Russian threats to the submarine internet cable infrastructure

Wasiuta, Olga

doi:10.5604/01.3001.0053.9127

Artykuł - szczegóły

Tytuł artykułu

Russian threats to the submarine internet cable infrastructure

Autorzy

Wasiuta Olga

Treść / Zawartość

Pełne teksty:

Pobierz

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0053.9127

Warianty tytułu

Rosyjskie zagrożenie dla podmorskiej kablowej infrastruktury internetowej

Języki publikacji

Abstrakty

The article outlines the importance of undersea communication cables, an under-researched and often underappreciated element of modern geopolitics, security and Internet resilience. The purpose of the article is to analyse the increased Russian naval activity in recent years around deep-sea cables, the critical infrastructure of the global Internet, which has the potential to disrupt the daily life of the West as Russia seeks new means of influencing the West during the war against Ukraine. As there is currently not yet enough scientific research on the topic, the article uses newspaper analytical materials and various reports in addition to scientific articles. Given the nature and purpose of the considerations, the assumption was made to use a diverse research methodology, at the basis of which were the following methods: historical, institutional-legal, monographic and document analysis. The conclusion of the article is that, as the world is heavily dependent on undersea cables that carry Internet traffic around the world, the Russian Federation will continue to threaten information systems, and their damage may not only adversely affect the state of Intercontinental communications, but also worsen the geopolitical situation on a global scale.

Artykuł przedstawia znaczenie podmorskich kabli komunikacyjnych, które są niedostatecznie zbadanym i często niedocenianym elementem współczesnej geopolityki, bezpieczeństwa i odporności Internetu. Celem artykułu jest analiza zwiększonej aktywności rosyjskiej marynarki wojennej w ostatnich latach wokół kabli głębinowych, krytycznej infrastruktury globalnego Internetu, co może zakłócić codzienne życie Zachodu, ponieważ Rosja szuka nowych środków wpływu na Zachód podczas wojny przeciwko Ukrainie. W związku z tym, że obecnie nie ma jeszcze wystarczającej ilości badań naukowych poświęconych danej problematyce, w artykule zostały wykorzystane, oprócz artykułów naukowych, prasowe materiały analityczne oraz różnego rodzaju raporty. Ze względu na charakter i cel rozważań przyjęto założenie o zastosowaniu zróżnicowanej metodologii badawczej, u podstaw której znalazły się następujące metody: historyczna, instytucjonalno-prawna, monograficzna oraz analiza dokumentów. Podsumowaniem artykułu jest wniosek, że w związku z tym, że świat jest w dużym stopniu uzależniony od kabli podmorskich, które przenoszą ruch internetowy na całym świecie, Federacja Rosyjska nadal będzie zagrażać systemom informatycznym, a ich uszkodzenie może nie tylko negatywnie wpłynąć na stan łączności międzykontynentalnej, ale także pogorszyć sytuację geopolityczną w skali globalnej.

Słowa kluczowe

undersea communication cables Internet Russian Federation potential Russian attack on undersea cables fibre optics

podmorskie kable komunikacyjne Internet Federacja Rosyjska potencjalny rosyjski atak na kable podmorskie światłowody

