Measurement of control power in corporate networks

• Autorzy: Stach Izabella , Mercik Jacek

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.37190/ord210106

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

corporate networks; indirect control; simple games; power indices

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: Vol. 31, No. 1
• Strony: 98--121
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 48 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Stach Izabella

• AGH University of Science and Technology, al. Mickiewicza 30, 30-059 Kraków, Poland

autor

Mercik Jacek

• WSB University in Wroclaw, ul. Fabryczna 29/31, 53-609 Wrocław, Poland

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa Nr 461252 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2021).