The Military Integration of Belarus into the Russian Federation

• Autorzy: Banasik Mirosław

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.37105/sd.178

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This article presents the results of research, which set out to identify and characterize the measures taken by the Russian Federation for its military integration with Belarus and to assess their consequences for regional security. In the research process, the systemic approach was applied. Critical evaluation of literature, systemic and comparative analysis, and generalization were used to solve the research problems. As a result, it was determined that Russia has been exerting constant pressure on Belarus for two decades to achieve military integration within the Union State. The goal of these efforts is to establish military bases and, potentially, permanently deploy significant armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Belarus. As a result, Russia may gain a strategic spatial and temporal advantage over NATO and create real threats to the territorial integrity of the Baltic States and Poland. The Zapad-2021 exercises verified the extent to which Belarus can maintain its sovereignty in terms of military security and what role it will play in Russia’s military plans in the event of a hypothetical confrontation with NATO.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

defense; military integration; permanent bases; Russian Armed Forces; sovereignty

PL

obronność; integracja wojskowa; stałe bazy; Rosyjskie Siły Zbrojne; suwerenność

• Wydawca: Centrum Rzeczoznawstwa Budowlanego Sp. z o.o.
• Czasopismo: Safety & Defense
• Rocznik: 2022
• Tom: 1
• Strony: 8--14
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 39 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Banasik Mirosław

• Jan Kochanowski University, Stefana Żeromskiego 5, 25-369 Kielce, Poland

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