

KIEV-MOSCOW CRIMEA CONFLICT

Radosław SZYMANKIEWICZ*

* The Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military Academy of Land Forces in Wrocław
e-mail: r.szymankiewicz@wso.wroc.pl

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Abstract:

Security is understood as a certain state of confidence, the lack of threat and the awareness that the fundamental values of the state, including, among others, existence, survival and development, are preserved and represent the objective of the security policy of each government and state¹. The lack of these values may exert an adverse impact on its development. The activities of the competent organs of the state, creating such policy, should be purposeful and aimed at its implementation and they should also contribute to its formulation on the international arena¹. The security of Ukraine, as a result of actions taken by the separatist forces, was put to a great test and the annexation of Crimea slightly redefined the European security environment and resulted only in the imposition of sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Russia. Today, it is difficult to predict the scenario for future developments in Ukraine. It would seem that the chances are 50/50 that the conflict will be resolved. So, the question remains, what will Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, do? Will the pressure exerted by almost the entire world lead to the stabilisation of the situation in Donbass or will it result in the escalation of the conflict and the seizure of further areas, with, perhaps, Kiev included? However, the escalation of the conflict seems to be very unlikely, although it certainly would arouse nationalistic euphoria in the Russian society, as the imposed sanctions, the economic situation and losses that would be suffered by the Russians will prevent such escalation. If Putin decided to go war with Ukraine, he would have to take account of the determined opposition of the world superpowers and even greater sanctions, which the Russian economy might not be able to cope with. The paper contains the information about the genesis of the conflict in Ukraine and attempts to present the objectives of operations in the Kiev-Moscow conflict.

Keywords:

Russia, Ukraine, security, genesis of the conflict, Crimea conflict, EU, NATO, strategic objectives

INTRODUCTION

*The great questions of the time will not be resolved by speeches and majority decisions but by iron and blood*¹. These words uttered by Otto von Bismarck² match perfectly with the latest actions taken as part of the international policy by Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, President of the Russian Federation, in relations with Ukraine. Although many years have passed since the times of Bismarck, it seems that the above quotation describes these relations most aptly. But is the one having authority and military power and determined enough to use it to achieve the set objectives always right? The events in Ukraine provoked many negative emotions in Poland and in whole Europe. Today, it is difficult to state definitely whether Russia will head for the restoration of its superpower status, disregarding the opinion of other states, or whether it will build the world security together with them. Observing the recent developments in Ukraine it can be assumed that Vladimir Putin is interested only in realising and achieving his own objectives and, perhaps, restoring a superpower status for Russia, which, obviously, will not be beneficial to Poland. The pro-Western orientation of the Ukrainian foreign policy led in consequence to the classical Russian pattern of geopolitical thought, namely *Kiev attempts to break free from Russian control*. It should be also remembered that the events that took place in Ukraine were a sort of the proving ground, intended to test the response of the “West”, its reactions and readiness to take possible or far-flung actions. Therefore, the choice of the Crimean peninsula as the place to start the “Ukrainian operation” was well-thought-out by Moscow. The decisive factors might include³:

- strategic and operational location of the peninsula (among others, the presence of the Black Sea Fleet);
- convenient bridgehead for long-term operations aimed at gaining geopolitical control over Ukraine;
- Crimean society speaking the Russian language.

The conducted “Ukrainian operation” was a military intervention planned in advance. In such case the possibility of an ad hoc operation, conducted as a result or in consequence of the events in Kiev, may not be considered. So was the “Crimean operation” only a planned non-recurrent “event” or was it a starting point for something more? Was it meant to serve as a pretext for “putting into effect” a military plan to use the armed forces? Will Russia be satisfied with reclaiming Crimea only or will it be the

¹ Online [access: 15.11.2015], Available on the Internet: <http://geopolityka.org/analizy/tomasz-otlowski-ukraina-rosja-konfliktu-ciag-dalszy>.

² Otto von Bismarck (born on 1 April 1815 in Schönhausen (Elbe), died on 30 July 1898 in Friedrichsruh) – Prince of Bismarck-Schönhausen, Duke of Lauenburg; a German politician, Minister President of Prussia, Chancellor of Germany, called the Iron Chancellor. He contributed to the unification of Germany and was the supporter of evolutionary conservatism in the internal policy.

