The probabilities of the transitions between the interlocking directorates’ states based on Markov chains

Siudak, Dariusz

doi:10.29119/1899-6116.2019.48.8

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Tytuł artykułu

The probabilities of the transitions between the interlocking directorates’ states based on Markov chains

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Siudak Dariusz

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DOI

10.29119/1899-6116.2019.48.8

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Abstrakty

The article analyzes the process of changes in the interlocking directorates network using Markov chains. The probabilities of company transitions between three specific states of networking, i.e. isolation, networking outside the largest component, and networking inside the largest component, were estimated. In addition, the average probabilities of transitions between states in the next 6 quarter periods, constant probabilities of transitions independent of the initial state of the process, and the expected time of return of the chain to individual states were estimated. Regardless of the initial state of networking of the enterprise, the highest probability was obtained for the process to be found in the state of connection with the largest component.

Słowa kluczowe

network strategy Markov Chain probability of transition estimated return time for Markov Chain

strategia sieciowa Łańcuch Markowa prawdopodobieństwo przejścia szacowany czas zwrotu dla łańcucha Markowa

Wydawca

Wydawnictwo Politechniki Śląskiej

Czasopismo

Organizacja i Zarządzanie : kwartalnik naukowy

Rocznik

2019

Tom

nr 4

Strony

103--120

Opis fizyczny

Bibliogr. 82 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Siudak Dariusz

dariusz.siudak@p.lodz.pl

Lodz University of Technology, Faculty of Management and Production Engineering

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa Nr 461252 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2020).

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Bibliografia

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bwmeta1.element.baztech-447bd07c-b55a-4846-9e79-8b91cfc034c4