Wydawca

Szkoła Główna Służby Pożarniczej

Czasopismo

Zeszyty Naukowe SGSP / Szkoła Główna Służby Pożarniczej

Rocznik

2023

Tom

Nr 87

Strony

357--378

Opis fizyczny

Biliogr. 58 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Wasiuta Olga

olga.wasiuta@up.krakow.pl

University of Krakow

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0481-1567

Bibliografia

1. Admiral James Stavridis’ comments in the introduction to Rishi Sunak’s paper. In: Undersea Cables: Indispensable, Insecure. Policy Exchange, London 2017, https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Undersea-Cables.pdf.
2. Birnbaum, M., (2017). Facing Russian threat, NATO boosts operations for the first time since the Cold War, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/facing-russian-threatnato-boosts-operations-for-the-first-time-since-the-cold-war/2017/11/08/9b47f542-c49b-11e7-9922-4151f5ca6168_story.html.
3. Boylan, P., (2022). Cyberattack on Hawaii undersea communications cable thwarted by Homeland Security, https://www.staradvertiser.com/2022/04/12/breaking-news/cyberattack-on-hawaii-undersea-communications-cable-thwarted-by-homeland-security/.
4. Brzozowski, A., (2020). NATO seeks ways of protecting undersea cables from Russian attacks, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/nato-seeks-waysof-protecting-undersea-cables-from-russian-attacks/.
5. Buchaniec, C., (2022). US approaching ‘critical time’ in tech race with China, report says. Report published by ex-Google CEO Eric Schmidt’s defense group details state of US-China competition, https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2022/09/13/usapproaching-critical-time-in-tech-race-with-china-report-says/.
6. Bueger, Ch., Liebetrau, T., Franken, J., (2022). Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361306264_Security_threats_to_undersea_communications_cables_and_infrastructure_-_consequences_for_the_EU
7. Burgess, M., (2022). The Most Vulnerable Place on the Internet, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/submarine-internet-cables-egypt.
8. Communiqué approved by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the Brussels Summit on June 14 2021, https://otan.delegfrance.org/Communique-approved-by-the-NATO-Heads-of-State-and-Government-at-the-Brussels
9. Cook, L., (2023). NATO moves to protect undersea pipelines, cables as concern mounts over Russian sabotage threat, https://apnews.com/article/nato-russia-sabotage-pipelines-cables-infrastructure-507929033b05b5651475c8738179ba5c.
10. Could Russia cut undersea communication cables? (2017). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-42365191.
11. Cyberattacks And Satellite Sabotage: Putin’s Non-Nuclear Escalations, (2022), https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Cyberattacks-And-Satellite-Sabotage-Putins-Non-Nuclear-Escalations.html.
12. Der Spiegel: Субмарина „Лошарик” могла залишити Європу без інтернету, (2019), https://www.unian.ua/world/10605117-prezidentom-yevroparlamentu-obrano-italiycya-davida-sassoli.html .
13. Dimitrova, A., (2019). NATO at Seventy: The Need to Redefine the Transatlantic Bargain, CIFE Policy Paper, December 1st, 2019, No 94, https://www.cife.eu/Ressources/FCK/files/publications/policy%20paper/2019/CIFE94_Dimitrova_NATO.pdf.
14. Faulconbridge, G., (2023). Russia now has free hand to destroy undersea communications cables, Putin ally says, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedevsays-moscow-now-has-free-hand-destroy-enemies-undersea-2023-06-14/
15. Gertz, B., (2015). U.S. Shadowing Russian Ship in Atlantic Near Nuclear Submarine Areas, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-shadowing-russian-ship-in-atlantic-nearnuclear-submarine-areas/.
16. Glover, C., (2022). Palantir UK security move highlights Russian threat to undersea cables, https://techmonitor.ai/technology/cybersecurity/russia-cable-attack-palantir.
17. Harding, L., (2022), UKmilitarychiefwarnsofRussianthreattovitalunderseacables, 8.01.2022, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jan/08/uk-military-chief-warnsof-russian-threat-to-vital-undersea-cables .
18. Hinck, G., (2018). Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables, https://www.lawfareblog.com/evaluating-russian-threat-undersea-cables.
19. How deep is the ocean? The average ocean depth is 3.7 kilometres (2.3 miles), https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/oceandepth.html [11.04.2023].
20. In France, Large Underwater Internet Cables Were Cut: A Russian Submarine Is Suspected Of Sabotage, (2022). https://sundries.com.ua/en/in-france-large-underwater-Internet-cables-were-cut-a-russian-submarine-is-suspected-of-sabotage/.
21. Indispensable but insecure – why protecting undersea cables will save the Internet, https://policyexchange.org.uk/press-release/indispensable-but-insecure-why-protecting-undersea-cables-will-save-the-Internet/.
22. Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), https://irp.fas.org/program/collect/iuss.htm [14.04.2023].
23. Jureńczyk, Ł., (2020). The 2019 NATO Summit in London in the context of Poland’s militarysecurity, Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2020, nr 18, z. 1, s. 43-59.
24. Kim, J., (2023). Top 100 Subsea Cable Systems in the World as of 2023, https://dgtlinfra.com/top-subsea-cable-systems/.
25. Lee, K., (2023). AI vs. TeleGeography: The Submarine Cable Showdown, https://blog.telegeography.com/ai-vs-telegeography-the-submarine-cable-showdown.
26. Lewell-Buck, E., (2022). The need for new international treaties on undersea cables, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-need-for-new-international-treaties-on-undersea- cables/.
27. Loki, A., (2016). This is the ‘most shadowy’ part of Russia’s navy, and it is rightfully giving NATO planners pause, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-losharik-subspooking- nato-2016-7?IR=T.
28. Matsakis, L., (2018). What Would Really Happen If Russia Attacked Undersea Internet Cables, https://www.wired.com/story/russia-undersea-internet-cables/.
