Collaborating Pariahs: Does the Ukraine War Cement an Adversarial Cyber-Information Bloc?

• Autorzy: Bronk Chris

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.60097/ACIG/190263

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has dramatically altered global politics, not least that several so-called pariah states appear to be cooperating at a deeper level than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Occupying a critical position between the pariahs and the rest of the community of nations is China, an adversary to the United States, but not a pariah to the degree of Russia or its allies North Korea and Iran. Each of these countries has advanced both cyber and information operations. Considered here is a framework for understanding linkages between China and the pariahs; a chronicle of cyberattacks by each of the countries mentioned as well as consideration of possible collaboration; and observations on their propagandistic information operations since the beginning of the Russo-Ukraine War.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

cybersecurity; information; role theory

PL

cyberbezpieczeństwo; informacja; teoria ról

• Wydawca: NASK – National Research Institute
• Czasopismo: Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: Vol. 3, No. 1
• Strony: 58--77
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 74 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Bronk Chris

• Hobby School of Public Affairs, University of Houston

• https://orcid.org/0009-0002-6778-2206

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa nr POPUL/SP/0154/2024/02 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki II" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki (2025).