Systemic Operational Design – a study in failed concept

• Autorzy: Przybyło Łukasz

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.35467/sdq/163292

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

One of the many reasons for the failure of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) in the Second Lebanon War was the concept of Systemic Operational Design (SOD), translated into de facto military doctrine. The story of the rise and fall of the SOD idea is a warning sign for all militaries faced with “modern” and “fashionable” ideas. The purpose of this paper is therefore to describe and evaluate the Systemic Operational Design created and introduced into the IDF by Brigadier General Shimon Naveh and the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI). The study is based on the literature created by the State of Israel, the IDF, and its main proponent Shimon Naveh, as well as other militaries (mainly the US Army). This theoretical background is confronted with the IDF’s operations during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and their effects on the war’s outcome. The over intellectualised, ambiguous, and not properly structured concept of the SOD, introduced as the IDF’s doctrine and approach to operations, led to military failure (which also had more root causes) in Lebanon. A study of the SOD failure should lead to a careful approach being taken to all new military concepts and ideas. Both change and continuation need to be properly balanced and evaluated, while enhanced military effectiveness could be of great value. At the same time, the impact of concepts which are not well anchored in military science/history and untested, like the SOD, could be devastating for militaries.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

military doctrines; IDF; systemic operational design; operational art; 2006 Lebanon War

• Wydawca: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej
• Czasopismo: Security and Defence Quarterly
• Rocznik: 2023
• Tom: Vol. 42, No. 2
• Strony: 35--54
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 46 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Przybyło Łukasz

• Military Strategy Institute, War Studies University, Al. gen. Chruściela “Montera” 103, 00-910 Warsaw, Poland

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9425-5359

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MEiN, umowa nr SONP/SP/546092/2022 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2022-2023).