieszczenia wojskowej stacjonarnej infrastruktury logistycznej w tylnej strefie działań

Abstract

The subject of the research presented in the article is the Rear Area of Activity (RAA), which is a part of the theater of military operations conducted by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (AF RP) as part of the national defense operation on the territory of Poland. The aim of the research included in the article is to check, verify and assess the validity of the deployment of military stationary material depots and repair workshops in the country during peacetime, as well as to examine the adopted doctrinal solutions in terms of maintaining the ability of the logistic system to ensure that fighting troops can maintain their operations. The research hypothesis adopted for consideration assumes that the location of the military stationary logistics infrastructure (material depots and repair workshops), due to the existing threat directions and the possibility of destruction of the logistics potential by the enemy, requires the transfer of part of the defense potential from the zone of direct operations to the RAA. The conclusions drawn allow us to state that in the current geopolitical conditions of Poland there is a need to transfer part of the stationary logistics potential of the army already in peacetime from the first zone of the theater of operations to the second and third ones. Moreover, taking into account the operational base, the authors of the study also found it necessary to implement changes in the organization of the mobile logistics potential of tactical level II.

Keywords:

rear area of activities, combat service support, military logistic potential, military material depots, military repair workshops

Streszczenie

Przedmiotem badań przedstawionym w artykule jest tzw. tylna strefa działań (TSDz), będąca częścią teatru działań wojennych prowadzonych przez Siły Zbrojne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SZ RP) w ramach narodowej operacji obronnej na terytorium Polski. Celem badań przedstawionych w artykule jest sprawdzenie, weryfikacja i ocena zasadności rozmieszczenia na terenie kraju w czasie pokoju wojskowych stacjonarnych składów materiałowych i warsztatów naprawczych oraz zbadanie przyjętych rozwiązań doktrynalnych pod kątem zachowania zdolności systemu logistycznego do zapewnienia walczącym wojskom podtrzymania działań. Przyjęta do rozważań hipoteza badawcza zakłada, że lokalizacja wojskowej stacjonarnej infrastruktury logistycznej (składy materiałowe i warsztaty naprawcze), z uwagi na występujące kierunki zagrożeń i możliwość zniszczenia potencjału logistycznego przez przeciwnika, wymaga przeniesienia części potencjału obronnego ze strefy działań bezpośrednich do TSDz. Wyciągnięte wnioski pozwalają na stwierdzenie, że w obecnych uwarunkowaniach geopolitycznych Polski występuje konieczność przeniesienia części stacjonarnego potencjału logistycznego wojska już w czasie pokoju z I strefy teatru działań operacyjnych do stref II i III. Ponadto, uwzględniając bazę operacyjną, autorzy opracowania uznali za konieczne również wdrożenie zmian w organizacji mobilnego potencjału logistycznego szczebla taktycznego II.

Słowa kluczowe:

tylna strefa działań, zabezpieczenie logistyczne działań bojowych, potencjał logistyczny wojska, wojskowe składki materiałowe, wojskowe warsztaty naprawcze

JEL: H56

Introduction

So far, a critical analysis of available literature allows for stating that at present there is a lack of uniform opinions as regards management of the logistic support for military troops in the rear area of activities, including procedures of delivering supply assets and rendering logistic services for the troops deployed in this zone and performing their tasks. Moreover, a choice of topic for this article and the authors' willingness to consider the same were influenced by their perception of the necessity of diagnosing problems in the system of logistics support in the rear area of activities, determined by a variety of forces deployed there and distinct character of tasks performed by them. The above mentioned circumstances and outdated records in many doctrinal documents, as well as changes that have taken place in the system of managing and commanding the Polish Armed Forces, create a problematic situation in the aspect of managing the logistics support for the military.

The aim of the research was to check, verify and evaluate the solutions adopted in the doctrinal document in terms of the ability of the logistics system to provide the fighting forces with the ability to maintain their combat capability.

