GPS/GNSS spoofing and the real-time single-antenna-based spoofing detection system

• Autorzy: Ochin E.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.17402/256

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The idea of C/A codes GPS/GNSS Spoofing (Substitution), or the ability to mislead a satellite navigation receiver into establishing a position or time fix which is incorrect, has been gaining attention as spoofing has become more sophisticated. Various techniques have been proposed to detect if a receiver is being spoofed – with varying degrees of success and computational complexity. If the jammer signals are sufficiently plausible then the GNSS receiver may not realize it has been duped. There are various means of detecting spoofing activity and hence providing effective mitigation methods. In this paper, a novel signal processing method applicable to a single antenna handset receiver for spoofing detection has been described. Mathematical models and algorithms have been developed to solve the problems of satellite navigation safety. What has been considered in the paper is a spoofing detection algorithm based on the analysis of a civil satellite signal generated by mobile C/A GPS/GNSS single-antenna receivers. The work has also served to refine the civilian spoofing threat assessment by demonstrating the challenges involved in mounting a spoofing attack.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Global Navigation Satellite System; Global Positioning System; anti-terrorism; anti-spoofing; transport safety; spoofer; spoofing detection algorithm

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie
• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie
• Rocznik: 2017
• Tom: nr 52 (124)
• Strony: 145--153
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 13 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Ochin E.

• Maritime University of Szczecin, Navigation Faculty 1–2 Wały Chrobrego St., 70-500 Szczecin, Poland

Bibliografia

• 1. Broumandan, A., Jafarnia-Jahromi, A., Dehghanian, V., Nielsen, J. & Lachapelle, G. (2012) GNSS Spoofing Detection in Handheld Receivers based on Signal Spatial Correlation. Position Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS), April 23–26, 2012, Myrtle Beach, SC, USA. Available from: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6236917/ [Accessed: August 15, 2017]
• 2. Dobryakova, L. & Ochin, E. (2014) On the application of GNSS signal repeater as a spoofer. Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie 40 (112), pp. 53–57.
• 3. Dobryakova, L., Lemieszewski, Ł. & Ochin, E. (2012) Antiterrorism – design and analysis of GNSS antispoofing algorithms. Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie 30 (102), pp. 93–101.
• 4. Dobryakova, L., Lemieszewski, Ł. & Ochin, E. (2013) The analysis of the detecting algorithms of GNSS-spoofing. Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie 36 (108) z. 2, pp. 30–36.
• 5. Dobryakova, L., Lemieszewski, Ł. & Ochin, E. (2014) Design and Analysis of Spoofing Detection Algorithms for GNSS Signals. Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie 40 (112), pp. 47–52.
• 6. Hartman, R.G. (1996) Spoofing Detection System for a Satellite Positioning System. U.S. Patent No. 5,557,284, Sept. 1996. Available from: https://www.google.ch/patents/ US5557284
• 7. Humphreys, T.E., Kintner, P.M., Jr., Psiaki, M.L., Ledvina, B.M. & O’Hanlon, B.W. (2009) Assessing the Spoofing Threat. GPS World 20 (1), pp. 28–38.
• 8. Humphreys, T.E., Ledvina, B.M., Psiaki, M.L., O’Hanlon, B.W. & Kintner, P.M. Jr. (2008) Assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer. Preprint of the 2008 ION GNSS Conference Savannah, GA, September 16–19, 2008 https://radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/ images/stories/files/papers/ion2008r01_for_distributionW. pdf
• 9. Ochin, E., Lemieszewski, Ł., Lusznikov, E. & Dobryakova, L. (2013) The study of the spoofer’s some properties with help of GNSS signal repeater. Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie 36 (108) z. 2, 159–165.
• 10. Psiaki, M.L., O’Hanlon, B.W., Powell, S.P., Bhatti, J.A., Humphreys, T.E. & Schofield, A. (2014) GNSS Spoofing Detection using Two-Antenna Differential Carrier Phase. GPS World 25, (11), pp. 36–44.
• 11. Rawnsley, A. (2011) Iran’s Alleged Drone Hack: Tough, but Possible. [Online] December 2011. Available from: http:// www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/iran-drone-hack-gps/ [Accessed: August 15, 2017]
• 12. Tippenhauer, N.O., Pöpper, C., Rasmussen, K.B. & Čapkun, S. (2011) On the Requirements for Successful GPS Spoofing Attacks. Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security CCS’11, Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 17–21, 2011. Available from: https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/files/6489/gps.pdf [Accessed: August 15, 2017]
• 13. Zaragoza, S. & Zumalt, E. (2013) Spoofing a Superyacht at Sea. [Online] July 2013. Available from: http://www. utexas.edu/know/2013/07/30/spoofing-a-superyacht-at-sea/ [Accessed: August 15, 2017]

Uwagi

PL

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2018).