Interface between nuclear safety and security

• Autorzy: Berg H, P. , Seidel F.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Nuclear power plants benefit from a sophisticated and comprehensive safety regime that has been established over the years. However, the security regime for nuclear power plants is far less developed than the safety regime. Although adopting (and adapting) certain elements of the nuclear safety regime could significantly strengthen the nuclear security regime, at least four challenges are likely to surface: national sovereignty, information transparency, lack of policy consensus, and challenges of regime harmonization. Seek an optimal balance between mandatory international standards and voluntary actions and endorse consideration of additional binding and non-binding international safety and security requirements.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

safety; security; defence in depth; integrated approach; risk management; risk models

• Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Bezpieczeństwa i Niezawodności
• Czasopismo: Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: Vol. 5, No. 1
• Strony: 9--20
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 35 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Berg H, P.

• Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Salzgitter, Germany

autor

Seidel F.

• Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Salzgitter, Germany

Bibliografia

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