The hypothesis adopted for the research assumes that the activities of the Rear Area of Activity (RA) (AAP-6, 2021, p. 109) are mainly aimed at supporting and securing the fighting forces in terms of logistics, ensuring freedom of action and maneuver for own and allied forces, as well as at protecting and maintaining operational bases, and protecting the power sources of the troops. Therefore, the effectiveness of operations in the RA plays a key role from the point of view of the assumed goals of the conducted military operation as it provides adequate forces and means to maintain the combat capability of the troops involved in the zone of deep and direct operations.

The research problem taken to solve was specified in the form of questions: What changes should be introduced in the existing doctrinal documents in order to improve the functioning of the logistic support system for troops in the rear zone of operations? What measures should be taken to ensure freedom of action and maneuver for own and allied forces? What and to which extent has the greatest impact on the protection and maintenance of operational bases and the protection of troops?

Many methods were used in the material, among which the leading ones were: analysis and synthesis, query of the literature on the subject, abstraction and inference. As an empirical method, the method of diagnostic survey with the use of the expert interview technique was applied. The adopted approach made it possible to develop cross-sectional considerations,

while providing a basis for further, extended research on this extremely important and current problem.

The problem situation is subordinated to the general objective of this publication which is to examine and evaluate the functioning of the area supporting the fighting troops. An identification of the above problematic situation in scope of the logistics system and command reform underway prompted the authors to consider the issue in a framework of managing the logistics support for the troops in the rear area of activities, so the purpose of the article is also to propose organizational-functional solutions that can possibly be useful in optimization of this system in the future.

Literature study

From the ancient times a human being develops various forms of activity in many aspects, including the particular one connected with conducting combat effort. Development of military formations, together with evolution of military art and dynamic changes in the scope of applied destruction assets and the proper coordination of activities taken, have become essential to achieve an assumed goal of confrontation with an enemy (Avazovich, 2023, p. 128; Hristov, 2017, p. 998). It is a challenge for the command system, and imposes the necessity of dividing the operational region into particular areas.

The command (operational) system is defined as an ordered entirety, following the rules of military art, containing its bodies and command assets reciprocally combined with informatics that enables making appropriate decisions at all levels of the Polish Armed Forces command and their efficient completion on time (Kręcikij & Lewandowski, 2015, p. 25).

A division of operational region into areas of deep, direct and rear activities comes from new technologies development in military equipment since they have opened up more possibilities in the scope of reconnaissance and command, as well as destruction and mobility. Most of conventional operations in the first half of the 20th century was based on the assumption that, firstly, it was necessary to destruct enemy forces in the direct contact area, and then to create proper conditions for own troops to fight with its reserve battalion by maneuvering inside the enemy combat grouping. The latest technological achievements enable the troops to detect hostile objects (civil and military) and then to attack them with high precision (AJP-3, 2019, p. 1–10).

When synthesizing results of conducted analyses of relevant literature resources, a division of operational region to particular areas can be also explained by the fact that there are many forces and assets as well as the civil and military entities

engaged in the considerable area. Hence, from the praxeological point of view, concerning the goals to be achieved, it is reasonable to distinguish the area where the main purpose is attained and the areas where partial purposes are achieved as conditions for achieving the main purpose (Tomaszewski, 2006, p. 13). Possessing the modern informatics systems has become, in the 21st century, a determinant of modern armed forces including efficient and effective system of logistics support. Righteousness of the introduced solution has its reflection in the experiences of leading armies of the Alliance and many civil firms, while the variety of applied tools confirms the fact that logistics is susceptible to informatics (Yamin, 2019, p. 759–766).