³ Online [access: 17.11.2015], Available on the Internet: <http://geopolityka.org/analizy/tomasz-otlowski-ukraina-rosja-konfliktu-ciag-dalszy>.

starting point for regaining the lost influence over the whole territory of Ukraine? Numerous questions arise, of varying magnitudes, and it is impossible to find an unambiguous and satisfactory answer to each of them. However, it does not mean that seeking answers to such questions should be abandoned, and, likewise, appropriate solutions for emerging problems should be sought on the international arena, to prevent the conflict from escalating and threatening directly the security of our country.

1. GENESIS OF THE CONFLICT

Ukraine has been a sovereign state since 1991. Before it was one of many republics forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter: the USSR), however, it was one of the three republics (apart from the Russian and Byelorussian ones) which were subjects of international law. The Crimea conflict should be analysed taking account of many aspects. The historical background and the resulting conditions certainly represent one of them. It should be remembered that Crimea⁴, belonging to Ukraine since 1954, differs from it with respect to history, culture, ethnicity and language. Its territory comprises the Autonomous Crimean Republic and Sevastopol, a city with special status. The Russians represent the decisive majority of population inhabiting Crimea, at the level of 58.5%, whereas the Ukrainians account for 24.4%, the Crimean Tatars for 12.1% and the Byelorussians for 1.5% of the population. It should be also taken into account that the Russian population forms the decisive majority in Sevastopol, representing as many as 71.6% of its inhabitants, whereas the Ukrainian population is at the level of 22.4% and the Byelorussian citizens account for 1.6%⁵. Russian is the dominant language in the Crimean peninsula and over 79% of citizens have declared it to be their mother tongue, while only slightly more than 9% have chosen the Ukrainian language⁶.

Prof. Kłoczowski is one of many people who consider the historical background as being the source of the conflict⁷. In his opinion the cause of the conflict lies in ... *the deep historical background, connected with the clash of two concepts concerning the roots of modern Ukraine: the Ukrainian and the Russian ones. Ukraine has formed its roots on the basis of the Byzantine and the Western cultures, which permeated to the East through the Republic of Poland. Prof. Kłoczowski stated that This concept stands in opposition to the Moscow concept, which emphasises Holy Rus. It comprises Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine – as one Russian nation. Prof. Kłoczowski adds that he is not surprised by the present conflict, and the fundamental question is whether the Russians*

⁴ Crimea – Crimean peninsula (Ukrainian Крим, Russian Крым, Crimean Tatar Qırım, Къырым) – the Black Sea peninsula, in the antiquity called Tauric Chersonesos or Taurida, connected with land only through the narrow Isthmus of Perekop, between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Separated from Russia by the Strait of Kerch. The area of Crimea totals over 27,000 km, online [access 17.11.2015] Available on the Internet <http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krym>.

⁵ *National composition of population*, (English), online [access: 2014-08-19] Available on the Internet: 2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua.

⁶ Cf. R. Szymankiewicz, *Kryzys krymski a bezpieczeństwo Polski*, Zeszyty Naukowe WSOWL No. 2/15, p. 15.

⁷ Prof. Jerzy Kłoczowski – Director of the Institute of East-Central Europe in Lublin (Lubelski Instytut Europy Środkowo - Wschodniej).

will still strive to recreate Holy Rus. In the Professor's opinion they are too weak due to the economic and demographic crisis⁸.



Fig.1. Ukraine and its neighbours

Source: prepared on the basis of the Internet materials⁹

Other factors that unquestionably contributed to the conflict (from the historical perspective) include:

- the Ems Ukaz¹⁰ of 1876, pursuant to which it was prohibited to use the name Ukraine and to print any materials in the Ukrainian language. Books published in this language were removed. Instruction at schools was conducted in the Russian language. The extensive Russification of the nation was started, which aimed at the total suppression of social and cultural life and led to political repressions. By the time of the fall of the Tsar in 1917, all governorates of the Empire, including the Ukrainian ones, were officially referred to as Little Russia, and the Ukrainian language was termed as a Little Russia dialect of the Russian language;
- events that took place after the war in the years 1917-1921. The majority of the territory of contemporary Ukraine was subdued by the Soviets, forming the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; by 1934, Kharkiv was the capital of Soviet Ukraine and afterwards it was Kiev;
- the Holodomor – the Great Famine man-made by the USSR in Ukraine in the years 1932-1933, which caused the death of several millions of Ukrainian citizens;

⁸ Online [access 19.08.2014], Available on the Internet <http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/lublin/historyczna-przyczyna-konfliktu-na-ukrainie/d3qsb>.

