Identifying the potential roles of design-based failures on human errors in shipboard operations

• Autorzy: Celik M. , Er I. D.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Despite the various developments in maritime society, human errors have been continued to be one of the primarily causes of marine accidents. The outcomes of detailed investigations on the root causes of human errors can provide valuable support on execution process of required precautions on board merchant ships. This paper examines the potential role of the design-based failures in shipboard systems on human errors during operational process. After completing the statistical research on maritime accidents, the paper concentrates on the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and the model is supported with the illustrative cases related to the influences of design-based failures on human errors. Consequently, this study originally proposes integrated unit into the HFACS systematic to manage to identify design-based human errors in maritime casualties. The model is eagerly expected to provide additional contributions on identifying the influences of poor design and constructional failures on human errors.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

human factor; shipboard operations; human errors; design-based failure; Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS); marine accidents; maritime casualties; safety at sea

• Wydawca: Faculty of Navigation, Gdynia Maritime University
• Czasopismo: TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
• Rocznik: 2007
• Tom: Vol. 1, no. 3
• Strony: 339--344
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 22 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Celik M.

• Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey

autor

Er I. D.

• Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey

Bibliografia

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