Quantitative safety goals as a basis for decision making

• Autorzy: Berg H. P.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Internationally, probabilistic safety analyses represent the state of the art in the licensing process for new industrial facilities, but increasingly also for evaluating the safety level of older industrial plants, e. g. as part of periodic safety reviews of nuclear power plants. Quantitative safety goals have not yet reached the same level of acceptance. However, this depends on the type of industry. Most of the countries consider those criteria as safety targets rather than as sharply defined boundary values. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are exceptions, they require demonstration of compliance with legally binding safety goals in the licensing procedure.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

quantitative safety goals; safety criteria; tolerable risk; decision making

• Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Bezpieczeństwa i Niezawodności
• Czasopismo: Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association
• Rocznik: 2008
• Tom: Vol. 1
• Strony: 53--63
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 37 poz., rys., tab., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

Berg H. P.

• Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Salzgitter, Germany

Bibliografia

• [1] Aven, T. & Vinnem, J. E. (2005). On the use of risk acceptance criteria in the offshore oil and gas industry. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 90, 15-24.
• [2] Aven, T., Vinnem, J.E. & Røed, W. (2006). On the use of goals, quantitative criteria and requirements in safety management. Risk Management: an International Journal 8, 118-132.
• [3] Berg, H. P. (1995). On the potential of probabilistic safety assessment. Kerntechnik 60, p. 71.
• [4] Berg, H. P., Görtz, R. & Schimetschka, E. (2003). Quantitative Probabilistic Safety Criteria for Licensing and Operation of Nuclear Plants, Comparison of the International Status and Development. BfS-Report, BfS-SK-03/03, Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Salzgitter.
• [5] Van der Borst & Versteeg, M. F. (1996). PSA supported severe accident management strategies for the Borssele NPP. Proc. International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment PSA '96. Vol. 3, 1601-1607. Park City, Utah, USA.
• [6] Braband, J. (2005). Risikoanalysen in der Eisenbahn-Automatisierung, Eurailpress, Hamburg 2005.
• [7] CENELEC. (2003). Railway applications-Communications, signalling and processing systems-Safety related electronic systems for signalling. EN 50129.
• [8] Cepin, M. (2004). Development of criteria for risk-informed decision-making. Proceedings International Conference Nuclear Energy for New Europe 2004, Nuclear Society of Slovenia, paper 501.
• [9] Cepin, M. (2007). The risk criteria for assessment of temporary changes in a nuclear power plant, Risk Analysis 27, No 4, 991-998.
• [10] Dennis, C. (2006). The use of risk assessment to inform safety decision making, Safety Risk Management as an Input to Business Strategy, Institute of Risk Management.
• [11] Directorate General for Environmental Protection at the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment (1989). Premises for Risk Management-Risk Limits in the Content of Environmental Policy.
• [12] Eendebak, B. (1995). The use of probabilistic safety assessment for operating nuclear power plants, fourth annual Two-Day Conference on PSA on the Nuclear Industry, London.
• [13] European Commission. (2005). Mandate to the European Railway Agency.
• [14] Ales, F. (2007). Safety aspects of GNSS based train position determination for railway signalling, UIC GALILEO for Rail Symposium, Paris.
• [15] Görtz, R., Berg, H. P. & Schimetschka, E. (2001). Risk targets and reliability goals. Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Risk-informed Decision Making PSARID EUROCOURSE, Garching.
• [16] Hakata, T. (2003). Basic considerations on defining safety goals. Nuclear Technology 142, 243-249.
• [17] Hokstad, P., Vatn, J., Aven, T. & Sorum, M. (2004). Use of risk acceptance criteria in Norwegian offshore industry: dilemmas and challenges. Risk, Decision and Policy, 9, 193-206.
• [18] Holloway, N. & J. Butcher, P. (1995). Ignalina RSR Task 10: a defense in depth approach to safety assessment for RMBK reactors. Serco Assurance Ltd., UK, December 1995, private communication by S. Simkevicius [e-mail].
• [19] Health & Safety Executive. (1988). The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations. HMSO, London.
• [20] Health & Safety Executive. (1992). Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Plants. HMSO, London.
• [21] Health & Safety Executive. (2006). Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities, Edition HSE, Redgrave Court.
• [22] Health & Safety Executive. (2006). Numerical Targets and Legal Limits in Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities, An Explanatory Note, HSE, Redgrave Court.
• [23] International Atomic Energy Agency. (1992). The Role of Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Probabilistic Safety Criteria in Nuclear Power Plant Safety. IAEA Safety Series No. 106, Vienna.
• [24] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2001). Safety Assessment and Verification for Nuclear Power Plants. Safety Guide No. NS-G-1.2, Vienna.
• [25] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2002). Heavy Water Reactors: Status and Projected Development. IAEA Technical Report Series No. 407, Vienna.
• [26] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2007). Risk- Informed Decision-Making. Draft B, Safety Guide, Vienna.
• [27] International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group. (1999). Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants. 75-INSAG-3 Rev. 1, INSAG-12, IAEA, Vienna.
• [28] Kumamoto, H. (2007). Satisfying Safety Goals by Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Springer Series in Reliability Engineering, Springer-Verlag.
• [29] Maharik, H. & Vrijling, J. K. (2002). Lessons from quantitative risk assessment in the Netherlands: national and international perspective. 6th International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, San Juan, Puerto Rico, USA.
• [30] NORSOK. (2001). Risk and Emergency Preparedness Analysis, Standard Z-013.
• [31] Nuclear Energy Agency/OECD. (2007). Use and Development of Probabilistic Safety Assessment, NEA/CSNI/R 12.
• [32] Nuclear Energy Agency/OECD. (2007). The Regulatory Goal of Assuring Nuclear Safety, Paris.
• [33] Rimkevicius, S., Senkin, V. & Brandisauskas, D. (2002). Presentation at IAEA Technical Meeting on Analysis Results and Methods for PSRs of NPPs, Ljubljana, Slovenia.
• [34] Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). (1996). Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). Guide No. YVL 2.8, issued December 20th, 1996, updated version May 2003.
• [35] Villadóniga, J. (2001). Towards the risk-informed approach. Probabilistic safety assessment and risk- informed decision making. PSARID EUROCOURSE, Garching.
• [36] Vrijling, J. K., van Hengel, W. & van Maanen, S. E. (1996). The application of the concept of societal risk to various activities in the Netherlands. Proceedings of the International Conference Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, ESREL 1996-PSAM III, Springer-Verlag, Volume 2, 960-966.
• [37] Vrijling, J. K. et al. (2004). A framework for risk criteria for critical infrastructures : fundamentals and case studies in the Netherlands, Journal of Risk Research 7 (6), 569-579.