State of knowledge – identification of the Rear Area Activity

According to the records in the Doctrine of Conducting Joint Operations, the Rear Area of Activities (AJP-3, 2019, p. 2–10) constitutes a part of the military theater and is defined by the Chief of General Staff of PAF (Polish Armed Forces) – Supreme Commander of Armed Forces, and approved by the supreme national authorities. In this

area, the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces plans and conducts operational activities with selected elements of Armed Forces and, in cooperation with the nonmilitary system, achieves strategic-operational purposes. The activities in the rear area are mainly focused on the support for fighting troops, providing freedom of activity and maneuver to own and allied forces, and also maintenance of operational bases, including shielding of supply sources for the military troops (the doctrine of conducting combined operation, 2015, p. 13). The location of the RAA during a national defense operation is illustrated in Figure 1.

When considering a hypothetical operation in the domestic area to defend own sovereignty, or in case of collective defense, operation sovereignty of the member state of alliance, the terrain of achieving military purposes concerns a territory of potential aggressor and its active allies in the conflict, and the defended state and its potential allies. Determination of rear activities area magnitude is based on defining a territory of geographic region where an operation is conducted, and capabilities of operational activity such as determining its borders with geographic points. This depends on achieving a military goal of operation, including environmental conditions. It imposes restrictions on the commander of operation, but it also precisely determines a scope

Figure 1
The location of the Rear Area Activity in the theater of operations



Source: own study.

of competence of his military activity. The administrative area of the states involved in the conflict is known as military theater.

At present conditions it is not possible to attribute norms concerning operational area (width, depth of interaction) the way it was in the past global conflicts, since operation becomes a form of supporting political intentions of the state (DWLąd, 2008, p. 425). Therefore, in the sphere of its military interest, there are all objects that can have an impact on the course of conflict. That is why it is possible to assume that the future operational area will be difficult to precisely define with linear norms and its volume is variable. The analysis of some American sources points out that – for instance – it is necessary to take into account tenfold increase in the field of activity for the future division. This field covers considerably larger space than at present and majority of activities can be conducted in distinct and remote areas. Approximately, one can assume that magnitude of area for conducting direct activities by the commander can cover from 1/4 to 1/2 of the domestic territory in the endangered direction, so, by analogy from a half to 3/4 of this area can be the rear area of activities (Tomaszewski, 2006, p. 36).

Undoubtedly, the most important surface is the area of direct activities, because that's where the main purpose is achieved. The analysis of relevant literature and conclusions drawn from exercises, including their observation, lead to formulate a general opinion that rear area of activities performs a specific role for activities taken in the two remaining areas constituting unity with them, despite the fact that it is often identified and interpreted only in logistic or operational-tactical aspect.

The fundamental task to be performed in the rear is to ensure the rear forces make maneuver and deliver an essential amount of resources to conduct an operation, because the rear area of activities performs the role of operational base, enabling these forces to prepare and supply them with assets essential for completion of operational tasks. Due to the above-mentioned fact, the basic task performed by the forces and assets allocated to the rear area of activities, determining continuity of conducting an operation, both in deep and direct activities, is to ensure the continuity and freedom of their maneuver as well as completion of logistic support tasks.

In this scope, undertaking the activities adequate to the situation requires the effective and efficient management system. The system that allows effective capturing of regions and maneuver made by: rear forces, support and shield assets, as well as taking ventures of logistics support based on the national economy potential and logistic potential of Polish Armed Forces, providing freedom in deploying the forces and assets essential for achieving the objective of the operation (Łepkowski, 2006, s. 104).

When identifying the rear area of activities, it is necessary to introduce characteristics of objects that can possibly be there and at the same time to assume that they play an important role from the perspective of achieving operational targets. First of all, this requires the first sequence of selecting the whole areas or single objects that are or can be key-important to preserve vitality of the state, that means these which in a large measure determine its functioning. Historical facts gathered allow for stating that these terrains, called "the core of the state", cover: the capital of state, areas with the highest density of population, most important roads and industrial centers, terrains of the most intensive agricultural production, as well as other main roads and communication links (Balcerowicz, 1997, p. 115).

