Indirect control and power

• Autorzy: Bertini C. , Mercik J. , Stach I.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5277/ord160202

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex prob-lem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

game theory; indirect control; corporations; power indices

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: Vol. 26, No. 2
• Strony: 7--30
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 21 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Bertini C.

• University of Bergamo, Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods, Italy

autor

Mercik J.

• WSB University in Wrocław, Poland

autor

Stach I.

• AGH University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, Poland

Bibliografia

• [1] BANZHAF J.F., Weighted voting doesn’t work. A mathematical analysis, Rutgers Law Review, 1965, 19, 317.
• [2] BERTINI C., GAMBARELLI G., STACH I., Power indices in politics and finance, Bollettino dei docenti di matematica UIM-CDC, 2016, 72, 9 (in Italian).
• [3] BERTINI C., STACH I., Banzhaf voting power measure, [in:] K. Dowding (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE, Los Angeles 2011, 54.
• [4] CRAMA Y., LERUTH L., Control and voting power in corporate networks: concepts and computational aspects, European Journal of Operational Research, 2007, 178, 879.
• [5] CRAMA Y., LERUTH L., Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures, Inter-national Game Theory Review, 2013, 15 (3), 1340017-1.
• [6] CRAMA Y., LERUTH L., WANG S., A Markov chain model of power indices in corporate structures, Working paper, 2011, retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2268/178393, April 2016.
• [7] DENTI E., PRATI N., Finding winning coalition in indirect weighted majority games, Working Paper Dipartimento di Finanza dell’Impresa e dei Mercati Finanziari, University of Udine, 1996 (1).
• [8] DENTI E., PRATI N., An algorithm for winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations, Decisions in Economics and Finance, 2001, 24 (2), 153.
• [9] DENTI E., PRATI N., Relevance of winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations, Theory and Decision, 2004, 56, 183.
• [10] GAMBARELLI G., OWEN G., Indirect control of corporations, International Journal of Game Theory, 1994, 23, 287.
• [11] HU X., SHAPLEY L.S., On authority distributions in organizations: controls, Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 45 (1), 153.
• [12] JOHNSTON R.J., On the measurement of power. Some reactions to Lawer, Environment and Planning A, 1978, 10, 907.
• [13] KAROS D., PETERS H., Indirect control and power in mutual control structures, Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 92, 150.
• [14] KOŁODZIEJ M., STACH I., Control sharing analysis and simulation, Proceedings of International Con-ference on Industrial Logistics ICIL 2016, forthcoming.
• [15] MERCIK J., LOBOS K., Index of implicit power as a measure of reciprocal ownership, Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9760, 2016, 132.
• [16] OWEN G., Multilinear extensions of games, Management Sciences, 1972, 18, 64.
• [17] PENROSE L.S., The elementary statistics of majority voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1946, 109, 53.
• [18] PENROSE L.S., On the objective study of crowd behaviour, H.K. Lewis Co., London 1952.
• [19] SHAPLEY L.S., SHUBIK M., A method for evaluating the distributions of power in a committee system, American Political Science Review, 1954, 48, 787.
• [20] STACH I., Shapley–Shubik index, [in:] K. Dowding (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles 2011, 603.
• [21] www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/content/en/investor_relations/share/ Shareholder_Structure.html (URL consulted in March 2016).

Uwagi

PL

Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.