The role of clan in the hybrid and alternative modes of supply chain governance

Świerczek, Artur

doi:10.17270/J.LOG.2020.384

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Tytuł artykułu

The role of clan in the hybrid and alternative modes of supply chain governance

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Świerczek Artur

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DOI

10.17270/J.LOG.2020.384

Warianty tytułu

Rola klanu w hybrydowych oraz alternatywnych mechanizmach koordynacji działań w łańcuchach dostaw

Języki publikacji

Abstrakty

Background: Recent studies in the domain of supply chain management underline the significance of the contractual and relational aspects of governance, at the same time ignoring the relevance of classical hierarchy. To respond to this challenge, our study posits that the market and hierarchy are both embedded in the wider social context, and as such they can only apply to some degree of relational aspects, referred in this research to as clan. Concomitantly, clan rarely acts as a sole mode of supply chain governance; quite the contrary, it can be either a hybrid (anchored between market and hierarchy) or an alternative (neither market nor hierarchy) mode of governance. By returning to the classical roots of governance of market and hierarchy as two bipolar modes, the goal of the paper is to compare diverse modes of supply chain governance (with the emphasis on the hybrid and alternative modes) in terms of the strength of clan. Methods: The study involves two stages of multivariate statistical analysis. In the first step, the variables indicating certain modes of market and hierarchy of upstream and downstream dyads were narrowed down to the main underlying multi-item constructs through Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with Varimax Rotation. In the second step of the analysis, the factor scores obtained through the PCA for market and hierarchical governance were used in cluster analysis. Results: The study reveals that the hybrid modes of governance (especially relational governance) anchored between bipolar modes of market and hierarchy demonstrate a higher portion of clan in comparison to hierarchy as the sole mode of governance in triadic supply chains. At the same time, triadic supply chains run by both market and hybrid governance do not differ from each other, as they indicate similar and significantly higher mean ranks for clan. The study reveals that the alternative (neither market nor hierarchical) modes of governance do not indicate higher portion of clan as compared to market and hierarchy as two sole modes of governance in triadic supply chains. Conclusions: The study shows that as the mode of governance clan takes a leading role in the hybrid modes of governance as compared to the alternative mechanisms. This may suggest that either the hybrid modes are much stronger enhanced by social dimensions encapsulated in clan than the alternative modes or the essence of clan in the hybrid modes is not the same as the essence of clan in the alternative modes of governance. Consequently, we conclude that the silver bullet for solving this problem may reside within the nature of clan, which is significantly different in both modes of governance.

Wstęp: Ostatnie publikacje dotyczące zarządzania łańcuchem dostaw podkreślają znaczenie kontraktowej i relacyjnej koordynacji działań, jednocześnie ignorując istotność koordynacji hierarchicznej. W celu sprostania temu wyzwaniu artykuł zakłada, że zarówno koordynacja rynkowa, jak i hierarchiczna są osadzone w kontekście społecznym, i jako takie, w pewnym stopniu stosują aspekty relacyjne, określane w tym artykule mianem klanu. Jednocześnie, klan rzadko występuje jako samodzielny mechanizm koordynacji działań, przeciwnie może przyjmować postać formę hybrydy (osadzonej między rynkiem i hierarchią) lub może być mechanizmem alternatywnym (nie rynkowym i zarazem nie hierarchicznym). Poprzez nawiązanie do klasycznej koordynacji rynkowej i hierarchicznej, celem artykułu jest porównanie różnych mechanizmów koordynacji działań w łańcuchu dostaw (w tym przede wszystkim mechanizmu hybrydowego i alternatywnego) ze względu na siłę aspektów relacyjnych, zakotwiczonych w klanie. Metody: W artykule przeprowadzono dwa etapy wielowymiarowej analizy statystycznej. W pierwszym etapie zmienne odzwierciedlające mechanizm rynkowy i hierarchiczny oddzielnie dla obu diad, zostały zredukowane za pomocą analizy czynnikowej z rotacją varimax w celu identyfikacji podstawowych konstruktów. W drugim etapie badania, otrzymane oceny czynnikowe zostały wykorzystane w grupowaniu obiektów. Wyniki: Przeprowadzone badanie pokazuje, że hybrydowa koordynacja działań (w szczególności mechanizm relacyjny), osadzona między dwoma biegunowymi mechanizmami rynku i hierarchii wykazuje wyższy stopień wykorzystania aspektów relacyjnych, typowych dla klanu, aniżeli hierarchia, stosowana jako jedyny mechanizm w triadycznych łańcuchach dostaw. Jednocześnie, triadyczne łańcuchy dostaw koordynowane za pomocą mechanizmu rynkowego i hybrydowego nie różnią się istotnie, pokazując podobne wartości średnie rang dla klanu. Badanie pokazuje również, że alternatywne (nie rynkowe i zarazem nie hierarchiczne) mechanizmy koordynacji działań nie wskazują wyższych wartości średnich rang dla klanu w porównaniu do mechanizmu rynkowego i hybrydowego. Wnioski: Badanie pokazuje, że klan pełni przewodnią rolę w koordynacji hybrydowej w porównaniu do alternatywnych mechanizmów koordynacji. Może to sugerować, że albo koordynacja hybrydowa jest wzbogacona aspektami relacyjnymi, typowymi dla klanu, w porównaniu do alternatywnych mechanizmów koordynacji, albo istota klanu w koordynacji hybrydowej nie jest tożsama z istotą klanu w alternatywnych mechanizmach koordynacyjnych. W świetle powyższego, rozwiązanie tego problemu może wynikać z natury klanu, który istotnie różni się w obu mechanizmach koordynacji działań w łańcuchach dostaw.

Słowa kluczowe

market governance relational governance hierarchy

koordynacja rynkowa koordynacja relacyjna hierarchia

Wydawca

Wyższa Szkoła Logistyki

Czasopismo

LogForum

Rocznik

2020

Tom

Vol. 16, no. 1

Strony

47--60

Opis fizyczny

Bibliogr. 55 poz., tab., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

Świerczek Artur

artur.swierczek@uekat.pl

University of Economics in Katowice, Department of Business Logistics, ul. 1 Maja 50, 40-287 Katowice, Poland

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa Nr 461252 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2020).

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Bibliografia

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