The Shia armed groups and the future of Iraq

• Autorzy: Rached K. K. , Bali A. O.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0012.1471

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this article, we try to identify the impact of the Shia militias in Iraq on the future of this country. We maintain that these armed groups will be a destabilising factor for Iraq and its neighbours, and they will worsen and deepen the sectarian division in the Middle East. We assess these different groups from different perspectives, for example, using the Weberian theory that the state is the only entity that has a monopoly of violence, Ariel Ahram’s model of state-sponsored and government-sponsored militias, and finally the devolution of violence to these armed groups.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Iraq; Shia armed groups; sectarian division; ISIS and New Middle East

• Wydawca: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej
• Czasopismo: Security and Defence Quarterly
• Rocznik: 2018
• Tom: Vol. 19, No. 2
• Strony: 39--53
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 20 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Rached K. K.

• University of Human Development, Iraq

autor

Bali A. O.

• University of Human Development, Iraq

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2018).