⁹ Online [access 20.05.2016], Available on the Internet: http://www.google.pl/search?q=fotoukraina&rlz=1C2VFKB_enPL604PL604&biw=1600&bih=799&tbm=isch&imgil=hW4h2bJga.

¹⁰ Online [access 17.11.2015], Available on the Internet https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukaz_emski.

- events that took place after the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. As a result over seven million citizens of different nationalities perished or were killed. In consequence of these events, on 30 June 1941, in Lvov, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (the so-called Bandérivtsi, hereinafter the OUN) proclaimed the act of restoration of the Ukrainian state and called for cooperation with Germany against the USSR in order to gain the autonomy or independence of Ukraine. In 1942, the OUN started to operate as an underground organisation and formed an underground army – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (hereinafter: the UPA), fighting with the Polish and the Soviet underground armies and with the German occupation administration and the German police forces, and after the occupation of the areas of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia – with the Red Army troops and the NKVD¹¹. In the years 1943-1944, the UPA initiated the ethnic cleansing – mass murders with signs of genocide of Polish civilians within the area of contemporary western Ukraine (Volhynia, Eastern Galicia). In 1943, the OUN was the political promoter of establishing the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (Galizien). According to Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin even considered the deportation of all Ukrainians to Siberia, but he abandoned this idea because of the scale of such operation.

Geopolitics is unquestionably another aspect related to the genesis of the conflict in Ukraine, comprising¹²:

- Ukraine’s aspirations to become a member of the European Union (hereinafter: the EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter: NATO);
- loss of political influences, particularly after Victor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions were overthrown;
- threat to the Russian military bases deployed in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine;
- threat to Putin’s plan to establish the Eurasian Union;
- presence of native Russians in the Crimea peninsula, where they account for over two thirds of the population;

¹¹ NKVD of the Soviet Union (Russian НКВД СССР), the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union (Russian Народный комиссариат внутренних дел СССР, transcription: Narodnyj komissariat wnutriennich del SSSR) – a central body of the state (ministry), being a part of the Council of People’s Commissars, i.e. the government of the Soviet Union, existing under this name in the years 1917-1946, online [access: 18.11.2015] Available on the Internet: <https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/NKWD>.

¹² R. Gonczarenko, M. Matzke, *O co naprawdę chodzi na Krymie*, Polityka, online, [access: 18.11.2015], Available on the Internet: <http://www.dw.com/pl/o-co-naprawd%C4%99-chodzi-na-krymie/a-17467075>.

- not only political issues, but also the possibilities of exploiting the natural resources of the “Crimean region” (natural gas, crude oil, coking bituminous coal, manganese, iron, uranium);
- loss of Russian economic dependencies on Ukraine (which is related to the loss of influences, not so much political as, definitely, economic, and becoming dependent on suppliers), for example the issue of supplies of engines (the Motor Sich company) for all Russian armed helicopters and to the shipyards in the Black Sea carrying out repairs for the Russian Navy. Without these engines the modernisation of the fleet, on which Russia has incurred huge expenditure, would be impossible. Also the success of ambitious plans of modernising nuclear warheads depends on cooperation with the Piwdenne and Piwdennemasz designing offices. It is worth adding that these plants and offices are located in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine – within the areas that could be easily captured and controlled by the Russian army¹³;
- removal from power of pro-Russia President Victor Yanukovich¹⁴;
- leaving the issue of borders in Eastern Europe unresolved after the collapse of the USSR, which has led to the lack of prospects for millions of citizens;
- wish to enhance support for President Putin among the Russian citizens and to show the power of Mother Russia, accompanied by a rather strong conviction that the West will do nothing except for complaining and warning.