When generalizing the conclusions drawn from the relevant literature on particular areas of military activity, we can set aside (besides grouping elements) the four basic categories of objects that can be in the rear area of activity. First of all, these are various objects of natural environment that are directly connected with characteristics of terrain, such as geomorphology embodying sculpture, ground cover and natural properties, including atmospheric impacts (seasons, climate). There are also civil and civil-military objects as well as strictly military ones constituting the infrastructure, including the logistic infrastructure. The term infrastructure is understood as organizations with devices in a given environment and their functioning that create conditions for establishing and developing a considered organization. When considering this term from technical perspective, these are devices connected with satisfying various human needs, for example water supply and sewerage system, railways, phone lines and post office devices, roads, bridges, radio and television stations. Logistic infrastructure is regarded as an open system containing a set of subsystems like linear, point and information infrastructure (Aarhus & Gundersen, 2017, p. 187).

In a framework of military infrastructure, it is necessary to distinguish the following (Wojnarowski, 2013, p. 93):

- barracks base, grounds for exercises and polygons;
- marine and air force bases;
- logistic infrastructure;
- infrastructure of liaison and command system;
- infrastructure of air defense;
- defense structure (fortification devices, systems of entanglements and destructions).

It is worth paying attention to the fact that the objects connected with the national defense infrastructure, as well as those of civil defense units, can be present in the rear areas of activities that are understood as objects, devices and institutions determining the efficiency of tasks completed by this infrastructure (Pawłowski et al., 2020, p. 137).

When considering characteristics of objects in the rear area of activities, it is first of all necessary to classify them in terms of their specific features. Identification of these features must begin with precisising a degree of objects' importance for the defense system of the state (Kitler, 2018, p. 134), including its area and shape. Then it is necessary to consider features like possibilities of changing a region of deployment by an object, possibility of its detection and precise reconnaissance including a degree of vulnerability to destruction. Simultaneously, it is obvious that we cannot omit features like level of security and defense, distance between an object and the line of armies base, and its autonomy (self-dependent objects or a part of system including their designation – industrial, communicational, geographic) (Prusiński, 2009, p. 36).

When basing upon the above-mentioned features of objects that can be located in the rear area of activities, we may conclude that, from the military perspective of own forces, preservation of military troops vitality is essential, while enemy's business is to lead to their full exclusion for as long as possible. This results from the conducted analysis of relevant literature, personal attendance in military exercises and conducted research studies that, undoubtedly, the key-important element in execution of logistic tasks for military needs in all areas of activities is proper organization of management system for logistics (Byleń, 2020, p. 65). Management of logistic support in favor of deployed troops or performing

their tasks in the Rear Area of Activities in the state does not omit the content of doctrinal documents concerning performance of managerial functions in the logistics system of the Polish Armed Forces (Ficoń & Krasnodębski, 2008, p. 73).

Own research

When rationally shaping the structure of the spatial distribution of logistics infrastructure, one should first of all take into account the possibilities of its use during military operations. Considering the above-mentioned factors, the distribution of territorial logistics potential on the territory of Poland can be assumed, as shown in Figure 2.

For the purposes of research, taking into account the directions of potential threats, the country's territory was divided into three zones:

- I – from the north-eastern border to line A: Szczecin–Grudziądz–Włodawa;
- II – from line A to line B: Kostrzyn–Kielce–Przemysł;
- III – from line B to the southwestern border.

The scientific research conducted shows that the location of supply depots in individual zones is as follows:

- in zone I there are 40% of supply depots;
- in zone II there are 25% of supply depots;
- in zone III there are 35% of supply depots.

The scientific research conducted shows that the location of stationary military repair workshops in individual zones is as follows:

- in zone I there are 20% of stationary military repair workshops;
- in zone II there are 35% of stationary military repair workshops;
- in zone III there are 45% of stationary military repair workshops.

