Price-based coordinability in hierarchical systems with information asymmetry: a comparative analysis of Nash equilibrium conditions

• Autorzy: Karpowicz M. P. , Malinowski K.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The well-known problem of price-based coordinability is studied for the case of a multi-agent system in which information regarding the goals of the interacting subsystems is asymmetric. The paper illustrates how the uniform-price-based coordination rulet may create incentives to anticipate the values of coordination signals and, thus, why the coordinability condition cannot be satisfied under asymmetric information. For this purpose a comparison is given of Nash equilibrium outcomes that are reachable individually by priceanticipating agents in two noncooperative games. These games are induced by the uniform-price-based coordination mechanism and are referred to as payment-bidding auction and demand-bidding auction. The analysis presented shows that in the games considered some of the agents may improve payoffs and allocations by applying the price-anticipating bidding strategies. However, the payment-bidding auction cannot be strictly dominated by the demand-bidding action with respect to the resource allocation levels individually received by each agent. The derived results of theoretic considerations are illustrated by numerical examples.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Nash equilibrium, coordination asymmetric information; optimization

• Wydawca: Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Control and Cybernetics
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: Vol. 42, no. 1
• Strony: 85--110
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 42 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Karpowicz M. P.

• Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK) ul. Wąwozowa 18, 02-796 Warsaw, Poland
• Institute of Control and Computation Engineering Warsaw University of Technology ul. Nowowiejska 15/19, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland

autor

Malinowski K.

• Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK) ul. Wąwozowa 18, 02-796 Warsaw, Poland
• Institute of Control and Computation Engineering Warsaw University of Technology ul. Nowowiejska 15/19, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland

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