Alarm handling onboard vessels operating in DP mode

• Autorzy: Nepal S. , Gudmestad O. T.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12716/1001.16.01.05

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper explores concerns regarding the design, implementation, and management of alarms in DP vessels that, while in operation, need an incredibly high level of accuracy along with high reliability and safe operations. The Human, Technological, and Organizational factors (HTO) method is primarily used as analysis tool to find weaknesses in alarm handling during DP operations. The research focuses on results collected from Dynamic Positioning Operators (DPO) and instructors. Findings from the survey are presented and compared to the results from past accidents and technical requirements from Petroleum Safety Agency Norway via YA 711. Three accidents from past are referred to picturize the findings from the survey results. Furthermore, the conclusion is given with recommendations reflecting the findings from the survey. The main findings are an urgency to establish a centralized marine accident investigation system which enforces learning and recommendation to make operations safer. In addition, the survey also suggests that prohibition of clients or limiting their access to the bridge is necessary. Manufacturers could focus on research and development of alarm prioritization, on structuring and presentation, and profiting by taking feedback from end-users to make DP operations safer.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

dynamic positioning; human; DP Mode; alarm handling; DP vessel; safety at sea; alarm management

• Wydawca: Faculty of Navigation, Gdynia Maritime University
• Czasopismo: TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
• Rocznik: 2022
• Tom: Vol. 16 No. 1
• Strony: 51--56
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 14 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Nepal S.

• Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, Haugesund, Norway

autor

Gudmestad O. T.

• Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, Haugesund, Norway

Bibliografia

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