These are just some of the historical and geopolitical occurrences that could lay the foundations for the Crimea conflict and inflame the situation between Kiev and Moscow.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE CRIMEA OPERATION

It seems that the strategic objective of Russia was clear and accurately defined from the very beginning and consisted in subduing Ukraine on a permanent basis and gaining (retaining) influences on its external and internal polices, broadly understood security and economy. Democratic changes taking place in Ukraine could affect adversely the image of Putin and his proposed assumptions for the construction of a political system based on ideology, relying on the specificity of the Russian civilisation, which excludes the adoption of Western political models, namely liberal democracy, within its territory. It would undermine the philosophy behind Putin’s assumptions regarding the Eurasian integration in this region, which the Kremlin still hopes for. Therefore, it is determined to make all efforts to obstruct the European direction for Ukraine and thwart the resulting systemic and economic transformation of the state. Quoting from the

¹³ Online [access: 18.11.2015], Available on the Internet: <http://swiat.newsweek.pl/wschodnia-ukraina-atak-rosji-rosyjskie-wojsko-ukraina-newsweek-pl,artykuly,283616,1.html>.

¹⁴ The cause of the outbreak of mass anti-government protests in Ukraine, which turned into a revolution in the streets of Kiev, was the postponement by President Victor Yanukovich of the signing of the association agreement with the EU. Therefore, these were mainly the western and central parts of Ukraine which rebelled against the pro-Russia Ukrainian authorities.

materials of Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia (the Centre for Eastern Studies) ... *apart from prestige considerations, it should prevent any further curbing of Russian influences in this country and ensure the systemic compatibility with the Russian political and economic model. Furthermore, Moscow puts forward an argument that as a consequence of closer relations with the EU Ukraine will strengthen its cooperation with NATO, which is perceived by Moscow as a threat to its significant security interests*¹⁵. Therefore, it can be inferred that Moscow will destabilise the situation in Ukraine until the costs of the aggravating crisis are high enough to make the Ukrainian government accept the unfavourable Russian conditions.

Thence, does ... *Russia want to guarantee the full autonomy of Donbass or does it intend ... simply to create an entity dependent on it, like Moldavian Transnistria*,¹⁶ *by formalising the status of "Novorossiya" (New Russia) – a project of building a pro-Russia parastate, implemented in Donbass and referring in its ideological assumptions to the Russian superpower rhetoric? The postulate of a political system reform, permanently advanced by Russia and called federalisation by Moscow, is an attempt to guarantee the influence on Kiev through such political formation. On the Russian side there were also concepts of integrating autonomous Donbass with the Eurasian structures, in case the plan of integrating whole Ukraine failed and there would be a need for balancing the progressing relations between Kiev and the West*¹⁷. One thing that has to be emphasised is that Moscow will do anything to prevent the implementation of economic and democratic reforms and the European integration of Ukraine. Fuelling the conflict by the continuation of current activities and acts of terror as well as attempts at expanding the instability zone are far better methods than sending the armed forces to Ukraine and occupying its territory. Such action (occupation) would obviously lead to the increased reluctance or even hatred of Kiev towards Moscow and would ultimately foil any potential integration, confirming also that the choice of a pro-Western direction is right. It should be also taken into account that a possible military intervention could provoke the West to intervene. Such possibility may not be excluded, particularly in the situation where the prolonging conflict is perceived as a weakness of Russia.

¹⁵ W. Rodkiewicz, J. Rogoża, A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, *Rosyjska polityka wobec Ukrainy: lokalne działania, globalne cele*, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia, online, [access: 19.11.2015]. Available on the Internet: <http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-08-20/rosyjska-polityka-wobec-ukrainy-lokalne-dzialania-globalne-cele>.

¹⁶ On 2 September 1990, Transnistria proclaimed its independence as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublica, abbreviated as PMR), with its capital in Tiraspol. The sovereignty of this region is not recognised on the international arena, with the exception of the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and it is still treated as a part of the Moldavian Republic, online, [access: 19.02.2016]. Available on the Internet: <https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naddniestrze>.

