Assessing the cost of friction between NATO Allies

• Autorzy: Katsaitis Oysseus , Zombanakis George

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.35467/sdq/143276

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper proposes a method for assessing the cost of friction between North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies and highlights internal threats. This is applied to the Greek–Turkish conflict within the NATO context and concerns the functioning of defence expenditure in Greece, modified in such a way as to focus on the causes of friction between these allies. The analysis concentrates mainly on the issue of internal threats to the long-run equilibrium of NATO. The ARDL methodology used modifies the typical error correction model by introducing a mechanism that accelerates the process that leads back to the long-run equilibrium. Along with assessing the cost to an ally in relation to an internal threat, the method proposed allows the time required for the long-run equilibrium of NATO to be restored. The paper concludes that dynamic incidents of friction between allies expressed as an internal threat disturb NATO’s static equilibrium, destabilise an individual ally’s defence policy and contribute to cost being incurred.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

ARDL; NATO; defence expenditure

• Wydawca: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej
• Czasopismo: Security and Defence Quarterly
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: Vol. 36, No. 4
• Strony: 25--48
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 50 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Katsaitis Oysseus

• Sustainable Innovations Institute, 29 Commercial Street, Dundee, Scotland, DD1 3DG UK

autor

Zombanakis George

• Accounting, Finance and Economics, the American College of Greece, Greece

• https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3137-2029

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa Nr 461252 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2021).