Designing issues of the alarm system in context of functional safety and human factors

• Autorzy: Kosmowski K. T.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This article addresses selected aspects of the alarm system and human factors that should be evaluated during the design and operation of an industrial hazardous installation. In such installations the layer of protection analysis (LOPA) methodology is often applied for simplified risk analysis based on defined accident scenarios. To reduce and control the risks the safety instrumented functions (SIFs) are identified and their safety integrity levels (SILs) determined taking into account defined criteria the risk evaluation results. Given SIF is implemented using the basic process control system (BPCS), the alarm system (AS) and the safety instrumented system (SIS). Nevertheless a crucial role plays the human-operator undertaking safety-related decisions during potential abnormal situations and accidents. Below some issues concerning requirements for the alarm system design in context of human factors are outlined and discussed.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

hazardous plants; protection layers; functional safety; alarm system; human factors

• Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Bezpieczeństwa i Niezawodności
• Czasopismo: Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: Vol. 6, No. 2
• Strony: 47--58
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 30 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Kosmowski K. T.

• Gdańsk University of Technology, Gdańsk, Poland

Bibliografia

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