Debt maturity and family related directors : evidence from a developing market

• Autorzy: Hussain H. I. , Abidin I. S. Z. , Ali A. , Kamarudin F.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.17512/pjms.2018.18.2.10

Warianty tytułu

PL

Zapadalność zadłużenia i dyrektorzy związani z rodziną : dowody z rozwijającego się rynku

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper examines the debt maturity structures of Malaysian firms based on the presence of family-related directors (FRDs) on boards. The motivation is derived from the board composition literature, which highlights reforms taken place over the years in order to ensure proper governance mechanisms. Conversantly, debt maturities are also linked to reductions in agency costs whereby firms with short-term borrowings will be subject to greater levels of monitoring by markets. Furthermore, this reduces information asymmetry. Thus, the paper evaluates the effectiveness of FRDs in alleviating the agency problem by studying the trade-off of such presence on debt maturity structures. The study finds that firms with the presence of FRDs tend to opt for longer maturity structures. These points towards a substitution effect where firms with FRDs will not rely on short-term borrowing as a mechanism for reducing agency problems. The findings of the study are further validated given that the presence of FRDs is not motivated by firms matching strategy of assets versus liabilities. However, these firms also opt for long-term borrowing in order to mitigate potential liquidity problems. The study further documents that these firms face lower bankruptcy costs. Interestingly, the authors also document that FRD opt to lengthen maturity structures during periods of increase in share prices indicating that control by family members tend to take into consideration shareholders’ wealth maximization. The finding is valid given that most firms with FRD also tend to have significant ownership by families.

PL

W niniejszym artykule przeanalizowano strukturę zapadalności długu malezyjskich firm w oparciu o obecność dyrektorów rodzinnych (FRD) w zarządach. Motywacja pochodzi z literatury poświęconej składom zarządów, która podkreśla reformy, które miały miejsce od lat w celu zapewnienia odpowiednich mechanizmów zarządzania. Konsekwentnie, zapadalność długu jest również powiązana z obniżeniem kosztów pośrednictwa, w wyniku czego firmy o pożyczkach krótkoterminowych będą podlegać większemu monitorowaniu na rynkach. Ponadto zmniejsza to asymetrię informacji. W związku z tym, w artykule dokonano oceny skuteczności FRD w łagodzeniu problemu agencji poprzez zbadanie zysku takiej obecności w strukturach dojrzałości długu. Badanie wykazało, że firmy z obecnością FRD wybierają dłuższe struktury dojrzałości. Wskazuje to na efekt substytucyjny, w którym firmy z FRD nie będą polegać na pożyczkach krótkoterminowych jako mechanizmie zmniejszającym problemy agencji. Wyniki badania są dalej potwierdzane, ponieważ obecność FRD nie jest uzasadniona przez firmy, które dopasowują strategię aktywów do zobowiązań. Firmy te również wybierają długoterminowe pożyczki, aby złagodzić potencjalne problemy z płynnością. Badanie to dokumentuje również, że firmy te ponoszą niższe koszty bankructwa. Co ciekawe, autorzy dokumentują również, że FRD opowiadają się za przedłużeniem struktur zapadalności w okresach wzrostu cen akcji, wskazując, że kontrola członków rodziny ma tendencję do uwzględniania maksymalizacji zamożności akcjonariuszy. Stwierdzenie jest słuszne, biorąc pod uwagę, że większość firm z FRD ma również znaczny udział rodzinny w strukturze własności.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

debt maturity; capital structure; family related directors; board composition; corporate governance; family firms

PL

zapadalność zadłużenia; struktura kapitałowa; dyrektor związany z rodziną; skład zarządu; ład korporacyjny; firmy rodzinne

• Wydawca: Czestochowa University of Technology
• Czasopismo: Polish Journal of Management Studies
• Rocznik: 2018
• Tom: Vol. 18, No. 2
• Strony: 118--134
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 81 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Hussain H. I.

• Taylor’s Business School, Taylor’s University; Universiti Kuala Lumpur Business School

autor

Abidin I. S. Z.

• School of Economics, Finance and Banking, Universiti Utara Malaysia

autor

Ali A.

• University College of Technology Sarawak

autor

Kamarudin F.

• Faculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2018).