Orders of criticality in voting games

• Autorzy: Dall'Aglio M. , Fragnelli V. , Moretti S.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5277/ord160204

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The authors focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, the classical notion of the criticality of players has been ex-tended, in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to collusion with other players.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

voting game; blackmailing power; semivalue

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: Vol. 26, No. 2
• Strony: 53--67
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 7 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Dall'Aglio M.

• LUISS University, Department of Economics and Finance, Viale Romania 32, 00197 Roma, Italy

autor

Fragnelli V.

• University of Eastern Piedmont, Department of Sciences and Innovative Technologies (DISIT), Viale T. Michel 11, 15121 Alessandria, Italy

autor

Moretti S.

• CNRS and Université Paris-Dauphine, UMR7243 LAMSADE, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France

Bibliografia

• [1] AUMANN R.J., MASCHLER M., The bargaining set for cooperative games, [in:] M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley, A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Advances in Game Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1964, 443.
• [2] BANZHAF J.F., Weighted voting doesn’t work. A mathematical analysis, Rutgers Law Review, 1965, 19, 317.
• [3] CHESSA M., FRAGNELLI V., The bargaining set for sharing the power, Annals of Operations Research, 2014, 215, 49.
• [4] DUBEY P., NEYMAN A., WEBER R.J., Value theory without efficiency, Mathematics of Operations Re-search, 1981, 6, 122.
• [5] FRAGNELLI V., OTTONE S., SATTANINO R., A new family of power indices for voting games, Homo Oeconomicus, 2009, 26, 381.
• [6] SHAPLEY L.S., A value for n-person games, [in:] H.W. Kuhn, A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1953, 307.
• [7] SHAPLEY L.S., SHUBIK M., A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system, American Political Science Review, 1954, 48, 787.

Uwagi

PL

Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.