¹⁷ online, [access: 19.02.2016]. Available on the Internet: <http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-08-20/rosyjska-polityka-wobec-ukrainy-lokalne-dzialania-globalne-cele>.



Fig.2. Rebels claim that the heavy military equipment has been withdrawn from the frontline. The Staff in Kiev has some doubts about it.

Source: prepared on the basis of the Internet materials¹⁸

An attempt at changing the geopolitical structure in the European area and obtaining the approval for actions taken with regard to Ukraine may be another objective of Russia. The acceptance of the Russian actions with regard to Kiev could be commensurate with the future abandonment of aspirations to expand the European Union into the countries of Eastern Europe and it could strengthen the position of Russia within the area of the post-Soviet states. In the opposite situation, it would mean that the position of Russia as a local superpower could be severely undermined. The example of Ukraine could become a kind of a trigger for the other post-Soviet states in the region. Therefore, it is so important for Russia to reverse the unfavourable geopolitical direction¹⁹.

3. RUSSIAN INTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE CONFLICT

The conflict in Ukraine undoubtedly serves as an opening gambit for Moscow and it is of crucial importance for the internal political situation in Russia. The conflict, presented as the defence of Russian interests and citizens inhabiting the eastern part of Ukraine, caused the integration of social elites and a noticeable increase in support for V. Putin. The last time such high level of support (88%) for the Russian president was recorded was during the war with Georgia. Since this event his support was gradually decreasing to the level of 65% at the beginning of 2014. Such trend reversal in the observed support, expressed as a percentage, definitely strengthened the position of the president of the Russian Federation, and, thus, curbed the aspirations of his opponents. The fact that the support of nationalist circles has been maintained is also im-

¹⁸ Online, [access: 17.11.2015]. Available on the Internet <http://www.tvn24.pl>.

¹⁹ Online [access: 20.02.2016]. Available on the Internet: <http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-08-20/rosyjska-polityka-wobec-ukrainy-lokalne-dzialania-globalne-cele>.

portant. The observed superpower aspirations are high in this environment and it sends a message that the operations conducted in Ukraine are insufficient. The annexation of Crimea has heightened their expectations, which were limited to the criticism of the Kremlin only several years ago. Nationalists euphoria has mobilized support for the Russian expansion into the territory of Ukraine and has raised expectations regarding its further enlargement to the West. Apart from that, the expectations of all Russians regarding the role to be performed by Ukraine on the international arena are different. For the Kremlin policy it is unimaginable that the West could wish to draw Ukraine (as well as the other post-Soviet states) into the sphere of its influences. For the Russians it will be the violation of the established Eurasian balance and their actions will be justified as the defence of such balance in this area. The Ukrainian integration with the EU would be a devastating failure for the Kremlin and for the planned geopolitical arrangement in the Eurasian area. Such failure would be unacceptable. However, if the Ukraine was "pulled" in the Asian direction, it would be a perfect example for the other former post-Soviet republics, showing the power of Russia and the weakness of Europe and NATO, whereas a failure would evidence Putin's weakness and would lead to the loss of the key state in this region.

It should be also remembered that year by year Russia has been increasingly losing its political and economic influences in Central Europe. If the spheres of influence of NATO and the EU expand to the East, it will push Russia to the farther "protective lines". Therefore, all actions taken with regard to Ukraine are designed to maintain the sphere of influence in this region. Is there any reason for Russia to fear the West? Some time ago, George F. Kennan wrote that ... *at the bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of the world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in the neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more component, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it*²⁰. These words were spoken several dozen years ago, but are they not true in the present situation? The authorities of the Russian Federation commonly hold the view that the events that took place during the Euromaidan were inspired by intelligence services of other countries, mainly by the CIA. Sławomir Krakowczyk, Ph.D., commented on the words of George F. Kennan in the following way ... *out of necessity the Rus-*

²⁰ Online [access: 19.05.2016]. Available on the Internet: <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>.

sian activities at that time were limited to the political aspect only, although they also had their military dimension, consisting in the strengthening of defence potential of Russia near its western borders. At present, the fear of the West additionally overlaps with the Russian post-imperial complex, manifested by the longing for power gone by with the times of the USSR and by the frustration caused by the permanent loss of political influences in Europe, lasting for over twenty years. In consequence, the more Moscow is pushed out of its original positions, the more fiercely it defends what has been left for it and tries, as far as possible, like during the war with Georgia in 2008, to regain whatever it is capable of reclaiming. Its intervention in Crimea and in the eastern part of Ukraine should be viewed in this context²¹. It would be difficult to challenge the above statement, but the direction of future developments will become clear in the coming months.