The analyzes carried out indicate an excessive number of them in zone I, where they may be particularly vulnerable to destruction or incapacitation. Hence the conclusion that the combat service support of troops operating in zone I should be based primarily on mobile potential reinforced with stationary potential, in zone II on stationary potential reinforced with mobile potential, and in zone III on potential that will maintain the ability to carry out combat service support tasks.

Depending on their location, stationary infrastructure facilities and mobile logistics units are exposed to varying degrees to destruction or incapacitation, thus reducing the logistics potential. The risk of loss of potential is presented in Table 1.

The research shows that stationary infrastructure facilities and mobile logistic units in the first zone are exposed to destruction or incapacitation primarily as

Figure 2
Proposal for changes in the deployment
of military stationary logistics potential (variant)



Source: own study base on: Brzeziński, 2021, p. 124–134; MON, 2019.

Table 1

Risk of loss of logistics potential divided into zones

Theater zone of operations	I	II	III
Type of risk of loss of logistics potential	High	Medium	Low
Probability of losses in logistics potential	0.67–1.00	0.33–0.45	0.00–0.22

Source: own study.

Table 2

Proposal for the deployment of the stationary potential of logistics infrastructure in the territory of Poland

Theater zone of operations	I	II	III
Stationary military supply depots [%]	10	60	30
Stationary military workshops [%]	10	50	40

Source: own study.

a result of the impact of artillery, rocket artillery systems, missile systems and aviation, in the second zone of rocket artillery systems, missile systems and aviation, and in the third zone of missile systems and aviation.

Taking into account the analyzes carried out in a long-term perspective, it would be necessary to strive to distribute the stationary potential of logistics infrastructure on the territory of Poland in the following way: zone I – 10%, II – 60% and III – 30%. The risk of loss of potential is presented in Table 1.

When assessing the distribution of logistics potential on the territory of the country, one should take into account, first of all, the expected directions, the size of military threats and the potential depth of enemy intrusions, the possibility of the enemy's destructive impact on logistic infrastructure facilities and expected losses, taking into account the operational grouping of own troops, the expected scenario of military operations resulting from planning strategic and determining the shape of logistics capabilities in the long term.

The concept of combat service support (CSS) of the Rear Area Activity during the allied combined operation (ACO) is illustrated in Figure 3.

The identification of logistic support levels and the tasks completed by particular components in a framework of organizational infrastructure of PAF logistics system allows concluding that the functions of managing logistics will be performed by proper cells allocated in scope of logistic managerial bodies.


From the analysis of command relations course it results that the Logistics Center and HNS as the Center of Support for the Polish Armed Forces steering the job of the Inspectorate of Support for the needs in all activity areas through the General Command of The Armed Forces is responsible for managing the logistics support system of PAF during defense operations in the state. In this situation the Inspectorate is only an executor of received tasks being to all forces and assets subordinated to the Chief of Inspectorate the supreme military planning body in their system managing the logistic support.

Delivering logistic resources and rendering services for the needs of deployed troops or completing their tasks in the rear area of activities is executed on the basis of needs generated by these units. Then these needs are passed to the chain of command (through all its components) to the Joint 4 General Command of The Armed Forces or directly to the Inspectorate (in case of autonomous forces and assets).

Next, the Joint 4 General Command of the Armed Forces sends the needs to the Inspectorate that, basing upon them, makes plans of deliveries and rendering services. The execution of submitted needs is conducted on the basis of own autonomic mobile logistics potential of the Inspectorate (Logistics Brigade), depending on deployment places in the rear area of activity and according to the priorities of General Command of the Armed Force. It results from the analysis of records in the normative

Figure 3

The concept of combat service support of the Rear Area Activity during the allied combined operation



Source: own study based on (Byleń, 2009).

documents and conducted research studies, that managing the logistic support for the troops in rear area of activities is a domain of J4 General Command of the Armed Force generating task in this scope for the Inspectorate bearing responsibility with its potential for their practical execution.