29. Mauldin, A., (2017). Cable Breakage: When and How Cables Go Down, https://blog.telegeography.com/what-happens-when-submarine-cables-break.
30. Menon P., Westbrook T., (2022). Undersea cable fault could cut off Tonga from rest of the world for weeks, https://www.reuters.com/markets/funds/undersea-cable-fault-couldcut-off-tonga-rest-world-weeks-2022-01-18/.
31. Morcos, P., Wall, C., (2021). Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security.
32. Newdick, T., (2021). Norwegian Undersea Surveillance Network Had Its Cables Mysteriously Cut, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43094/norwegian-underseasurveillance-network-had-its-cables-mysteriously-cut .
33. Nilsen, T., (2022). Disruption at one of two undersea cables to Svalbard, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2022/01/disruption-one-two-undersea-optical-cablessvalbardn.
34. Nordenman, M., (2018). Russian Subs Are Sniffing Around Transatlantic Cables. Here’s What to Do About It, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/01/russian-subs-aresniffing-around-transatlantic-cables-heres-what-do-about-it/145241/.
35. Online press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the first day of the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers, (2020). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_178946.htm?selectedLocale=en.
36. Patalano, A., (2022). Understanding AUKUS, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/understanding-aukus/.
37. Peck, M., (2020). Why Russia’s Poseidon Thermonuclear Torpedo Is Atomic Overkill, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/why-russia%E2%80%99s-poseidon-thermonuclear-torpedo-atomic-overkill-171268.
38. Peter, L., (2018). What makes Russia’s new spy ship Yantar special? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42543712.
39. Putin knows that undersea cables are the west’s Achilles heel (2022). https://www.ft.com/content/0ddc5b48-b255-401b-8e9f-8660f4eab37b
40. Rauscher, K.F., (2010). Proceedings of the Reliability of Global Undersea Cable Communications Infrastructure Study & Global Summit. The Report. „IEEE Communications Society,” https://www.ieee-rogucci.org/files/The%20ROGUCCIReportv186PARTI_0.pdf.
41. Russia a ‘risk’ to undersea cables, defence chief warns, (2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42362500.
42. Sanger, D.E., Schmitt, E., (2015). Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-nearundersea-cables-concerns-us.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0.
43. Scott, M., (2022). Will Russia attack undersea internet cables next? https://www.politico.eu/article/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-threat-to-undersea-internet-cables/.
44. Seibt, S., (2022). Threat looms of Russian attack on undersea cables to shut down West’s Internet, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220323-threat-looms-of-russianattack-on-undersea-cables-to-shut-down-west-s-Internet.
45. Shalal, A., (2017). Russian naval activity in Europe exceeds Cold War levels: U.S. admiral, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-military/russian-naval-activity-ineurope-exceeds-cold-war-levels-u-s-admiral-idUSKBN17B0O8.
46. Siebold, S., (2023). NATO says Moscow may sabotage undersea cables as part of war on Ukraine, https://www.reuters.com/world/moscow-may-sabotage-undersea-cablespart-its-war-ukraine-nato-2023-05-03/.
47. Starosielski, N., (2015). The Undersea Network, Duke University Press Durham and London 2015, https://syllabus.pirate.care/library/Nicole%20Starosielski/The%20Undersea%20Network%20(397)/The%20Undersea%20Network%20-%20Nicole%20Starosielski.pdf.
48. Starr, B., (2015). U.S. sensors detect Russian submarines near underwater cables, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/28/politics/russian-submarine-expansion-atlantic/index.html.
49. Stringer, E., (2022). Putin knows that undersea cables are the west’s Achilles heel. “Financial Times”, https://www.ft.com/content/0ddc5b48-b255-401b-8e9f-8660f4eab37b.
50. Submarine Cable Map, May 2023, https://www.submarinecablemap.com/.
51. Sunak, R., (2017). Foreword by Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret), former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Undersea-Cables.pdf.
52. Wall, C., Morcos, P., (2021). Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security,https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security.
53. Way, F., (2022). Vital underwater internet cables could be next on Vladimir Putin’s hit list, it is feared, https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/vital-underwater-internet-cables-couldbe-attacked-by-russia/.
54. Andrijczuk, P., (2023). НАТО зосереджується на захисті підводної інфраструктури (NATO zoseredzujet’sia na zachysti pidwodnoji ingrastruktury, https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/01/12/nato-zoseredzhuyetsya-na-zahysti-pidvodnoyi-infrastruktury/.
55. В РФ є можливість обірвати доступ Британії до інтернету – начальник штабуоборони (W RF je możlywist’ obirwaty dostup Brytanii do internetu – naczalnyk sztabu oborony, (2017). https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/ news/2017/12/15/7075092/.
56. Керівник британського Генштабу: Росія може пошкодити підводні кабелі (Keriwnyk brytan’skogo Gensztabu: Rosja może poszkodyty pidwodni kabeli), (2017). https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news/28920228.html.
57. Radkovec’, J.,, (2020). Чим РФ намагається лякати США і НАТО в Світовому океані (Czym RF namagajet’sia lakaty SSZA I NATO w Switowomu okeani), https://defence-ua.com/army_and_war/chim_rf_namagajetsja_ljakati_ssha_i_nato_v_svitovomu_okeani-808.html.
58. У Британії заявили, що РФ представляє загрозу для країни у сфері доступу до інтернету, (2017). https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/britanii-zayavili-rf-predstavlyaetugrozu-1513328230.html.

Typ dokumentu

Bibliografia

Identyfikator YADDA

bwmeta1.element.baztech-6a870221-de18-4e53-a081-c820e4d8242e