Partner Selection Using Reputation Information in n-player Cooperative Games

• Autorzy: Mariano P. , Correia L.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

To study cooperation evolution in populations, it is common to use games to model the individuals interactions. When these games are n-player it might be di cult to assign defection responsibility to any particular individual. In this paper the authors present an agent based model where each agent maintains reputation information of other agents. This information is used for partner selection before each game. Any agent collects information from the successive games it plays and updates a private reputation estimate of its candidate partners. This approach is integrated with an approach of variable sized population where agents are born, interact, reproduce and die, thus presenting a possibility of extinction. The results now obtained, for cooperation evolution in a population, show an improvement over previous models where partner selection did not use any reputation information. Populations are able to survive longer by selecting partners taking merely into account an estimate of others' reputations.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

evolution of cooperation; multi-agent systems; n-player games; partner selection; reputation

• Wydawca: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
• Czasopismo: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: nr 4
• Strony: 53--60
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 45 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Mariano P.

• Departamento de Informática, Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal

autor

Correia L.

• Departamento de Informática, Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal

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