The current considerations and results gained from research studied evidently indicate that full and prompt logistic support for the troops performing tasks in the rear area of activities requires both the efficient and effective system to manage this support. It is necessary from the perspective of importance and role of activities performed in the rear area of activities due to which logistic support is possible in all areas of activity. Its functioning also covers the tasks connected with maintenance and shield of operational bases as well as sources of military supply. Since the RAA provides for projection of forces and assets deciding about keeping combat readiness of troops, it also creates conditions for achieving the objectives of conducted operation.

While taking into an account the above mentioned issues, it is necessary either to seek new solutions or to improve the existing ones, to raise the efficiency and efficacy of the system managing the logistic support in the rear area of activities.

Confirmation of such solution has its reflection in opinions of many experts (military experts: former Head of the Inspectorate of Support for the Polish Armed Forces; former Commander of the Land Forces; Commanders of the Regional Logistics Base (RBL); former employee of the War Game and Simulation Center and military theoreticians from the Military University of Technology and the War Studies University. The conducted analyses made possible to select a set of desired competencies of Support Command of Armed Forces such as:

- organizing, managing and commanding the logistic system of Armed Forces to follow the guidelines (directives) of Chief of the General Staff/Supreme Command and the needs of the Operational Command of the Armed Forces;
- completion of logistics support tasks for the needs of divisions, subdivisions and tactical echelons in the particular Types of the Armed Forces;
- commanding subordinated subdivisions and divisions including selected and not selected assets subordinated to Operational Command of the Armed Forces;
- commanding the territorial defense;
- planning and following the mobile and operational deployment of Armed Forces

according to the guidelines (directives) of Chief of General Staff/Supreme Command;

- training the civil reserves for needs of military units replacement during warfare operations;
- managing the process of planning and completion of tasks resulting from performance of host nation support function;
- cooperation with other bodies and entities in the field of the state security.

In the authors' opinion, creation of Support Command of Armed Forces may improve both the efficacy and efficiency of logistic support management system in the Rear Area (RA). Many arguments confirm this, but the main one is that, because of smaller number of command chains, the time of making a decision will certainly be limited in the chain of logistic support management of the Armed Forces.

The postulated solution has its justification also in numerous publications on management where a large number of managerial levels is perceived as the situation where delay in decision-making process occurs, which is extremely disadvantageous under conditions of dynamically changing environment (for instance; changing operational-tactical situation). The assumed organizational structure of Support Command of Armed Forces should be in accordance with the general structure of Polish Armed Forces.

In the authors' assessment, it is also necessary to make changes in the present organizational structure of Regional Logistics Base, since it does not create premises for providing efficient and effective managing the logistic support for the troops in the part of RAA that is a responsibility region of a given Regional Logistics Base (RLB). Simultaneously, it is necessary to assume that finally the RLB organizational structure should be coherent with the organizational structure of Support Command of Armed Forces. Additionally, it is recommended to consider the possibility of total uniformity of all RLB organizational structures.

When keeping in mind the growth in efficiency and effectiveness of functioning the system managing logistic support in the RAA, it is necessary to remember about the need of providing for quick exchanging of a series of precise information (logistic, tactical-operational) in scope of command relation among the particular elements of this system as well as forces and assets for which logistics support is given, regardless of ongoing tactical or operational conditions.

At present, the management of logistics support for the troops in the RAA follows the obligatory procedure in scope of which all bodies of management participate in all areas of command. However, correct execution of tasks on duty posts by particular function persons in the logistic cells of management encounters many obstacles. This especially concerns the planning phase. The most

serious obstacles include the lack of updated indicators of loss, high work consumption for elaboration of materiel documentation, invalid records in many normative documents (e.g. Logistic doctrine of Land Forces). There is also a problem with the lack of informatics tools enabling the function persons to improve their work within a framework of logistic cells management.

