Dynamic safety management model for rail traffic control

• Autorzy: Ilczuk Przemysław , Kycko Magdalena , Szmel Dariusz

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.24136/tren.2023.016

Warianty tytułu

PL

Dynamiczny model zarządzania bezpieczeństwem dla sterowania ruchem kolejowym

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In rail transport, increasing emphasis has been placed in recent years on improving safety levels. Therefore, more requirements and legal documents require risk analyses to be carried out at various stages of investment implementation. One of the leading legal documents that introduce the obligation to monitor risk is Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013 of 30 April 2013 on the common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment and re-pealing Regulation (EC) No 352/2009. Additionally, for traffic control systems, the requirements of CENELEC standards are mandatory. These documents present the subject of safety level and show its relation with the safety targets defined in the railway system, including the different ways of measuring them. Methods are also available to analyse the safety level of railway system components in detail, both at the level of individual components, subsystems, and the whole national railway system. However, after conducting an in-depth analysis of the literature, the authors of the article indicate that these methods are not consistent with each other. There is no method defined to present the direct relation of the safety level of the components of the system on the achievement of safety targets for the national railway system. The research and analysis aimed to define an approach, a method that would meet all legal requirements but at the same time would allow to clearly and reliably determine the safety level of the railway system. To define a unified approach, the authors of the article propose to develop a model of a dynamic object - a railway system safety model, which has also been verified on accurate safety data in rail transport in recent years. This model organises the process of safety management on railways and allows to determine values influencing the achievement of safety targets on an assumed level.

PL

Dyskusja o zagrożeniach i potrzebie metody ich oceny na różnych etapach inwestycji jest wciąż żywa na kolei. Istnieje również wiele dokumentów prawnych, które określają podejście do ryzyka oraz metody analizy i oceny ryzyka. Niemniej jednak dokumenty te często pokazują rozbieżne podejścia do zarządzania ryzykiem, co powoduje niejednoznaczność w interpretacji wymagań. Co więcej, niejednoznaczne wymagania skutkują różnymi interpretacjami przepisów i ich różnym stosowaniem przez uczestników rynku. Jednolite podejście i precyzyjne wymagania mają kluczowe znaczenie dla utrzymania wysokiego poziomu bezpieczeństwa, co jest ściśle związane z osiągnięciem zrównoważonego rozwoju transportu kolejowego. Dlatego w artykule autorzy podjęli się przedstawienia metody, która ujednoliciłaby rozbieżności w wymaganiach prawnych i objęła cały system kolejowy. W pierwszej części artykułu autorzy skupiają się na ujednoliceniu zarządzania bezpieczeństwem w sferze formalno-prawnej. Stosowana jest tu dogłębna analiza i porównanie istniejących standardów, wraz z mapowaniem poszczególnych procesów. Jest to kwestia krytyczna, ponieważ brak jednolitego podejścia stwarza problemy w ocenie globalnego bezpieczeństwa systemu. W dalszej części artykułu autorzy poruszyli problem rozłożonych w czasie analiz bezpieczeństwa. Obecne metody koncentrują się na statycznej ocenie bezpieczeństwa. W artykule zaproponowano nowatorskie podejście do dynamicznego zarządzania ryzykiem, wykorzystując teorię mechaniki i automatyki. Oczekuje się, że podejście to zaowocuje wytworzeniem predykcyjnych metod zarządzania ryzykiem.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

risk; safety management; rail traffic control

PL

ryzyko; poziom bezpieczeństwa; sterowanie ruchem kolejowym

• Wydawca: Uniwersytet Technologiczno-Humanistyczny im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego w Radomiu
• Czasopismo: Journal of civil engineering and transport
• Rocznik: 2023
• Tom: Vol. 5, No. 4
• Strony: 53--63
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 52 poz., rys. tab., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

Ilczuk Przemysław

• Warsaw University of Technology, Faculty of Transport, ul. Koszykowa 75, 00-662 Warsaw, Poland,

• https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9317-8710

autor

Kycko Magdalena

• Railway Institute, ul. Chłopickiego 50, 04-275 Warsaw, Poland

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5630-2812

autor

Szmel Dariusz

• Independent researcher, Warsaw, Poland

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9742-2298

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