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Net spills among NATO allies: Theory and empirical evidence from dynamic quantile connectedness

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Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
The paper draws on the economic theory of alliances to stress the importance of considering both benefits and costs arising from the interaction between member states of a military alliance in terms of defence expenditure on equipment. We expand the theory of alliances to incorporate the spills that stem from the obligations of each ally by introducing the notion of spill-outs and net spills, the latter measured as the difference between spill-in and spill-out effects. To assess the net spills contribution of each of the members to the alliance, we test for empirical evidence of net spills among a group of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, applying time-varying Dynamic Quantile Connectedness analysis. The results that stem from our model considering the cost of spill-outs suggest that there are strong incentives among the allies for free-riding behaviour. In line with our theoretical model, our empirical analysis shows that it is only during crisis period that NATO member-states contribute actively to the alliance, something that has become increasingly clear since the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Rocznik
Strony
21--37
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 35 poz., rys., tab.
Twórcy
  • Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deree - The American College of Greece, 6 Gravias, 15342, Athens, Greece
  • Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deree - The American College of Greece, 6 Gravias, 15342, Athens, Greece
  • Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deree - The American College of Greece, 6 Gravias, 15342, Athens, Greece
Bibliografia
  • 1. Alley J. (2021) ‘Reassessing the public goods theory of alliances’, Research and Politics, 8(1). doi: 10.1177/20531680211005225.
  • 2. Ando T., Greenwood-Nimmo M. and Shin Y. (2022) ‘Quantile connectedness: Modeling tail behavior in the topology of financial networks’, Management Science, 68(4), pp. 2401–2431. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.3984.
  • 3. Antonakakis N., Gabauer D. and Gupta R. (2019) ‘International monetary policy spillovers: Evidence from a time-varying parameter vector autoregression’, International Review of Financial Analysis, 65, pp. 1–12. doi: 10.1016/j.irfa.2019.101382.
  • 4. Bera A.K., Galvao A.F., Wang L. and Xiao Z. (2016) ‘A new characterization of the normal distribution and test for normality’, Econometric Theory, 32, pp. 1216–1252. doi: 10.1017/S026646661500016X.
  • 5. Beron K.J., Murdoch J.C. and Vijverberg W.P.M. (2003) ‘Why Cooperate? Public goods, economic power, and the Montreal protocol’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(2), pp. 286–297. doi: 10.1162/003465303765299819.
  • 6. Bouri E., Cepni O., Gabauer D. and Gupta R. (2021) ‘Return connectedness across asset classes around the COVID-19 outbreak’, International Review of Financial Analysis, 73, 101646. doi: 10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101646.
  • 7. Chatziantoniou I. and Gabauer D. (2021) ‘EMU risk-synchronisation and financial fragility through the prism of dynamic connectedness’, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 79, pp. 1–14. doi: 10.1016/j.qref.2020.12.003.
  • 8. Diebold F.X. and Yilmaz K. (2009) ‘Measuring financial asset return and volatility spillovers, with application to global equity markets’, The Economic Journal, 119(534), pp. 158–171. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02208.x.
  • 9. Diebold F.X. and Yilmaz K. (2012) ‘Better to give than to receive: Predictive directional measurement of volatility spillovers’, International Journal of Forecasting, 28(1), pp. 57–66. doi: 10.1016/j.ijforecast.2011.02.006.
  • 10. Diebold F.X. and Yilmaz K. (2014) ‘On the network topology of variance decompositions: Measuring the connectedness of financial firms’, Journal of Econometrics, 182(1), pp. 119–134. doi: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2014.04.012.
  • 11. Flores A.Q. (2011) ‘Alliances as contiguity in spatial models of military expenditures’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28(4), pp. 402–418. doi: 10.1177/0738894211413064.
  • 12. Gates W.R. and Terasawa K.L. (2003) ‘Reconsidering publicness in alliance defence expenditures: NATO expansion and burden sharing’, Defence and Peace Economics, 14(5), pp: 369–383. doi: 10.1080/10242690302924.
  • 13. George J. and Sandler T. (2018) ‘Demand for military spending in NATO, 1968–2015: A spatial panel approach’, European Journal of Political Economy, 53, pp. 222–236. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.002.
