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Russia’s Cyber Campaigns and the Ukraine War: From the ‘Gray Zone’ to the ‘Red Zone’

Autorzy
Stoddart Kristan
Treść / Zawartość
Pełne teksty:
Applied_2024_1_1_Stoddart.pdf
Identyfikatory
DOI
10.60097/ACIG/189358
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
This article examines Russia’s cyber campaigns against Ukraine and shines some light into this corner of the ‘gray zone’ and into the ‘red zone’ warfare inflicted upon Ukraine. Hitherto, there has been a lack of in-depth, systematic studies in relation to state-on-state cyber attacks. This article means to begin to bridge this gap in knowledge with its focus on Ukraine while arguing that Russia’s cyber campaigns are components of a wider suite of active measures/hybrid warfare engagements from its state and substate entities. For the Kremlin, hybrid warfare (gibridnaya voina) is fought with all the tools at their disposal on a ‘battlefield’ that stretches beyond the four modern domains of land, sea, air, and space. The fifth domain of cyberspace is increasingly important for espionage, cyberwar, and influence operations.
Słowa kluczowe
EN
PL
Wydawca
NASK – National Research Institute
Czasopismo
Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance
Rocznik
2024
Tom
Vol. 3, No. 1
Strony
5--33
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 149 poz., wykr.
Twórcy
autor
Stoddart Kristan
K.D.Stoddart@Swansea.ac.uk
  • Swansea University
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Uwagi
Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa nr POPUL/SP/0154/2024/02 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki II" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki (2025).
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