CONCLUSIONS

What can be observed in the present conflict in Ukraine is a new quality of some sort. It consists in the method of transmission and the way of reporting on events taking place in the eastern part of Ukraine. It can be even ventured to say that these events happen in front of cameras and are lit by the flashes. Online reports available on the Internet as well as taking photos and placing them on various social networking portals are not infrequent.



Fig.3. Pro-Russia separatists.

Source: prepared on the basis of the Internet materials²²

²¹ S. Krakowczyk, *Głównym celem Rosji jest doprowadzenie do krachu ekonomicznego Ukrainy*, Online [access: 19.05.2016]. Available on the Internet: <http://geopolityka.net/celem-rosji-doprowadzenie-do-krachu-ekonomicznego-ukrainy/>.

²² Online [access: 20.05.2016]. Available on the Internet: http://www.google.pl/search?q=foto+ukraina&rlz=1C2VFKB_enPL604PL604&biw=1600&bih=799&tbn=isch&imgil=hW4h2bJga18OM%25

It could seem that at present the best scenario for resolving the conflict would be to use diplomacy, provided that the Russians show a little goodwill to resort to it. Reaching an agreement is not convenient for the Russians, as they are more interested in actions leading to a war causing destruction (of, for example, the Ukrainian economy). Therefore, the Russians will continue wide-scale actions aimed at achieving the set strategic and operational objectives. They will support actions taken by *separatists*, to tip the scales in their favour. Whole Europe should (in the author's opinion) play an important role in this region. The determined attitude of the EU should exert a pressure on the Russian Federation, leading to the conclusion of the conflict which, otherwise, will do no good. The sanctions imposed on the Russians should be continued, concurrently providing support for the Ukrainian authorities, including armaments, finance or training. It is with regret that it should be emphasised that some regions in the EU are willing to accept that Crimea is an integral part of Russia. One of such regions is Veneto²³, where the councillors adopted a resolution proposing to recognise Crimea as an integral part of Russia and to lift sanctions imposed on Russia. Such decision seems quite shocking and it is the first resolution of this kind within the area of the EU, however, it was adopted by majority vote of the councillors of this region. The councillors appeal to the Italian government to condemn the EU international policy regarding Crimea, describing it as discriminatory and unfair in the light of international law. Hopefully, other regions and member states of the EU will not follow the Italians and the conflict will be resolved peacefully.

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3A%253BgKsNNEupK5pHM%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fkrzysztof-szymonszymanski.blog.on et.pl.

²³ Administrative region in the north-eastern part of Italy, with an area of 18,377 km². Venice is the capital city (331,400 inhabitants). In the north it borders on Austria, in the east on Friuli-Venezia Giulia, in the south on Emilia-Romagna and in the west on Trentino-Alto Adige and Lombardy, Online, [access date: 20.05.2016]. Available on the Internet: <https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wenecja> _Euganejska.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Radosław SZYMANKIEWICZ – Ph.D. manager of the Department of Theory and Practice of Fire – Institute of Command of the Military Academy of Land Forces. Graduate of the Tadeusz Kościuszko Military Academy of Mechanized Infantry (WSOWZ). In the years 1992-2007, served in various positions at the 10th “Sudety” Mechanized Division and the 11th “Lubuska” Armoured Cavalry Division. Interested in the issues related to the military security of the state. Completed master’s degree studies and postgraduate studies, as well as degree and doctoral studies at AON (the National Defence University) in Warsaw. In 2013, obtained his Ph.D. from the National Security Faculty of AON. Member of organisational committees preparing scientific conferences held at WSOWL. Received numerous distinctions and awards for service. Author of several articles and a research paper concerning the security of the state.

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