In the efforts toward improvement of efficiency and effectiveness of the system managing the logistics support, it is necessary to search solutions guarantying efficient passing of information. The solutions here should be compatible with those applied in the Alliance, because of which the above presented selected possibilities offered by LOGFAS allow for adopting an assumption that this informatics platform can be used in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland to support the logistics cells managing the logistics support for the troops (NCI Agency, 2015; Byleń, 2020, p. 232). A potential implementation of this platform (partial or total) is capable to increase efficiency and effectiveness of the system managing the logistic support for the troops in the RA, because at present we do not possess this kind of software and the attempts undertaken to implement national solutions are only in the initial (test) phase and not always compatible with the allied standards.

An application of informatics support, especially in civil logistics, indicated that because of new informatics solutions it is possible to achieve considerable organizational and economic advantages. This means improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness, allowing to gain competitive edge in conditions of market economy. Therefore, analogically, the assumed implementation of informatics solutions in the system managing the logistics support for the troops can be one of the premises for improving efficiency and effectiveness under conditions of the contemporary battlefield, because this way it will be possible to gain domination over an enemy.

Conclusions

The Rear Area of Activity as a part of theater plays an important role in the system of logistics support for the troops, due to containing the basic logistic bodies of military and nonmilitary logistic potential. This area provides for freedom of activity and maneuver to own and allied forces, as well as creates conditions for permanency of supplying with logistic resources in combat modules in each area of military activity. The RAA key-important mission is also to maintain and reproduce a desired state of combat readiness of troops. Simultaneously, the activities undertaken are focused on protection and maintenance of readiness to use sources of troops supplying.

The analyzes and assessments carried out regarding the functioning of the management system in the RAA confirmed the hypothesis adopted for the research: they indicate that the location of the military stationary logistics infrastructure, due to the directions of threats and the possibility of destruction of the logistics potential by the enemy, requires the transfer of part of the defense potential from the area of direct operations to the rear area activity. This means that in Poland's current geopolitical

conditions, there is a need to transfer part of the stationary logistics potential of the army, already during peacetime, from zone I of the theater of operations to zones II and III, including 30% of military material depots and 10% of repair workshops. Moreover, taking into account the operational base, the authors of the study also found it necessary to implement changes in the organization of the mobile logistics potential of tactical level II.

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ZAPOWIEDŹ

Dr Parves Khan

**SIŁA KOBIET
JAK WZMACNIĄĆ POZYCJĘ KOBIET
W MIEJSCU PRACY**

Pomimo niezliczonych inicjatyw na rzecz różnorodności i równego traktowania w miejscu pracy utrzymuje się nierówność płci. Autorka książki odkrywa, dlaczego tak się dzieje, i wzywa do działania. Na podstawie wywiadów z 70 członkami kadry kierowniczej przedsiębiorstw, ankiet przeprowadzonych wśród 2000 pracowników oraz kompleksowych badań źródeł wtórnych dr Parves Khan ujawnia niewygodną prawdę – kobiety same, choć nieumyślnie, gotują sobie taki los. Autorka odkrywa trudno uchwytnie sposoby nieświadomej internalizacji i propagowania przez kobiety uprzedzeń związanych z płcią i, co ważniejsze, pokazuje, jak można temu zaradzić. To nie jest książka wyłącznie o płci – to raczej świadectwo zmiany, która będzie możliwa, gdy zarówno kobiety, jak i mężczyźni zjednoczą się, wspierając postęp, solidarność i tworząc grunt, na którym każdy będzie mógł rozwinąć skrzydła. Przesłanie jest jasne – wzmocnienie pozycji kobiet wymaga uznania przez nie własnej siły sprawczej przy jednoczesnym usuwaniu barier systemowych. Każdy rozdział książki zawiera ćwiczenia i zalecenia, jak wspierać środowisko, w którym potencjał nie zna granic płci.

Jeśli jesteś gotowa rzucić wyzwanie status quo, postawić na osobistą swobodę i przeprowadzić głęboką transformację w swoim miejscu pracy, *Siła kobiet* będzie dla Ciebie praktycznym i odkrywczym przewodnikiem.

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