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Tytuł artykułu

Przygotowanie i przebieg operacji Iraqi Freedom

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Warianty tytułu
EN
The preparation and the course of operation Iraqi Freedom
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
EN
The article presents the process of preparation and the course of war operations conducted within the Operation Iraqi Freedom. This operation is undoubtedly a breakthrough moment in the development of modern art of war, which has been experiencing a kind of renaissance in the last decade. This process was initiated in the United States at the end of the 70s and beginning of the 80s when the supreme military and civil authorities started generating mechanisms and procedures in order to ensure the effective achievement of political goals with the use of military means. Basing on the works of outstanding military theoreticians and pragmatists (Clausewitz, Jomini, Douhet, Liddell Hart) and taking advantage of Vietnam war experiences, research was launched in order to work out one common concept , that would ensure the USA political leadership the capability to carry out interests of the state with the help of military means. The conducted analyses and evaluations from the mentioned above period show that the first attempts of practical implementation of the concept being built did not bring anticipated results, which was confirmed by failures during actions undertaken to free American hostages in Iran (April 1979) and during the intervention in Grenada (1983). It was not until the successful operation in Panama (1989), when Americans were convinced about a breakthrough in working out the conception ensuring effective conducting of strategic aims of the state on the strategic and military levels. The Operation Desert Storm (1990/91) was a model example of “operating troops freely on the whole area of operation” and became a kind of a test for new solutions. They proved fully effective and were implemented in USA operations to liberate Kuwait. During the Balkan war (1999), the political leadership’s guidelines and directives led to too early and unnecessary resignation from the use of NATO land forces. Also the first strikes on terrorist bases in Afghanistan (August 1998) were conducted exclusively by long range assets which air and naval forces were equipped with. Conclusions generated in the mentioned above operations influenced the strategy of G. Bush’s political leadership who maintained reserved to ineffective and not bringing expected results form of commanding from “a safe distance”. More-over, a common opinion (especially in American conservative circles) that the resignation of the land forces’ use in Iraq would cause that on the international arena there would be a conviction that the United States are afraid of operations resulting in huge human losses which would not be accepted by American citizens (so called Vietnam syndrome). That situation diametrically changed after terrorist attacks in New York and Washington (9/11/2001) when most American population felt greatly threatened. The presented in a general outline factors in the context of art of the war development became the basis of planning, preparing and conducting the Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003.
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Strony
188--201
Opis fizyczny
rys.
Twórcy
autor
  • Akademia Obrony Narodowej
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-4f44e5a1-dfa1-4ae2-b93d-577b81b4700c
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