  • 14. George J. and Sandler T. (2021) ‘EU demand for defence, 1990–2019: A strategic approach’, Games, 12(13), pp. 1–18. doi: 10.3390/g12010013.
  • 15. George J. and Sandler T. (2022) ‘NATO defense demand, free-riding, and the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022’, Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, 49, pp. 783–806. doi: 10.1007/s40812-022-00228-y.
  • 16. Gonzalez R.A. and Mehay S.L. (1991) ‘Burden sharing in the NATO alliance: An empirical test of alternative views’, Public Choice, 68, pp. 107–116. doi: 10.1007/BF00173822.
  • 17. Hertz J. (1951) Political realism and political idealism: A study in theories and realities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • 18. Hobbes T. (1946) Leviathan. Oxford: Blackwell.
  • 19. Kim W. and Sandler T. (2020) ‘NATO at 70: Pledges, free riding, and benefit-burden concordance’, Defence and Peace Economics, 31(4), pp. 400–413. doi: 10.1080/10242694.2019.1640937.
  • 20. Lanoszka A. (2015) ‘Do allies really free ride?’, Survival, 57(3), pp. 133–152. doi: 10.1080/00396338.2015.1046229.
  • 21. Morgenthau H.J. (1985) Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace, 6th edn. New York, NY: Knopf.
  • 22. Olson M. and Zeckhauser R. (1966) ‘An economic theory of alliances’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 48(3), pp. 266–279. doi: 10.2307/1927082.
  • 23. Palaios P. and Papapetrou E. (2022) ‘Oil prices, labour market adjustment and dynamic quantile connectedness analysis: evidence from Greece during the crisis’, Journal of Economic Structures, 11(30). doi: 10.1186/s40008-022-00291-7.
  • 24. Palaios P. and Papapetrou E. (2023) ‘Redefining the nexus of military spending among southeast Mediterranean countries in the presence of nonlinearities’, Defence and Peace Economics, doi: 10.1080/10242694.2023.2241122.
  • 25. Palmer G. (1990) ‘Corralling the free rider: Deterrence and the western alliance’, International Studies Quarterly, 34(2), pp. 147–64. doi: 10.2307/2600706.
  • 26. Plümper T. and Neumayer E. (2015) ‘Free-riding in alliances: Testing an old theory with a new method’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 32(3), pp. 247–268. doi: 10.1177/0738894214522916.
  • 27. Sandler T. (1977) ‘Impurity of defense: An application to the economics of alliances’, Kyklos, 30(3), pp. 443–460. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1977.tb02203.x.
  • 28. Sandler T. (1993) ‘Tropical deforestation: Markets and market failures’, Land Economics, 69(3), pp. 225–233. doi: 10.2307/3146589.
  • 29. Sandler T. and Forbes J.F. (1980) ‘Burden sharing, strategy, and the design of NATO’, Economic Inquirer, 18(3), pp. 425–444. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1980.tb00588.x.
  • 30. Sandler T. and Hartley K. (1995) The economics of defense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 31. Sandler T. and Hartley K. (2001) ‘Economics of alliances: The lessons for collective action’, Journal of Economic Literature, 39(3), pp. 869–896. doi: 10.1257/jel.39.3.869.
  • 32. Sandler T. and Murdoch J. (1986) ‘The political economy of Scandinavian neutrality’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 88(4), pp. 583–603. doi: 10.2307/3440432.
  • 33. Skogstad K. (2016) ‘Defence budgets in the post-Cold War era: A spatial econometrics approach’, Defence and Peace Economics, 27(3), pp. 323–352. doi: 10.1080/10242694.2015.1034911.
  • 34. Sørensen G., Møller J. and Jackson R.H. (2022) Introduction to international relations: Theories and approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 35. Yesilyurt M.E. and Elhorst J.P. (2017) ‘Impacts of neighboring countries on military expenditures: A dynamic spatial panel approach’, Journal of Peace Research, 54(6), pp. 777–790. doi: 10.1177/00223433177075.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-4679c681-c1f0-4167-ae34-b3f8365f1bf3
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