The Use of Cyber Tools by the Russian Military: Lessons from the War against Ukraine and a Warning for NATO?

• Autorzy: Miron Marina , Thornton Rod

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.60097/ACIG/190142

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This article examines the Russian military’s Information Warfare (IW) activities. The particular focus here is on the use by this military of operations in cyberspace as a strategic force-multiplier. It seeks to shed light on why such operations are so important to this military and what goals it hopes to achieve through their use. In particular, this article highlights the role played by what Russian analysts refer to as cyber-psychological and cyber-technical operations. Having established the background to the Russian military’s IW thinking, this article then goes on to examine the application of its cyberspace operations against Ukraine: both before the 2022 invasion and as part of it. It is from this examination of the cyber-attacks conducted against Ukraine that a better understanding of the potential of Russian IW can be generated. As such, lessons can be drawn from this conflict as to how, in the future, the Russian military might employ IW specifically against NATO states as part of a major kinetic confrontation. But, as this article notes, drawing lessons as to the actual strength of Russian IW capabilities from the Ukraine conflict may be a flawed process. It may be the case that the Russian military might not have shown its true cyber hand in Ukraine. It may be saving its best cyber tools for any future conflict with NATO itself.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

cyberattack; cyberspace; information war; Ukraine; Russia

PL

cyberatak; cyberprzestrzeń; wojna informacyjna; Ukraina; Rosja

• Wydawca: NASK – National Research Institute
• Czasopismo: Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: Vol. 3, No. 1
• Strony: 148--169
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 84 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Miron Marina

• War Studies, King’s College London, UK

• https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3695-6541

autor

Thornton Rod

• Defence Studies, King’s College London, UK

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9566-8956

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa nr POPUL/SP/0154/2024/02 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki II" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki (2025).